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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines contemporary American novelists whose depictions of 
how humans relate to the natural world challenge dominant Western cultural assumptions 
about human autonomy. My analysis centers on Marilynne Robinson, Louise Erdrich, and 
Richard Powers. Scholarship has largely understood these writers to be undertaking 
human-centered, social projects related to gender, ethnicity, and technology. However, in 
my reading, their works demonstrate how the formal elements of fiction—character and 
plot development, narrative voice and perspective, and recurring imagery—can be used to 
develop what I call a coextensive vision of the environment, one which shifts emphasis 
from the autonomous human self to a perception of how embodied individuals are 
embedded in larger networks and interchanges. In developing this claim, I suggest the 
environmental potential of the novel, a genre that has received short shrift in ecocriticism. 
Chapter One considers the novels of Marilynne Robinson, focusing on 
Housekeeping. Robinson’s nature imagery is highly metaphorical, but I argue that her 
writing also works on what we might call a material register: it persistently gestures toward 
an external world that resists enclosure through language, a natural world with which the 
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human body is entangled. Accordingly, I argue, Robinson’s work develops an ecological 
vision wherein humans are coextensive with the environment.  
Chapter Two centers on Louise Erdrich’s boundary imagery. I first explore the 
recurrence of imagery of harmful divisions across Erdrich’s whole body of work. This is, I 
contend, a pattern that Erdrich uses to critique radical individualism. I further argue that 
Erdrich draws on the traditional trickster of Anishinaabe storytelling to reinvigorate 
coextensive connections through pleasure and humor, generating a tribal kincentric ecology 
emphasizing reciprocity between interrelated beings. 
Chapter Three closes the project by reading Richard Powers, whose work offers a 
more frightening vision of what it means to be inseparable from nature compared with 
Robinson and Erdrich: in Gain, the primary link between humans and environment 
involves shared toxicity. I explore how Powers’s preferred two-stranded narrative structure 
develops the reader’s ecological awareness. However, I propose, Gain ultimately 
problematizes the ethical promise of interconnection, suggesting that knowledge of 
coextension spurs negative affect and disengagement.  
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INTRODUCTION 
We often forget that we are nature. Nature is not something separate from us.  
–Andy Goldsworthy 
Andy Goldsworthy uses natural materials including ice, stones, water, and branches 
to compose ephemeral works of art with the passage of time or a change in the weather. In 
the 2001 documentary about Goldsworthy’s work, Rivers and Tides, the camera lingers 
hypnotically on images of ice and sunsets and tides as Goldsworthy describes his artistic  
goals.1 Midway through the documentary our serene fascination is suddenly interrupted by 
an arresting image: a fat drop of thick red liquid splashes heavily onto stone. 
 
The shot cuts away to a man’s workworn hands grinding a reddish stone into 
pigment, and the viewer realizes that the red splash was not Goldsworthy’s blood, but 
homemade red paint. Subsequent footage shows Goldsworthy throwing red powder into 
bodies of water. We witness more and more pigment being placed in the water, moving 
                                                     
1 Andy Goldsworthy: Rivers and Tides—Working With Time, directed by Thomas Riedelsheimer 
(Docurama, 2001), film. 
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downstream, and eventually passing through an opening in the rocks. The camera lingers 
on a small waterfall that grows disconcertingly crimson.  
 
One way to interpret this project is as commentary about the earth’s suffering, 
made comprehensible to the viewer because of the visual analogy between the human body 
and rivers and streams. Art critic Stephen Holden, for instance, proposes that the work 
represents “a beautiful but disturbing image of the earth bleeding,” and relates it to 
Goldsworthy’s larger project of exposing the profound negative effects that humans can 
have on a landscape.2 In this view, Goldsworthy’s work relies on the tendency to project a 
human image onto nature. Seeing the resemblance of the crimson stream to an open vein 
in a human body, we react with discomfort and anxiety—and perhaps, then, we identify with 
the suffering of the mistreated, overburdened earth.  
                                                     
2 “Treasuring the Shifting Sands of Art,” Review of Andy Goldsworthy: Rivers and Tides—Working 
With Time, directed by Thomas Riedelsheimer. New York Times, Jan 2, 2003, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/02/movies/film-review-treasuring-the-shifting-sands-of-art.html. 
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An alternative reading is more persuasive, however. Rather than a statement about 
victimization, Goldsworthy’s work addresses what might be called our shared vitality—and 
the statement draws its power from the literal, material connections between human bodies 
and the natural world. When Goldsworthy describes what drives him to undertake the 
laborious process of grinding the rocks into red powder, he hints that the river-as-vein 
analogy is an incomplete explanation of this work’s meaning: 
The reason why the stone is red is because of its iron content. And 
that’s also the reason why our blood is red, too. I do feel that there is a 
special energy about the red, and it’s probably its relationship to 
blood…There’s such an energy and violence about that color. I am in a 
continuous pursuit of the red.  
What Goldsworthy is working with, in other words, is not a chance way in which nature 
resembles the human body—rather, blood and earth resemble each other because they 
participate in the same flows and exchanges of matter. One is not like the other; they are 
physically, chemically, the same. The “special energy” of the color red emerges from the 
shared material basis for the tint. The iron content of the rocks and of our blood explains 
their common hue.  
This commonality is an indication of shared origins: iron was originally created by 
the nuclear fusion process that made stars, which exploded to form the Earth itself and 
eventually to comprise the matter of our bodies.  The connection is also ongoing, as 
Goldsworthy’s images of “energy” and the “continuous” nature of red imply, and which the 
river’s movement also embodies when it spreads the red color into new regions. Humans 
require the continual influx of iron, which we acquire by ingesting the flesh of animals or 
plants, flesh which is iron-rich because it has absorbed iron from the soil. Our blood is red 
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because it contains the organic matter of the earth. In this way, Goldsworthy’s project goes 
beyond analogy, representing the human-nature relationship in terms of corporeal 
connections.  
I begin with this discussion of Goldsworthy’s project because it encapsulates the 
central idea with which this dissertation is concerned: the inescapable, and inescapably 
embodied, entanglement of humans and nonhuman nature. Goldsworthy’s red river 
reminds us that, to borrow Harold Fromm’s words, “the environment runs right through” 
the human “in endless waves.”3 Humans might impose themselves on the earth, but the 
earth with which they interact is likewise always imposing itself upon them. In this 
dissertation, I locate in contemporary literature a parallel interest to Goldsworthy’s: 
representing the human relationship with the natural world in terms of interconnection. 
This form of interconnection might be understood in spiritual or psychological terms, but 
is always also material. 
To forward this suggestion, I closely examine the work of three prominent 
contemporary writers of fiction—Marilynne Robinson, Louise Erdrich, and Richard 
Powers. Over the last thirty years, these authors have all produced major novels that 
persistently feature physical intersections between humans and animals, humans and 
plants, and even humans and the elements—air, water, soil—which complicate and revise 
our sense of the separation of supposedly discrete entities. Moreover, as I understand 
them, these authors are not only suggesting something about the relationships between 
human beings and the non-human natural world. They are also making an implicit claim 
                                                     
3 “The ‘Environment’ Is Us,” in The Nature of Being Human: From Environmentalism to 
Consciousness (Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 95. 
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about the importance of narrative to our understanding of these relationships. As we have 
seen, Goldsworthy’s verbal discussion of his work augments our insights into the meaning 
of his project: without his words, audiences may not grasp the full import of the pigment. 
The authors addressed in this dissertation recognize, in effect, what narrative storytelling 
can offer for those who seek to convey the inseparability of the human from the more-than-
human world. 
Consider, for instance, one of the most vivid scenes in Erdrich’s Tracks, the story 
of Eli Kashpaw’s desperate hunt for food, a process through which the divisions between 
the bodies of two species—human and moose—become blurred. When Eli kills the moose, 
the passage’s imagery draws increasingly intimate intersections between Eli and the moose’s 
body. Eli is depicted as being engrossed, drawn in by the moose’s flesh—“The warmth of 
the carcass dizzie[s] him”—and then melding with the animal physically as he “carefully 
remove[s] the liver, slice[s] off a bit” to eat.4 Eli affixes the butchered animal’s body to 
himself, and the passage’s verbs develop an increasing enmeshment between the two beings 
as the moose is “secured,” “fitted,” “knotted” “bound” and “wrapped” to Eli’s flesh (103). 
The imagery of attachment complements the imagery of ingestion; both underscore that 
human existence is predicated on animal lives. As easy physical distinctions are erased, so 
too are the typical distinctions in terms of hierarchy and control. While the passage 
develops its rhetoric of intimate bodily blending, it also obscures whether Eli is co-opting 
the animal’s vigor or whether the moose is remaking itself through Eli. Initially, the human 
is the agent in this negotiation—Eli “presse[s] to himself a new body”—but soon the moose 
                                                     
4 Tracks (New York: Harper Perennial, 1988), 103. Subsequent citations will appear within the text. 
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seems almost to exert itself: “The meat [stands] on its own in pieces, a moose transformed 
into the mold of Eli, an armor that would fit no other” (103-104). The moose, rather than 
being dominated or destroyed, is characterized with agency and force, further undermining 
the typical distinctions between the human and nonhuman animal.  
The moose hunt is one of a myriad of instances in which the texts of my 
dissertation depict the boundary between the human and more-than-human nature as an 
unstable—even unlocatable—margin. Similar constructions appear in Powers’s Gain, in 
which a cancer diagnosis spurs the protagonist’s acute awareness of environmental toxins 
that penetrate her body; and in Robinson’s Housekeeping, which repeatedly depicts the 
blending of human bodies with natural elements. Housekeeping’s protagonist Ruth 
explains a night in the woods by saying, “I simply let the darkness in the sky become 
coextensive with the darkness in my skull and bowels and bones.”5  
It is this word, “coextensive,” that I adopt to describe the specific model of 
interconnection developed by the authors examined in my dissertation. “Coextensive” 
suggests shared reality and overlapping limits, but not total unity—akin to the shifting but 
never completely dissolved borders between Eli and the moose. In other words, 
representations of coextensive relationality are probing what ecocritic Cheryl Lousley calls 
the critical position “in between a defensive shoring up of boundaries…and their complete 
repudiation in an immersive blending of self and environment.”6 I choose the term 
“coextensive” to characterize this position also because of its “co” prefix; the term implies 
                                                     
5 Marilynne Robinson, Housekeeping (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1980), 115. 
Subsequent citations will appear in the text.  
6 “Ecocriticism and the Politics of Representation,” in The Oxford Handbook of Ecocriticism, 
edited by Greg Garrard (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 166. 
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that both humans and nonhumans are lively participants in this relationship. The stories 
considered in this dissertation develop this idea of mutual constitution between active 
entities; even if human and nonhuman forms of agency are not precisely the same, both 
exert an undeniable influence on the other.  
As I read coextensive relationships across these texts, my first goal is to develop 
new readings of authors who are generally considered to be undertaking highly social 
projects: novels about gender or ethnicity or technology. Robinson, Erdrich, and Powers 
are vastly different writers, but one common thread between them is the way that existing 
criticism tends to treat their nature imagery in symbolic or metaphorical terms. In this view, 
nature is not really a subject in itself, but a blank screen onto which the real story is 
projected. Such readings implicitly think about nature and culture as dualistic realms: 
nature as fodder for the human mind, which is the foundation of culture. By contrast, I 
propose the possibility and the productiveness of taking nature seriously, as a subject and a 
matter of concern, even in character-driven texts with evident social themes.  
A second, complementary, goal is to use my close readings to comment on 
ecocriticism itself. As the above discussion of Goldsworthy’s voice-over narration suggests, I 
want to argue for the environmental relevance of the novel, a genre that has received 
relatively short shrift in ecocriticism.7 I explore how Robinson, Erdrich, and Powers use the 
formal strengths of long fiction–elements such as free indirect discourse; plot development 
                                                     
7 A few recent publications have begun to address ecocriticism’s neglect of fiction as an aesthetic 
form. See Hupert Zapf’s Literature as Cultural Ecology: Sustainable Texts (London: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2016) and Astrid Bracke’s “The Contemporary English Novel and its Challenges to 
Ecocriticism” in The Oxford Handbook of Ecocriticism (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 423-439. 
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and characterization; thick description; narrative voice and perspective; and especially, 
motifs that evolve and build across multiple passages–to represent the unstable boundaries 
between the human and the environment and to characterize the coextensive vision of the 
relationship between humans and nature that emerges from them. In so doing, I counter 
impulses within ecocriticism that have led to the lack of emphasis on fiction, and especially 
on the novel. 
I. Embodiment/Disembodiment in American Culture and Literary Theory 
The trope of coextensive bodies should be understood in relation to a specific 
historical and cultural context. Its manifestation in these texts takes on a particular 
significance in the contemporary moment’s social and environmental conditions. Claims 
about the de-materialization of our lives have become sufficiently commonplace as to be 
clichéd. The abstraction that is associated with technology is a particularly common refrain. 
My Facebook feed is, ironically, filled with articles worrying about how embodied, face-to-
face relationships are being replaced by online networks of relatively superficial 
connections. Philosopher David Abram calls the digital revolution one example of “our 
ever-expanding engagement with worlds hidden behind, beyond, or beneath the space in 
which we are corporeally immersed.”8 In Abram’s view, Facebook is merely a symptom of 
a broader ailment: what Abram calls the “age-old disparagement of sensorial reality.” There 
is good reason to be skeptical about the generalization that our historical trajectory since 
                                                     
8 Abram, “Earth in Eclipse: an Essay on the Philosophy of Science and Ethics” in Merleau-Ponty 
and Environmental Philosophy: Dwelling on the Landscapes of Thought, edited by Suzanne L. 
Cataldi and William S. Hamrick (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2007), 152. 
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the Enlightenment has progressed uncomplicatedly from sensuous engagement with nature 
toward abstracted detachment. Certainly within literary history, there is evidence to the 
contrary: in what, for instance, M. H. Abrams famously referred to a “Natural 
Supernaturalism,” or the “Romantic animism” that Stanley Cavell locates in Wordsworth 
and Coleridge, we find something very different from the disenchantment and 
“disparagement” of the material world that Abram speaks about.9 Nonetheless, there might 
be something to the complaint that our contemporary treatment of matter is generally 
“shabby,” as Stacy Alaimo puts it.10 Every day I see supporting evidence for the claim that 
our dominant cultural conception of nature is impoverished: signs advertising the sale of 
“empty land,” “undeveloped lots,” or “fully improved lots” (meaning that curbs or 
telephone lines or similar utilities have been installed) bluntly efface the vitality and 
complexity of the physical landscape. 
When it comes to recognizing how our bodies physically relate to the environment, 
we hardly do any better. We live in a culture and era that often neglects or renders invisible 
the co-implication of human bodies and the natural world. Globalization and our modes of 
production mean that we buy items with little sense as to where they come from and how 
they are related to the raw stuff of the earth. More than ever, meat and other foods appear 
in convenient packages, trash and waste are rapidly whisked from common view, and 
disease and death are relegated to the nursing home and the hospital. Moreover, our era’s 
                                                     
9 See Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature (New 
York: Norton, 1973) and Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism 
(University of Chicago Press, 1988), 45. 
10 Alaimo, Bodily Natures: Science, Environment, and the Material Self (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2010), 1. Subsequent citations will appear within the text.  
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central environmental issue, climate change, takes the form of what Rob Nixon has termed 
“slow violence,” an “incremental and accretive” destruction that often occurs “gradually” or 
“out of sight.”11 Perhaps, then, even to sympathetic audiences who might be critical of 
characterizing undeveloped land as empty, “the environment” itself, as a concept, feels 
increasingly abstracted and remote. 
Contemporary trends in academic theory evince similarly dematerializing 
inclinations. The linguistic turn has tended to treat the physical realm—bodies and matter—
as profoundly discursive constructions. More radical proponents of social constructivism 
deny there is an extra-discursive reality at all, or simply dismiss it as beyond our concern. 
How ecocriticism ought to relate to the constructivism of poststructuralist theory has always 
been a point of contention and debate. Some early ecocritics did view nature as a purely 
cultural product, and were dubbed “nature skeptics” by Kate Soper.12 But most tended to 
eye such views with a certain wariness; some simply declared ecocriticism anti-theoretical, 
while others produced more measured responses. In one well-known example, Lawrence 
Buell attempted to find a middle way between naïve realism and radical poststructuralism, 
arguing for a critical practice that “operate[s] from a premise of bidirectionality, imagining 
texts as gesturing outward toward the material world notwithstanding their constitution as 
linguistic, ideological, cultural, artifacts.”13 But as ecocriticism has become increasingly 
theoretical—engaging especially with poststructuralism, deconstruction, and queer studies—
                                                     
11 Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2011), 2. 
12 See Soper,What is Nature? (Blackwell: Oxford, 1995).  
13 “The Ecocritical Insurgency,” New Literary History 30, no. 3 (Summer 1999): 705, 
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.bu.edu/stable/20057562. 
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skepticism about mimesis has been augmented rather than dispelled. In 2003, Dana 
Phillips argued that ecocriticism is fatally flawed in its belief that literature can meaningfully 
represent the natural world, much less successfully represent the world in terms that make 
ethical claims on the reader.14 In the end, his critique of ecocriticism is so unstinting that it 
skirts close to being a rejection of the entire practice. Other critics share Phillips’s concerns 
about the problems of environmental representation without coming to the same dead end. 
For instance, Catriona Sandilands suggests that the best environmental writing will use 
reiterative, performative gestures to make visible its incapacity to represent the world.15 
Representations gain “transgressive” power when they serve as “mimetic disruption[s]” that 
“highlight the failure of the Symbolic to capture reality” (106). 
An even more acute distrust of affirmative representation appears in the work of 
Timothy Morton, who has been called “probably the most influential theorist of 
ecocriticism today.”16 According to Morton, environmental rhetoric has typically been 
naively realistic, “feigning one-to-one correspondences between language and reality.”17 
Morton suggests that ecocriticism, remade as “dark ecology,” should focus on how literary 
works deny us access to a realistic vision of nature, thus deconstructing the whole notion of 
                                                     
14 Phillips, The Truth of Ecology: Nature, Culture, and Literature in America (Oxford, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003). 
15 See Sandilands, The Good-Natured Feminist: Ecofeminism and the Quest for Democracy 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999): 106.  
16 Greg Garrard, Introduction to The Oxford Handbook of Ecocriticism (Oxford University Press, 
2014): 14. 
17 Morton, The Ecological Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010): 16. 
Subsequent citations will appear within the text. 
  
12
nature.18 It would seem that the deconstructive approach to nature writing that Morton 
espouses would most value texts that visibly de-compose language, and indeed, Morton’s 
work favors the “environmental ambience” of “blank space” and “silence,” as well as the 
“recursivity” of poetry that “‘mention[s]’ rather than ‘use[s]’ language.”19 Morton and others 
espousing similar views have injected ecocriticism with needed energy and theoretical 
insight, but taken to an extreme, their logic suggests that a blank page should be considered 
superior ecological writing when compared with, say, Annie Dillard. 
Against claims about the dematerialization of contemporary life—and theoretical 
approaches that may support those claims—what I’ll be calling coextensive bodies and 
nature insists on our continued materiality. Through the works’ shared trope of 
overlapping boundaries between human bodies and the complex environment in which 
they live, the literature of my dissertation wants to insist that the physical world persists and 
we continue to be co-created within it. The works of my dissertation aim to dispute the 
perception of a de-materialized, de-naturalized world, serving as literary interventions 
making visible the undeniable materiality of our existence and the inescapable relationship 
of our bodies with the environment.  
In order to make this point, I take inspiration from a line of thought which attempts 
to develop what we might call embodied perspectives. Ecocriticism has longed wrestled 
with Cartesian dualism, the philosophical tradition that defines man against nature and 
mind against body. Ecofeminist philosopher Val Plumwood identifies the dualistic splits of 
                                                     
18 Morton, Ecology Without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2007), 142. Subsequent citations will appear within the text. 
19 Morton, “Ecology as Text, Text as Ecology,” The Oxford Literary Review 32, no. 1 (2010): 11. 
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mind from body, reason from emotion, and man from nature, as the most important 
impediments to a legitimate environmental culture; and similarly, David Abram draws on 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology to advocate for reawakening our bodily perceptions of 
nature.20 Critical theorists Bruno Latour and Donna Haraway, influenced by Alfred North 
Whitehead’s process metaphysics, have both have endeavored to delineate nondualist 
positions. Latour’s explorations take the form of “actor network theory” that grants human 
and nonhuman “actants” equal amounts of agency within networks of influence, and later, 
what he calls a “stubbornly realist approach” (a lá William James) that eschews “the 
irrelevant difference between what is constructed and what is not constructed” and 
considers instead “the crucial difference between what is well or badly constructed.”21 
Haraway speaks in terms of “naturecultures” that are simultaneously material and 
discursive.22 Her studies of the cyborg as a material representation of the inadequacy of the 
nature/culture divide have been particularly influential in queer studies and posthumanism, 
but her work on companion animals—especially her use of the figure of the animal as a 
corporeal being with a living presence, not just a symbol to theorize from—has perhaps 
even more resonance with my own project.23 
                                                     
20 See Plumwood, Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason (London; New York: 
Routledge, 2002) and Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-
Than-Human World (New York: Pantheon Books, 1996). 
21 For Latour’s actor network theory see especially Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to 
Actor-Network-Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); for Latour’s discussion of his 
realist approach, see “An Attempt at a Compositionist Manifesto,” New Literary History: A Journal 
of Theory and Interpretation 41, no. 3 (2010): 474. 
22 See Haraway, The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness 
(Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2003). 
23 For discussion of the cyborg, see Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of 
Nature (New York: Routledge, 1991).  
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Such efforts to grapple with dualism have in recent years resulted, in literary and 
cultural theory, in a body of scholarship termed New Materialism, which has attempted to 
refine our accounts of how humans might begin to perceive themselves as embedded in 
larger material processes. Physicist and cultural theorist Karen Barad, for instance, insists 
that “Matter is not little bits of nature, or a blank slate, surface, or site passively awaiting 
signification…matter is substance in its intra-active becoming—not a thing, but a doing, a 
congealing of agency.”24 Accordingly, she proposes that we need to consider matter in terms 
of “intra-action”—a method of performative co-constitution between agents in which neither 
agent exists prior to or independently of the other. Barad’s is an attempt to make us rethink 
our assumptions about agency and the limits of the self. Similar efforts to do so culminate 
in Jane Bennett’s “vibrant materiality,” Vicki Kirby’s “telling flesh,” and Wendy Wheeler’s 
account of selfhood-in-system.25 These formulations that all share Barad’s concern with 
depicting matter as agential, active, and radically interactive with human bodies. 
The New Materialist voice from whom I’ve taken the keenest inspiration is that of 
Alaimo, who is, of the names I’ve mentioned, the most directly engaged with ecocritical 
and activist interlocutors. In Bodily Natures, Alaimo analyzes trans-corporeality, “material 
interconnections between the human and more-than-human world” (2). Studying these 
connections reveals that, as she puts it, “‘the environment’ is not located somewhere out 
there, but is always the very substance of ourselves” (2). In this project, I relate her 
                                                     
24 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and 
Meaning (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 151. 
25 See Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), Vicky Kirby, 
Telling Flesh: The Substance of the Corporeal (New York, London: Routledge, 1997), Wendy 
Wheeler, The Whole Creature: Complexity, Biosemiotics and the Evolution of Culture (London: 
Lawrence and Wishar, 2015). 
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provocative notion that “thinking across bodies may catalyze the recognition that the 
environment, which is too often imagined as inert, empty space or as a resource for human 
use, is, in fact, a world of fleshy beings with their own needs, claims, and actions” in a more 
sustained way to contemporary literature (2). For I find a parallel desire to think across 
bodies in the contemporary American fiction I will read in my dissertation: the texts I read 
make the all-too-often invisible or “inert, empty space” of the physical world into a world of 
embodied, vividly alive beings.  
Through the works’ shared trope of blurred boundaries and overlapping materiality 
between human bodies and the complex environment in which they live, the literature of 
my dissertation participates in what Donna Haraway suggests is the challenge for Western 
culture, finding a “system of figures to describe an encounter in knowledge that refuses the 
active/passive binary which is overwhelmingly the discursive tradition that Western folks 
have inherited…”26 Haraway says that theorists need to replace narratives of domination 
with “a story of relationality” that “keep[s] the tension [of Nature in relation to us] 
foregrounded” and demonstrates that “Nature in relation to us is neither ‘he,’ ‘she,’ ‘it,’ 
‘they,’ ‘we,’ ‘you,’ ‘thou’…and it’s certainly not ‘it’” (10). In this dissertation, I explore how 
writers of fiction are pursuing the same project.  
Haraway and Alaimo are writing critical theory, not literary criticism; they do 
consider how select literary representations might relate to their ideas, but the examples 
they use are mostly drawn from two genres: science fiction/fantasy and memoir. Their 
work, then, calls out for extension into other areas, for if we avoid (more or less) realistic 
                                                     
26 “Interview with Donna Haraway” (In Technoculture, edited by Constance Penley and Andrew 
Ross, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 3.  
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narratives, which delve into human psychologies and social relationships, in favor of 
seemingly less “human-centered” work, we risk reinforcing the very dualism that has been 
deemed problematic. By considering how writers use the formal attributes of fiction to 
attempt what Haraway calls for, replacing a Western tradition of dominance with stories 
about relationality–and indeed, by showing how they do so by developing forms of trans-
corporeality—I also speak back to an anti-mimetic impulse in ecocriticism disparaging art 
that “simulates immediacy” or attempts to “convincingly…render” the natural world (The 
Ecological Thought 16; Ecology Without Nature 30). In analyzing how the narrative 
techniques of Robinson, Erdrich, and Powers develop coextensive humans and 
environments, I seek to expand our critical views on what kind of art can challenge the cut 
that severs humans from nature. 
Reading Robinson, Erdrich, and Powers in light of Alaimo and Haraway is not, 
however, a way of saying that what these writers achieve can be understood in utopian 
terms, nor as a simple transfer of theoretical terminologies into fictional narrative. As I’ll be 
arguing, even as they underline the importance of understanding how deeply the human is 
enmeshed in the more-than-human world, these authors all, to varying degrees, 
acknowledge the barriers to a coextensive awareness, the dangers inherent in revising our 
sense of self, and the gap between ecological awareness and action. Indeed, the texts I 
examine underscore how the affects and the ethics inspired by ecological insight are 
unpredictable. In some instances recognizing that nature is as close as our own skin, bones, 
and blood inspires pleasure and care, as in the work of Erdrich; at other times, the bond is 
a source of both solace and danger, as in Robinson’s Housekeeping; at times it inspires 
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terror or even alienation from self and environment; as in Powers’s Gain. The tensions that 
these texts make visible about the impact of coextensive awareness is one reason I have 
selected to analyze these particular authors. The distinctions between them dramatize that 
while revising our sense of separation from nature has ethical potential, it does not in itself 
comprise an adequate ethical response to environmental degradation; moreover, as 
Chapter Three in particular explores, a change in consciousness does not necessarily 
translate to efficacious action.  
In emphasizing the range of conflicting responses to ecological awareness, the 
novels here, as I read them, represent a challenge to environmental views influenced by 
deep ecology, which have tended to represent ecological consciousness as fundamentally, 
even automatically, ethical. They also complement and perhaps even augment the more 
nuanced view of the relationship between trans-corporeality and ethics proposed by New 
Materialists. While Alaimo, for instance, concedes that trans-corporeality means 
“acknowledging…unpredictable and unwanted actions of human bodies, nonhuman 
creatures, ecological systems, chemical agents,” she ultimately spends much more time 
exploring how trans-corporeality engenders “concern and wonder” rather than, say, the 
many instances of dread, fear, and disengagement that one finds in the novels I’m 
discussing here (BN 2). In our understandable eagerness to locate a superior alternative 
construction of subjectivity compared with a dominating, autonomous individual, these 
texts suggest that we shouldn’t efface the ease with which the potential of trans-corporeality 
can collapse. The recognition of one’s openness can instigate paranoia and defensive 
attempts at self-protection (what Catriona Sandilands terms “skin vigilance”) or even, by 
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overwhelming us with a sense of the risks to which we are subject, spur apathy.27 
Accordingly, this project argues for coextensive representations of nature as a promising 
eco-literary trope, but it also evinces a measure of skepticism about the sufficiency of an 
ethics of coextensive awareness.  
II. Chapter Summaries 
My first chapter centers on Marilynne Robinson’s novel Housekeeping, with quick 
glances at a few of Robinson’s other novels. While critics read Robinson’s nature imagery 
in highly symbolic terms—as an extension of protagonist Ruth’s psychology—I argue that the 
novel alternates between two modes: a highly discursive style in which nature motifs are 
metaphorical, versus what we might call a material register, which persistently complicates 
the discursive mode to gesture toward the external natural world. In the second mode, the 
human body is depicted as inexorably intertwined with the physical environment, and 
human subjectivity becomes not a safe, bounded site from which to master the world, but a 
continually emergent position always connected with the mysterious agencies of water, 
earth, and air. Having argued for the ecological relevance of Housekeeping’s rhetoric, I 
close the chapter by suggesting how Robinson’s style might serve as a counter-example to 
critiques that denigrate eco-mimesis. 
The second chapter reads Louise Erdrich’s boundary imagery. While criticism has 
primarily explored how images of carved-up land in a handful of Erdrich novels reflect 
Erdrich’s critique of American property laws, I propose that this imagery is in fact part of a 
                                                     
27 Sandilands, “Eco Homo: Queering the Ecological Body Politic,” Social Philosophy Today 19 
(2004), 20. 
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larger network of harmful divisions—boundaries severing humans from each other and 
from nonhuman beings—that exists across Erdrich’s whole body of work. In developing this 
pattern of boundary imagery, I contend, Erdrich reveals that her larger consideration is not 
just land laws themselves but the larger, still-dominant cultural ideology that motivated and 
justified those policies: radical individualism. I further argue that Erdrich draws on the 
traditional trickster of Anishinaabe storytelling to oppose an ideology of autonomy and 
reinvigorate a “kincentric ecology” emphasizing reciprocity between interrelated, non-
hierarchical beings.28 Focusing on how pleasure and humor assist characters in crossing 
boundaries and reinvigorating linkages to both human and nonhuman others, I suggest the 
shortcoming of critical views that understand Erdrich’s plotlines and characters in terms of 
mourning and voicelessness. Moreover, I propose that a form of new materialism was 
already embodied in what Erdrich calls “a tribal view” of the world.29 
In the last chapter, I turn to the work of Richard Powers. In his novel Gain, images 
of the human body’s intersections with the world proliferate, as in the work of Robinson 
and Erdrich. But in place of the expansive relationality we have seen in their work, Powers’ 
connections offer a much more frightening vision of what it means to be inseparable from 
our environment: in this novel, the primary link between human and nonhuman involves 
shared toxicity. I explore how cancer catalyzes protagonist Laura’s awareness of her body’s 
permeability—and further, how the narrative might spur readers to acknowledge their own 
                                                     
28 See Enrique Salmón, “Kincentric Ecology: Indigenous Perceptions of the Human-Nature 
Relationship,” 
Ecological Applications 10, no. 5 (October 2000): 1327-1332. 
29 Erdrich, “Where I Ought to Be: A Writer’s Sense of Place,” New York Times, July 28, 1985, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1985/07/28/books/where-i-ought-to-be-a-writer-s-sense-of-
place.html?pagewanted=all. 
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bodily vulnerability, as the omniscient narration augments and extends Laura’s perspective 
with a larger sense of the historical and institutional forces that have made Laura 
vulnerable. However, as I suggest in the second part of the chapter, even as Gain’s toxic 
discourse attempts to convince us of the dangers of ignorance, Gain also implicitly raises 
serious questions about the value of ecological insight. Laura’s new attunement to how her 
body is coextensive with the dangerous byproducts of corporate capitalism produces 
suffering, paranoia, and ultimately, resignation. Accordingly, the novel crystallizes a 
problem with which ecocriticism will continue to grapple: while an awareness of 
interconnectedness contains ethical potential, tracing how that potential can be realized is 
an exceptionally difficult task.  
*** 
When Goldsworthy states that he is in a “continuous pursuit of…red,” he gestures 
toward the complex motivations that drive his art. Red is fascinating for its figurative 
interest; its “energy” and “violence.” But as he explains, energy and violence—the way that 
red is read—are not arbitrary projections of humankind: they are built upon a literal, 
physical connection between human and environment. Given this message, the tactile form 
of Goldsworthy’s art seems ideal: he is creating a very embodied kind of art, making it with 
his hands, and producing something that you can reach out and touch—at least temporarily. 
His pieces are designed to be vulnerable to nature’s ebbs and flows, and as the artworks 
wash away or dissolve, their destruction comments on our own vulnerability, our own 
participation in these cycles.  
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Robinson, Erdrich, and Powers too are interested in the tension between nature’s 
figurative and literal dimensions, and they too comment on relationality and co-implication 
between humans and nonhuman nature. The way their stories can develop this theme, 
however, differs significantly from Goldsworthy. All three, in their own distinct ways, make 
brilliant use of the formal strengths of long fiction: plot development and character 
development, both individually and through networks of relations across generations and 
species; extended imagery and evolving rhetoric; stylistic aspects of narration including free 
indirect discourse and authorial irony. Taken together, these attributes offer something 
quite different from Goldsworthy’s visual statement about the environment. Instead of 
spontaneity, fiction offers us is time—the time to explore how people mature, how things 
come to be the way they are, how the environment itself transforms, how points of view 
diverge and coalesce—and therefore complexity, nuance, and depth. In this way, long 
fiction offers its own kind of ecocritical appeal. 
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CHAPTER ONE     
‘Our Mingled Nature’: Marilynne Robinson’s Environmental Fictions 
“…even as our capacity to describe the fabric of reality and the dimensions of it has 
undergone an astonishing deepening and expansion, we have turned away from the ancient 
intuition that we are a part of it at all. What such a recognition might imply…is difficult to 
say, but the strange ways of quarks and photons might enlarge our sense of the mysterious 
nature of our own existence.” 
--Marilynne Robinson, Absence of Mind 
In the spring of 1993, Marilynne Robinson sat overlooking the windswept south 
shore of Wisconsin’s Lake Mendota as she engaged in a lively discussion with 
contemporary literature scholar Thomas Schaub. Their conversation touched on what 
motivated her to write her controversial exposé Mother Country, in which she alleges that 
nuclear contamination has occurred off the coast of England.  Asked about her interest in 
advocacy, Robinson flatly declared, “There is no environmental group whose methods or 
priorities I consider useful. Zero. Right across the board.”30 
Robinson’s emphatic critique of the approaches of environmentalist groups raises 
the question of whether her fictional works, filled as they are with nature imagery, 
undertake their own distinct environmental project. It is with this question in mind that 
Professor Schaub followed up by asking whether Robinson’s “concern for nature” informs 
her novels. Robinson’s answer is both revealing and perplexing: 
I don’t even know how to describe what I think of the natural world 
as being. Lines from Gerard Manley Hopkins occur, or not even—I’m more 
radical than that…It seems to me a blasphemy, an atrocious crime of the 
most cosmic proportions what has been done…The world expresses the 
                                                     
30 Marilynne Robinson and Thomas Schaub, “An Interview with Marilynne Robinson,” 
Contemporary Literature 35, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 248. 
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ultimate—I don’t know what to say, but we’re undoing it. It’s 
phenomenal…if you’re contaminating the sea, which is the source of most 
of the oxygen in the atmosphere and the base of the food chain, you’re 
unknitting the whole system; there’s no place where this destruction is 
limited or ends.31 
Faced with the subject of the natural world’s place in fiction and in life, Robinson’s mastery 
of language suddenly falls short: “the world expresses the ultimate—I don’t know what to 
say,” she concedes. Trying to verbalize how she conceives of nature, she breaks off into 
temporary silence and then into passionate invective against how humans are destroying the 
environment. Yet when asked whether she would “write a novel about this,” Robinson 
declares, “No, I would not write a novel about this.”32 
Current criticism seems to bolster Robinson’s self-assessment; while scholarship on 
Robinson’s fiction does note her pervasive use of nature imagery, it has typically taken that 
imagery to signify anything but the natural world.33  Even Housekeeping, the novel most 
filled with descriptions of natural places, has largely been critiqued using psychoanalytic or 
feminist methodologies that treat the environment as “mere background,” to borrow a 
phrase from Stacy Alaimo.34 Martha Ravits’s study of Housekeeping, for instance, is 
emblematic in that it reads the book’s natural elements as projections of a character’s 
personality and past trauma, or the social memory and social norms with which the 
                                                     
31 Robinson and Schaub, “An Interview,” 249. 
32 Robinson and Schaub, “An Interview,” 250. 
33 Particularly relevant additional examples include Christine Caver, “Nothing Left to Lose: 
Housekeeping’s Strange Freedoms,” American Literature 68, no. 1 (March 1996): 111-137; 
Heather Bohannan, “Questioning Tradition: Spiritual Transformation Images in Women’s 
Narratives and Housekeeping by Marilynne Robinson,” Western Folklore 51, no. 1 (January 
1992): 65-79; and Thomas Foster’s “History, Critical Theory, and Women’s Social Practices: 
‘Women’s Time’ and Housekeeping,” Signs 14, no. 1 (Autumn 1998): 73-99.  
34 Alaimo, Bodily Natures: Science, Environment, and the Material Self (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2010), 2.  
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characters grapple.35 Ravits posits that the trees and lakes of the book function as “symbolic 
representations” of psychological states: nature is a “screen” upon which something human, 
such as protagonist and narrator Ruth’s fear of abandonment, is “projected.”36  In this 
account, the hills and valleys with which Ruth becomes intimate are a placeholder for the 
true story—that of Ruth’s psychology and gender identity. Undoubtedly, Robinson uses 
nature imagery to metaphorize characters’ inner states, not just in Housekeeping but also 
across her whole body of work. However, I dispute the inference that for Robinson nature 
is figured as only a useful source for metaphors, and that her fiction is not concerned with 
nature as such. Despite Robinson’s insistence that she would never write fictional stories 
about the environment, it is my contention that she already has.  
In fact, despite Robinson’s denial, her fiction consistently reflects her valuation of 
the environment—we might think here of John Ames’s meditative reflections on the world’s 
patterns in Gilead, or Lila’s gratitude for the passing of seasons in Lila. But it is 
Housekeeping that most fully explores the natural world, through developing the persona 
of Ruth Stone. Through Ruth’s narrative vision, the novel characterizes nature in highly 
imaginative terms that reveal the “puzzling margins” between humans and environment, as 
                                                     
35 Ravits, “Extending the American Range: Marilynne Robinson’s Housekeeping,” American 
Literature 61, no. 4 (1989): 650.  
36 Ravits’s language here is strikingly similar to Lawrence Buell’s paraphrase of Leo Marx’s The 
Machine in the Garden. Buell says that according to Marx, “Thoreau was not really that interested 
in nature as such; nature was a screen for something else” (The Environmental Imagination 
[Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1995], 11). Buell’s book contradicts 
Marx’s view, arguing that while “one must acknowledge that reported contacts with particular 
settings are intertextually, intersocially constructed,” one must also recognize that “the nonbuilt 
environment is one of the variables that influence culture, text, and personality” (13).  
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Ruth’s language repeatedly complicates neat divisions between the two.37 This phenomenon 
is especially prominent when Ruth considers the lake—the novel’s central natural feature, 
and the place where both her grandfather’s and her mother’s bodies rest. When Ruth 
drinks from the lake, the water’s iron tinge brings to mind the mingling of her ancestors’ 
bodies with the elements she now ingests: “I cannot taste a cup of water but I recall that the 
eye of the lake is my grandfather’s, and that the lake’s heavy, blind, encumbering waters 
composed my mother’s limbs…There is remembrance, and communion, altogether human 
and unhallowed” (193-194). Metaphorically, the lake serves as a locus for Ruth’s feelings of 
loss and her desire for a continued connection to her perished ancestors. Such an 
interpretation has been widely touched upon in the critical discussion.38  
What has gone unnoticed, though, is how the language also persistently calls 
attention to the physicality of the natural world within which humans are imbedded. The 
passage depicts Ruth’s connection to her family not simply as an issue of desire or memory 
or wishful thinking; this connection is also material. It is Ruth’s taste of water that prompts 
the recognition that the human body is a permeable site. Just as human bodies are made up 
of the air, water, and soil—for of course we must drink and breathe to sustain life—so too 
are natural elements undeniably enmeshed with humans. This passage about the “eye of 
the lake” crystallizes the central phenomenon that I explore in this chapter: while 
                                                     
37 Marilynne Robinson, Housekeeping (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1980): 4. Subsequent 
citations will appear within the text. 
38 See for instance Christine Caver, “Nothing Left to Lose”; Allyson Booth, “To Caption Absent 
Bodies: Marilynne Robinson’s Housekeeping,” Essays in Literature 19, no. 2 (1992): 279-291; 
Martha Ravits, “Extending the American Range”; and Joanne Hall, “The Wanderer Contained: 
Issues of ‘Inside’ and ‘Outside’ in Relation to Harold Gray’s Little Orphan Annie and Marilynne 
Robinson’s Housekeeping,” Critical Survey 18, no. 3 (2006): 37-50. 
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Housekeeping’s densely metaphorical passages develop the rich psychological, historical, 
or religious implications that constitute bodies, they also foreground the material world on 
which such constructions rely. In doing so, they convey the inescapable, vital nature of our 
connection to that world. 
Accordingly, I argue that an ecological vision is traceable throughout 
Housekeeping. Indeed, Robinson’s own words in her interview with Professor Schaub 
offer us a compressed version of that vision. When Robinson refers to nature as “the 
ultimate—”, she gestures toward this view: nature, she implies, is both ineffable and all-
encompassing. Robinson labels her outlook on the environment “radical,” and suggests 
that it is so caught up in everything that it cannot be talked about in isolation. If there is “no 
place this destruction [of nature] is limited or ends,” then there is no locale in which we can 
withdraw from nature. In her imagery of the world as a work of knitting, Robinson suggests 
the intricate interconnection of the environment’s parts. Housekeeping dramatizes this 
ecological perspective. The novel demonstrates that despite nature’s inevitable otherness, 
its resistance to being understood or neatly defined, it is also true that “the environment is 
us”; humans and the natural world are knitted together.39 The environment, Housekeeping 
affirms, is our inescapably coextensive other.  
The lake in Fingerbone serves as the central motif revealing this coextensive 
relationship, as the first part of this chapter will demonstrate. A close look at how Ruth 
describes the lake reveals how the novel moves back and forth between two modes: a 
highly discursive style in which nature motifs act as symbolic projections of characters’ 
                                                     
39 Harold Fromm, “The ‘Environment’ Is Us,” in The Nature of Being Human: From 
Environmentalism to Consciousness (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 95-103. 
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psychological features, versus what we might call a material register, which persistently 
complicates and corrects the discursive mode to gesture toward the world in its vibrancy 
and immediacy. In the second part of the chapter, I explore how attending to this material 
register alerts us to how inexorably the human body is intertwined with the material 
environment. The novel casts this entanglement as a needed corrective to the rigidity of 
conventional American culture and its tendency to dichotomize self and other, outside and 
inside, and wilderness and civilization. Yet, as I explore in the third section of the chapter, 
when Ruth endeavors to extend her insight about blurred boundaries all the way into an 
erasure of all difference between self and other, the novel critiques those attempts as 
delusion. I view this critique as one with significance for ecocriticism: Housekeeping 
dramatizes both the attractions and the downfall of an extreme holism. Having suggested 
how Housekeeping’s rhetorical style and character development create an ecological 
incisive vision, I close the chapter by using my reading of Housekeeping to speak back to 
scholars who critique the mimetic aspects of environmental writing. 
I. Fingerbone Lake and Housekeeping’s Material Meaning  
Fingerbone’s lake is a force to be reckoned with. It devours everything from 
mechanical objects to human bodies to entire communities. Ruth’s grandfather’s train takes 
a fatal plunge into the lake, and years later, Ruth’s mother commits suicide by revving her 
car into the same water. The lake refuses to stay in one place, repeatedly breaking its banks 
and spilling into the local homes and shops. It is the site of Sylvie’s wanderings and 
unconventional lakeshore naps; Ruth and Lucille’s bold ice skating adventures; and Ruth 
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and Sylvie’s exploit with a stolen boat. Perhaps most strikingly, the lake is the border over 
which Ruth and Sylvie make their dangerous passage out of conventional small-town life in 
Fingerbone at the end of the novel. Certainly, the lake must be reckoned with, both for 
Ruth and for the reader. Given the lake’s importance to the narrative, it has garnered 
significant critical commentary, which can generally be placed into two categories. The first 
tendency is to read the lake as a mystical place of feminine power, the defining border 
between social life and personal freedom.40 By contrast, another group of critics read water 
as a symbol of death, and view the lake as a place with which Ruth is obsessed because of 
her preoccupation with her tragic family history and her own attraction to oblivion.41 
Despite their differences, both types of readings are typical of the de-materializing 
tendencies of contemporary theory; looking at a lake (or a blade of grass, or any 
representation of the external world), they see something else.  
What these readings miss is the novel’s interest in a more literal nature. For even as 
the lake’s representations explore how nature can act as a metaphor for traits of human 
consciousness, the narrative simultaneously develops a material level of meaning that draws 
our attention to the stuff of life: dirt, air, stone, and, especially, water. This material 
meaning emerges first and foremost through a kind of rhetorical accretion: the way the 
ambiguous and continually evolving nature imagery builds alternative modes of 
                                                     
40 See for example Marcia Aldrich, “The Poetics of Transience: Marilynne Robinson’s 
Housekeeping,” Essays in Literature 16, no. 1 (1989): 127-140; and Heather Bohannan, 
“Questioning Tradition.” 
41 See Christine Caver, “Nothing Left to Lose”; Sinead McDermott, “Future-perfect: Gender, 
Nostalgia, and the Not Yet Presented in Marilynne Robinson's Housekeeping,” Journal of Gender 
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understanding. From our first introduction to the lake, Ruth’s narration establishes one 
meaning, then quickly accumulates additional layers of possibility: 
It is true that one is always aware of the lake in Fingerbone, or the 
deeps of the lake, the lightless, airless waters below. When the ground is 
plowed in the spring…what exhales from the furrows but that same sharp, 
watery smell…At the foundation is the old lake, which is smothered and 
nameless and altogether black. Then there is Fingerbone, the lake of charts 
and photographs, which is permeated by sunlight and sustains green life and 
innumerable fish, and in which one can look down in the shadow of a dock 
and see stony, earthy bottom, more or less as one sees dry ground. And 
above that, the lake that rises in the spring and turns the grass dark and 
coarse as reeds. And above that, the water suspended in sunlight, sharp as 
the breath of an animal, which brims inside this circle of mountains. (9) 
The lake’s symbolism is established quickly; its initial associations with death and grief are 
unmistakable. The “deeps” of which Fingerbone’s citizens are always aware, the “lightless, 
airless” and “black” depths, indicate that the lake represents the bereavement that 
permeates the town. Indeed, Ruth imagines that it is the inescapable smell and taste and 
sight of the lake that causes widows to flee from Fingerbone: “They [the widows] said they 
could no longer live by the lake. They said the wind smelled of it, and they could taste it in 
the drinking water, and they could not abide the smell, the taste, or the sight of it” (8-9). 
Even the novel’s characters view the lake as a representation of death. Just when “the old 
lake” seems to become entirely symbolic of loss, though, Ruth’s imagery takes a turn. 
“Then,” she tells us, “there is Fingerbone.”  
 “Fingerbone” is the term used for the lake in its physicality—aptly enough, 
considering the name’s reference to a body part. It is a body of water with a more quotidian 
purpose. It “sustains green life” and houses “innumerable fish.” It is a habitat, a sturdily 
“stony, earthy” feature. Moving from the previous image of the lake as a “smothered and 
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nameless and altogether black” thing—a highly abstracted image of mysterious 
otherworldliness—we are reoriented in the commonplace physical world. Earlier the lake 
was distinguished by its lack of materiality: although it permeated the town’s consciousness, 
it was “lightless” and “airless.” But here, Fingerbone becomes the lake we breathe and 
drink, the lake we can “chart and photograph,” a place with substance and weight. 
Particularly intriguing is the line asking us to “look down” through the “shadow” and see 
the “stony, earthy bottom, more or less as one sees dry ground.” The image of the stony 
bottom reminds the reader that behind these evocative, symbolic images—these 
“shadows”—there is a plain, dry ground. Material reality, the novel implies, is not perfectly 
reproducible in language; after all, the bottom of the lake is only “more or less” 
perceivable. However, this image of looking down to the earthy bottom, coupled as it is 
with the sensuous description of the physical lake, hints that language is nonetheless 
capable of evoking some sense of the vitality of the living world. Such a suggestion might 
seem naive, but consider: earlier in the passage, the lake could have been anything at all, as 
long as that thing was pervasive, dark, and mysterious, since the lake’s textual purpose was 
to symbolize death’s ubiquity and power. But in the sensuous language that appears 
subsequently, the lake’s description evokes a lake as a lake—as a body of water, a habitat, 
and an element on which humans subsist—rather than posing it as a relatively arbitrary 
feature onto which other elements of meaning are projected.  
The material meaning does not supersede the symbolic associations of the lake with 
death, which the narrative has established strongly, and which will be reasserted later. 
Instead, it serves as a further fold, accumulating on top of the earlier construction. The 
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phrase “and above that,” repeated in the passage, further stresses that the lake cannot be 
reduced to one identity. “And above that” can be read literally, as a spatial reference—
perhaps Robinson uses it to show how Ruth’s perspective zooms upward as she moves 
from the lake’s bottom to its surface and then to the “breath” that it gives off.  However, 
“and above that” could signify not a spatial movement upward but a choice between 
competing options for interpretation: is Ruth implying that most of all, privileged above any 
of its other meanings, the lake should be understood as that which “brims inside this circle 
of mountains”? The passage ends in ambiguity, encouraging us to try to hold both 
meanings—lake as material and ecological feature, lake as a symbol of mortality—in our 
minds simultaneously. A similarly accretive, ambiguous orientation toward physicality 
appears elsewhere in Robinson’s fiction, too, as when John Ames closes an anecdote 
musing on the “luminous water” he once saw fall on a woman’s hair with the admonition to 
his grandson that “This is an interesting planet. It deserves all the attention you can give it,” 
or when Lila’s memories of her phenomenological experiences of the outdoors—the 
“raggedy meadows and pastures and the cornfields and the orchards…the buzz and the 
smell and the damp of it”—transition seamlessly to reflections on suffering and mortality.42 
Even in those novels, then, which are less evidently preoccupied with the boundaries 
between man and nature, Robinson’s rhetoric continues to suggest both the material and 
discursive aspects of the environment. 
In Housekeeping, the novel’s narrative voice repeatedly partakes in another striking 
rhetorical pattern: frequent self-correction, which complements the complexity introduced 
                                                     
42 Marilynne Robinson, Gilead (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2004), 27-28 and Lila (New 
York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2014), 256. 
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by the accretive imagery. The interruption of “but” into Ruth’s elliptical, meandering 
metaphorical passages tends to signal a temporary shift from abstract, symbolic meaning to 
a more sensuous description of the natural world, conveying a sense of the incompleteness 
or inadequacy of the previous view(s). When Ruth and Lucille undertake a daylong sojourn 
around the lake, for instance, the narrative first emphasizes the lake’s mythical status, 
recounting, “If we looked at it, the water seemed spread over half the world. The 
mountains, grayed and flattened by distance, looked like remnants of a broken dam, or like 
the broken lip of an iron pot, just at a simmer, endlessly distilling water into light” (112). 
The lake is magnified, dwarfing even the mountains in the distance. Its expanse “over half 
the world” and its eternal ability to “distill water into light” lend it qualities of universality 
and immortality that hint at mysteriously open-ended figurative meanings. Further 
augmenting the lake’s sway, the conditionality of “If we looked at it” implies that Ruth and 
Sylvie can barely stand to look at this shimmering, transcendent waterway. 
However, Ruth’s next images complicate the lake’s existence at this majestic level. 
Interrupting a long, evocative list of similes comparing the lake and mountains to eternity, 
Ruth abruptly acknowledges: “But the lake at our feet” is quite a different thing (112). The 
lake at Ruth’s feet is “quick with small life, like any pond,” not simmering or distilling but 
just “plain, clear water, bottomed with smooth stones and simple mud…modest in its 
transformations of the ordinary” (112). From this view, the lake is not exalted but 
“modest,” like a “pond.” It is a place for physical engagement with the natural, a place in 
which to take pleasure; it is used for ice skating and for catching small fish to fry for dinner. 
It is “plain” and “clear,” not dense and oversaturated with meaning as before. Earlier, 
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Ruth’s repetition of “and above that” encouraged readers to hold both the symbolic and 
material associations of the lake in our minds simultaneously; this passage achieves a 
similar ambiguity through self-correction (that crucial “But”), checking the abstracted, 
mythical representation of the lake and turning to more grounded material description. 
Robinson asks us to take seriously both sides of her figurative images, representing the 
symbolic constructions or psychological projections made possible by borrowing images 
from nature, but also foregrounding the material world on which such figuration relies.  
 
II. “…difference may be relative rather than absolute”  
I have been suggesting that Housekeeping has a material register of meaning, a 
register that becomes visible in the accretive imagery and self-corrective rhetoric associated 
with the lake. Cuing into this level of meaning prompts us to ask what the novel conveys 
about how humans relate to this material world—and what we find, I propose, is that 
Housekeeping depicts environment as inescapably, physically entwined with human 
existence.  
For an initial sense of what I mean, consider Ruth’s retelling of the Biblical story of 
the flood. The passage’s references to water could be read entirely in terms of religious 
metaphor, but such a reading is complicated by the images of intimate human-nature 
connections:  
And let God purge this wicked sadness away with a flood, and let 
the waters recede to pools and ponds and ditches, and let every one of them 
mirror heaven. Still, they taste a bit of blood and hair. One cannot cup 
one’s hand and drink from the rim of any lake without remembering that 
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mothers have drowned in it, lifting their children toward the air, though they 
must have known as they did that soon enough the deluge would take all the 
children, too, even if their arms could have held them up…Well, all that was 
purged away, and nothing is left of it after so many years but a certain 
pungency and savor in the water, and in the breath of creeks and lakes, 
which, however sad and wild, are clearly human. (193)  
As in the previous passages pertaining to the lake, readers are primed to understand the 
imagery of this passage in terms of violence and death, since the chapter in which the 
passage appears begins with the story of Cain’s murder of his brother Abel, the 
quintessential story of familial trauma. And the text does in fact construct an image of 
Biblical water, which at first represents a purifying death—a “purge” of the world’s “wicked 
sadness”—that recalls the story of Noah and the flood. But the passage includes an abrupt 
and suggestive change in direction. Streaming along through religious rhetoric about the 
cleansing powers of a flood, Ruth suddenly arrests her course with “Still.” Her self-
corrective hesitation redirects the imagery from one of heavenly purity and cleansing to one 
of bodily detritus, the “blood and hair” that undermines the otherworldliness of the 
religious overtones of the passage.  
Subsequently, the passage begins to incorporate the more grounded relationships 
that human bodies have with water. Not only do bodies of water “taste a bit of blood and 
hair” because water represents death, but because bodies of water are necessarily 
interpolated with the stuff of human bodies. The lakes and creeks are not just “wild”—not 
just representative of otherness and otherworldliness—but “clearly human.” The reference 
to the “mothers that have drowned” in the lake underscores that within the fictional world 
of the text, the lake takes on its discursive signification—its symbolism of death—because of 
the literal, physical dispersion of Ruth’s mother’s body into the water she now drinks. In 
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this fictional world, just as in our real world, the possibilities for a discursively constructed 
meaning arise from a specific set of environmental actualities that are themselves not 
constructed through discourse.  
If we focus entirely on the religious meaning of the flood waters, we relinquish a 
vital sense of water’s more literal force, as an element that is deeply enmeshed in our own 
bodily existence. As Judith Oster points out in connection with Robert Frost, where 
metaphor is concerned, we must negotiate between “the danger of overreading, and the 
opposite pitfall of being too literal.”43 This is a risk for readers as well as for Ruth herself. 
The passage implies as much when Ruth declares “I cannot taste a cup of water but I recall 
that the eye of the lake is my grandfather’s, and that the heavy, blind, encumbering waters 
composed my mother’s limbs and weighed her garments and stopped her breath and 
stopped her sight. There is remembrance, and communion, altogether human and 
unhallowed” (193-4). The connection between families is labeled a “communion,” a word 
with unmistakable religious connotation, referring to a mystical and (at least in Protestant 
traditions) symbolic ritual of connection. However, this is a communion of a particular 
kind, “altogether human and unhallowed,” suggesting a more grounded, modest 
connection, undercutting our ability to overread the lake in exclusively metaphorical terms. 
The grandfather’s eye, the mother’s limbs, the encumbering waters, and the communion 
achieved between them—these are of course much more than literal, corporeal references. 
But material interconnections comprise a significant aspect of the unhallowed communion 
referred to in the passage.  
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Ruth’s sensory experience of the lake’s taste demonstrates that bodies of water and 
human bodies are mutually constitutive. The lake, tasting of blood and hair, is partly 
human, and human bodies are partly water, as Ruth’s act of drinking must remind us. Ruth 
is linked to others, including her ancestors, through her inescapable participation in the 
circulation of the earth’s elements. This is a circulation that is not limited by time or space, 
but persisting across generations and across bodies and, indeed, across the entire earth. She 
is alone, but never radically so, linked as she is to others through both memory and 
material interconnections—the “remembrance” and “communion” she references. 
Like Ruth’s encounter with this paradoxically abstracted and intimate water—wild 
but human, Biblical but unhallowed—numerous passages undermining a clean split 
between self and other can be found throughout the novel. This pattern, I suggest, has 
ecological significance. As philosopher Val Plumwood elucidates, Western culture has 
tended to define the human against nature—in this view, humans are distinguished by our 
unique rationality and autonomy, the characteristics through which we solidify our 
difference from and supremacy over the brute, irrational animal and the mute, passive 
landscape.44 According to Plumwood, this definition of the human represents a “denial of 
our embeddedness in and dependency on nature,” a mistake of self-definition as well as an 
ethical failure. Plumwood is often cited as an inspiration for New Materialists, who 
continue her project by proposing various conceptions that might overturn the 
“hyperseparation” of human and environment, mind and matter. One such conception is 
Stacy Alaimo’s “trans-corporeality,” which entails “thinking across bodies” and attending to 
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the “interchanges and interconnections between various bodily natures.”45 This process 
reveals that “‘the environment’ is not located somewhere out there, but is always the very 
substance of ourselves” (2).   
Exemplifying the capacity of literature to articulate alternative conceptions of 
identity, Housekeeping uses Ruth’s characterization and distinctive rhetoric to demonstrate 
that human existence is not a discrete and autonomous position; rather, the human is 
always entangled with the world. For instance, Ruth’s story of how a ramble in the woods 
accidentally turns into an overnight stay can be read as dramatizing the breakdown of clear 
divisions between humans and the natural world. Hunkering down for the night, Ruth and 
her twin sister Lucille are initially invested in reinforcing traditional boundaries between 
themselves and the surrounding environment. They collect driftwood and stones to 
construct a shelter, choosing not only to protect themselves from the elements, but to 
partake in non-essential civilizing gestures: they layer fir limbs on top of the ground to serve 
as makeshift flooring and design the front of the building to be aesthetically oriented 
toward the lake. Lucille in particular attempts to make the shelter serve as a bastion of 
civilization, “writing her name in pebbles on the sand in front of the door”—she literally 
turns the material world into a discursive formulation (114). This action serves as a 
quintessential gesture of claiming and separation as Lucille attempts to complete “the cut so 
familiar to humanism, severing the person from all that surrounds them.”46 In other words, 
Lucille tries to demarcate her existence from the environment that unnerves her, the “rush 
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of the woods,” the “lisps and titters” and “stealthy approach” of noisy “coyotes…and owls, 
and hawks, and loons” (115).  
Such gestures are illusory, though, for Ruth admits that “[i]t was a low and slovenly 
structure, to all appearances random and accidental. Twice the roof fell” (114). Soon Ruth 
senses that the environment is not something surrounding humans after all, but is instead 
much more assertively integrated with humanity. She describes her growing awareness of 
the environment’s incorporation into her bodily limits: 
It was so dark that creatures came down to the water within a few 
feet of us. We could not see what they were. Lucille began to throw stones 
at them. ‘They’re supposed to be able to smell us,’ she grumbled. For a 
while she sang ‘Mockingbird Hill,’ and then she sat down beside me in our 
ruined stronghold, never still, never accepting that all our human 
boundaries were overrun. Lucille would tell this story differently. She would 
say I fell asleep, but I did not. I simply let the darkness in the sky become 
coextensive with the darkness in my skull and bowels and bones. (115)  
Sitting in a shelter that has lost its status as a “stronghold” against nature, Ruth relinquishes 
control in favor of “simply let[ting]” the illusion of inherent, stable divisions between 
humans and environment fall away. It would seem that darkness allows for the intimacy of 
disparate beings to be illuminated in ways they cannot be in the light, as the animals 
approach beyond what they are “supposed” to and the “human boundaries” separating 
Ruth from the environment have been “overrun.” While Lucille reacts to the animals’ 
closeness as a threat, hurling stones to drive them off, Ruth senses that Lucille’s attempt to 
keep nature at bay is doomed to fail. Ruth’s awareness of this obscured truth is made 
possible by her openness to non-rational, mysterious insight; Ruth enters a more sensuous, 
non-cerebral state close to dreaming. In fact, Ruth speculates that Lucille would say Ruth 
was just asleep.  
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Despite acknowledging that not everyone would experience the world the way that 
she does, Ruth insists that “the darkness in the sky [became] coextensive with the darkness 
in my skull and bowels and bones” (116). Here we find a key term elucidating 
Housekeeping’s ecological vision: “coextensive.” The O.E.D. defines the term to mean 
“extending over the same space or time; of equal extension; coinciding in limits,” and in the 
context of the passage above, the word suggests overlapping limits, conveying the 
inseparability of humans from the environment.47 This term resonates with the meaning 
suggested by Alaimo’s model of trans-corporeality, especially in Alaimo’s suggestion that 
trans-corporeality “underlines the extent to which the substance of the human is ultimately 
inseparable from ‘the environment.’”48 And, in fact, Alaimo periodically uses “coextensive” 
as a cognate for trans-corporeality.  
However, a distinction in emphasis exists based on the prefixes of the two terms. 
Trans-corporeality foregrounds matter itself, emphasizing as it does the way that matter 
moves across bodies, while the “co” prefix of “coextensive” portrays humans and 
environment as extended across the same space. Rather than emphasizing so strongly the 
way that the material world’s exertions penetrate one’s bodily limits, Robinson’s chosen 
term emphasizes the parallel existence of the human body and nonhuman world, as the 
two are implied to extend across the same space, intersecting and overlapping. In other 
words, a coextensive relationship between human and environment is one in which the 
typical divisions and separations between the two entities are “overrun.”  
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If we return to Ruth’s telling of the Biblical tale of the flood, we can see how Ruth’s 
distinctive self-correcting, accretive rhetorical patterns help develop the novel’s sense of the 
coextensive relations between humans and the environment. As I have suggested, the story 
about the deluge incorporates references to the lake that are highly metaphorical—using 
water as a metaphor for the purification of death—while intermittently foregrounding the 
lake itself, as a material feature with which humans are physically entangled. It is crucial to 
note that as the passage develops both of these levels of meaning, it features no concrete 
separation between them. In other words, it is difficult to tell where the lake as a 
metaphorical, emblematic feature leaves off and the lake as a vividly real and ever-changing 
part of the local ecology begins. Instead, the possibilities are layered as inseparable facets of 
the human experience of nature. The Biblical waters are poised to act as a representation 
of God’s wrath, but the references to “cup[ing] one’s hand and drink[ing] from the rim” of 
the water and “the breath of creeks and lakes” give both the human agents and the lake 
active roles that complicate the initial symbolism. The ambiguity about where the 
metaphorical meaning stops and the literal meaning starts—or vice versa—is typical of Ruth’s 
rhetoric, and it allows Ruth’s rhetoric to perform the co-extension it also alludes to. Just as 
humans and their environment extend across the same space, connected but not identical, 
so too do the metaphorical and material meanings of nature develop together, crossing and 
corresponding.  
The concept of coextensive human-environment relations achieves a broader 
relevance when we consider its bearing on the many other boundaries depicted in the 
novel. In addition to Ruth’s rambles around the forest and the lake, the atypical openness 
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of the Stone home undermines the typical divisions between human and environment. 
Domestic spaces traditionally act as markers of human difference and separation from the 
uncivilized wilderness, but Sylvie’s eccentric housekeeping reverses the home’s typical 
purpose. Sylvie “seemed to dislike the disequilibrium of counterpoising a roomful of light 
against a worldful of darkness…she preferred [the house] sunk in the very element it was 
meant to exclude. We had crickets in the pantry, squirrels in the eaves, sparrows in the 
attic” (99). Inside the Stone house a whole new ecosystem springs up, for in addition to 
crickets and squirrels, the home features over a dozen cats who prey on the swallows 
roosting in the eaves.  
Animals enter, darkness permeates—while these things in themselves might not 
encapsulate the coextensive relationship between the human body and the natural world, 
they participate in the same process of challenging a too-simple binary between the two. 
Like the body, the home is supposedly a stable and bounded space, but the novel depicts 
both as permeable and open. The other homes in Fingerbone are doing their American 
duty: living “safely within doors” (183), they insist to themselves that they are different from 
the hoboes who terrify them because they expose the instability of life lurking beneath the 
surface of “casseroles and coffee cakes…knitted socks and caps and comforters” (179). 
Sylvie undertakes the opposite process and, in doing so, challenges the townspeople’s 
carefully tended distinctions—between “us” and “them,” between civilization and nature.  
While the town wants to think of itself as a civilized space carved out of the “black 
wilderness” (18)—something entirely different from Sylvie’s increasingly wild house—
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Fingerbone’s geography reveals that the town is not as separated as it might like. Ruth 
reports that  
The terrain on which the town itself is built is relatively level, having 
once belonged to the lake. It seems there was a time when the dimensions 
of things modified themselves, leaving a number of puzzling margins, as 
between the mountains as they must have been and the mountains as they 
are now, or between the lake as it once was and the lake as it is now. (5)  
Perceptive Ruth notes the “puzzling margins” between what used to be and what currently 
is, but the time scale over which these changes took place makes it easy for most humans to 
forget that the geography they see is not inert and stable (2). “Sometimes in the spring the 
old lake will return,” Ruth tells us; the floods demonstrate that the natural world is active 
and capable of transformation, as “the earth will brim, the soil will become mud, and then 
silty water, and the grass will stand in chill water to its tips” (5). Just as the division between 
the past and present is “puzzling,” the divisions between humans and environment are not 
as definitive as they might seem. The human settlement in Fingerbone occupies land that 
“once belonged to the lake”—and in a way, the whole town still “belongs” to the lake, since 
the spring flooding acts as a perennial reminder that being human does not secure a 
discrete existence apart from the flux and unpredictability that characterizes the material 
world (4). The narrative endows the lake with an unusual amount of agency and centrality 
to human lives; the lake even enters back into Ruth’s family home perched on the hill over 
Fingerbone, partaking in a ghostly cycle of return that manifests as “boots floating tallow 
soles up and planks and buckets bumping at the threshold…a black pool in our cellar” (5). 
Human bodies and watery bodies are caught up in the same cycles of change.  
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Sylvie’s approach to housekeeping is extreme, but her strange housekeeping 
conveys the same message as the lake: closing the door does not keep out nature. Even the 
sturdiest house is enmeshed in the environment, just as even the toughest skin is always 
permeable to the elements.  To tell ourselves otherwise—to figuratively “throw rocks” at 
animals or lakes—is to delude ourselves, to imagine an existence far more superior, stable, 
and invulnerable than the one we truly possess.  
III. ‘What are all these fragments for, if not to be knit up finally?’  
As Ruth considers and reconsiders margins, the language of contested boundaries 
periodically moves beyond the overlap implied by “coextensive” to a complete collapse of 
all distinctions between inside and outside, between self and other. Sylvie facilitates many 
of Ruth’s exhilarating experiences of boundary-less-ness; key examples include Sylvie’s 
silence during dinner so they can all sink into the “boundless and luminous evening” (100) 
and Sylvie’s practice of keeping the house so dark that inside and outside are utterly 
merged, with the children walking in “from pure night into pure night” (99). These 
instances become more common in the middle section of the novel, after Sylvie begins 
drawing Ruth into her struggles against the “disequilibrium” between things, and they 
climax with the extended disappearance of distinctions that occurs when Sylvie abandons 
Ruth in a frost-covered valley (99). Ruth envisions the breakdown of divisions between her 
and the previous inhabitants of the ruined pioneer cabin, the “solitary children” that she 
imagines once lived here, and with whose lonely existence Ruth identifies: “I had been, so 
to speak, turned out of house now long enough…Now there was neither threshold nor sill 
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between me and these cold, solitary children” (159). The suggestion seems to be that 
through being “turned out of doors” both figuratively (cast out of a normative human-
centered culture) and literally (immersing oneself in the exterior world), Ruth awakens to a 
world in which no “threshold’ or “sill” remains to separate her self from others. It would 
appear that Ruth is becoming immersed in a mystically unified world absent of all 
perimeters or limitations.  
Given the progression of Ruth’s character and rhetoric in this direction, several of 
Housekeeping’s critics conclude that the novel develops Ruth’s full immersion in nature 
and celebrates it as a form of freedom. Joan Kirkby asserts that through aligning herself 
with the “unregulated energies of nature,” Ruth leaves the “artifice” of the social world 
behind. As Ruth achieves a “sense of wholeness without separation, a dissolution in which 
the ego’s grasp of the self loosens,” the “boundaries between the self and the world 
dissolve.”49 Similarly, Marcia Aldrich views Ruth as a sort of ecofeminist who “embraces 
women’s identification with the literal, with nature…” in order to escape patriarchal 
strictures.50 Parallel views appear in the work of several other scholars as well.51  
While none of these critics explicitly allude to deep ecology—the philosophy at the 
heart of radical environmentalism—the idea of unity with nature through dissolving 
boundaries resembles deep ecology’s concept of “ecological selfhood” or “ecological 
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consciousness.” Philosopher Arne Naess, who coined the term “deep ecology” in 1974, 
proposed that an ecological Self is one that feels “unity with the supreme whole.”52, This 
unity entails a transcendence of individual identity. As Warwick Fox puts it, “to the extent 
that we perceive boundaries, we fall short of deep ecological consciousness.”53 The 
ontological holism promoted by deep ecology was popular with scholars and activists who 
garnered significant visibility in the 1970s, 80s, and early 90s, but deep ecology has fallen 
out of favor for a few reasons. First, ecology itself has replaced the notion of nature’s 
harmonious holism with a concept of ecosystems as ever-shifting assemblages of 
competitive organisms and genes that rarely achieve a stable equilibrium. Second, critics of 
deep ecology have pointed out that despite deep ecology’s professed goal to challenge the 
human/nature binary in favor of a radically holistic, egalitarian vision, deep ecology still 
tends to dichotomize. It does so by treating “nature” as a synonym for all that is pure and 
good, and “culture” (or civilization, or humanity) as a synonym for all that is selfish, tainted, 
or even malignant.54  
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For these reasons, among others, a text’s affinity to deep ecology is more likely to 
be seen as a liability than an asset in the eyes of twenty-first-century literary critics, 
ecocritics, and (many) environmentalists. Thus it is all the more important to ask whether 
Housekeeping’s interest in exploding boundaries means that it expounds a metaphysical 
holism. Does Ruth find freedom through a total immersion in nature? It is true that Ruth is 
not ultimately content with complex linkages; rather, as the novel develops, she increasingly 
seeks a way for all forms of differentiation to be extinguished and for the world to “be 
made whole” (152). However, I propose that the novel complicates and undermines Ruth’s 
quest; while it paints Ruth’s striving for something that resembles an ontology of unbroken 
wholeness in sympathetic terms, it also shows the reader that in attempting to erase all 
“anomaly,” Ruth falters (152).  
Whereas rhetoric is key in understanding what a coextensive vision might look like, 
characterization and plot are crucial in understanding Ruth’s impulse to press on toward a 
more radical holism. The novel associates Ruth’s impulse to dissolve all boundaries with 
her traumatic family history. Her grandfather Edmund died early and violently, leaving his 
wife and daughters adrift. Years later, Ruth’s mother Helen leaves her children on a porch 
and speeds her car into the same lake in which Edmund’s body came to rest. The elderly 
aunts who arrive to care for newly-orphaned Ruth and Lucille soon find themselves 
overwhelmed and they, too, leave. These fractured relationships spur Ruth to forge an 
imaginative link to her forebears through nature. Her grandfather Edmund was deeply 
invested in the natural world: “He would pick up eggshells, a bird’s wing, a jawbone, the 
ashy fragment of a wasp’s nest. He would peer at each of them with the most absolute 
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attention, and then put them in his pockets…” (17). Ruth too marvels at natural rhythms 
and artifacts, and she knows how to fix the natural world with “absolute attention.” Ruth 
jealously guards her grandfather’s pressed flowers, found between some of his favorite 
books; this shared interest represents an enduring tie between two people who will never 
meet.  
Just how deeply Ruth desires this connection becomes apparent when Lucille 
suggests burning the flowers, revealing her own very different approach to nature and to the 
past. Lucille asks, “‘What are they good for?’ This was not a real question, of course. 
Lucille lowered her coppery brows and peered at me boldly, as if to say, It is no crime to 
harden my heart against pansies that have smothered in darkness for forty years” (126-127). 
Lucille, who is determined to “improve” herself in the traditional way—by becoming well-
dressed, educated, and attractive to young men—accuses Ruth of doing nothing more than 
“‘stand[ing] around like some stupid zombie!’” and insists that they each need new friends 
(123, 127). Although they were initially brought together by their shared grief, Ruth and 
Lucille now react differently to their shared marginalization: “…I had never made a friend 
in my life. Until recently, neither had she…We had spent our lives watching and listening 
with the constant sharp attention of children lost in the dark…What to make of sounds and 
shapes, and where to put our feet” (130). Ruth perceives that Lucille’s decision to harden 
her heart to the material world, which opposes her own sustained attentions to the physical 
world, is actually a product of their shared childhood sense of confusion and loss, of being 
“in the dark” and alone, looking for a foothold. Ruth depicts her attraction to nature as a 
way she connects with the sad familial history that Lucille, equally driven by trauma, tries at 
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first to deny (she claims that their mother had an accident rather than committing suicide) 
and then to leave behind.  
Ruth’s history of abandonment and loneliness has left her unmoored, unsure of the 
world and of herself, driving her unusually intense meditations on selfhood and otherness. 
Many of Ruth’s most luminous, arresting images of challenged boundaries occur in long 
passages that were spurred by Ruth’s attempts to process the unintelligible pain of being 
alone in the world. Sensuous images of human-nature connection typically appear after 
Ruth has already established how a particular nature motif is associated with a lost family 
member. In the woods, the lake, and even in Sylvie’s unusually naturalized home space, 
Ruth’s trauma spurs her desire for connection, and therefore her recognition that the things 
others perceive as separate are in fact overlapping and co-implicated. Ruth’s pain and 
solitude has made her capable of seeing likeness where others see only difference, of 
relinquishing dominance in favor of receptivity; these characteristics are what allow her to 
forge a vision of the coextensive relationship between humans and environment. But 
Ruth’s revelations of neglected connections go even further, culminating in a questionable 
mission to erase difference.55 Because traumatized Ruth is so completely desperate for 
connection and coherence, she is disturbed by fragmentation, and searches for 
explanations that might “knit up” the shards of the world into a “comprehensible” and 
                                                     
55 Karen Kaivola makes a similar point; she says, “Ruth’s struggle for individuation is complicated by 
an equal if not even more powerful desire not to become: she longs to merge with others, to lose 
herself. To merge in this way can make possible powerful connections with others, but it can also 
be a way to neglect the self. It can be a refusal to define oneself as a separate, autonomous person. 
Consequently, Ruth’s desire to merge is fraught with pleasures and perils” (“The Pleasures and 
Perils of Merging,” Contemporary Literature 34, no. 4 [Winter 1993]: 676). 
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unified whole (92). Ruth is not content with things merely being coextensive—intimate but 
mysteriously so—and seeks to penetrate “the mystery we are.”56  
The outlandishness of the grand leaps that Ruth must make to formulate this 
unified whole serves to undermine Ruth’s theories even as they are being created. When 
finding a torn page from her aunt’s National Geographic, for instance, Ruth sees the images 
of poverty in China juxtaposed with her aunt’s scrawled Bible verse—“I will make you 
fishers of men”—and concludes that “this document explained my aunt Molly’s departure 
to my whole satisfaction” (91). Ruth envisions this singular artifact as a condensed version 
of her aunt’s entire personality and motivations. The imaginative but tenuous nature of this 
extreme extrapolation primes the reader to be skeptical of what comes next.  
And indeed, Ruth subsequently attempts to extract from this single, faded image a 
cobbled-together theory of everything that applies to and unifies the entire world. She 
imagines that the fisherman’s net is an emblem for the way the world might be drawn 
together: “Such a net, such a harvesting, would put an end to all anomaly. If it swept the 
whole floor of heaven, it must, finally, sweep the black floor of Fingerbone, too,” she exults 
(92). She goes on: “There would be a general reclaiming of fallen buttons and misplaced 
spectacles, of neighbors and kin, till time and error and accident were undone, and the 
world became comprehensible and whole…” (92). The forward force of her language takes 
her all the way from a simple image of a net to imagining a “harvesting” which will cohere 
                                                     
56 Marilynne Robinson, Absence of Mind: The Dispelling of Inwardness from the Modern Myth of 
the Self (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010): 135. Krista Tippett also very appropriately uses 
this phrase from Robinson to refer to the parallel between Robinson’s work and that of Marcelo 
Gleiser, a physicist who rejects the validity of the search for a single unified Theory of Everything 
that can account for all physical phenomena. See “The Mystery We Are,” Interview with Krista 
Tippett, On Being (January 2, 2014), http://www.onbeing.org/program/the-mystery-we-are/4910. 
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every single thing and person, even the dead. Ruth eventually ties disparate images into a 
supernatural “rescue” that can finally make sense of the world: 
It was perhaps only from watching gulls fly like sparks up the face of 
clouds that dragged rain the length of the lake…Or it was from watching 
gnats sail out of the grass, or from watching some discarded leaf gleaming at 
the top of the wind. Ascension seemed at such times a natural law. If one 
added to it a law of completion—that everything must finally be made 
comprehensible—then some general rescue of the sort I imagined my aunt 
to have undertaken would be inevitable…What are all these fragments for, if 
not to be knit up finally? (92) 
Ruth attempts to piece together fragmentary phenomena—the movements of gulls, gnats, 
leaves—into a grand explanation in which no action or thought is wasted, everything has 
significance, and that those people no longer with us never really leave. Ruth presents her 
thinking as quite logical, setting it up like a mathematical equation: in her account, patterns 
in nature+ascension+the law of completion=a “general rescue” in which the world becomes 
“comprehensible.”  
Ending with what seems to be a rhetorical question, “What are all these fragments 
for, if not to be knit up finally?”, Ruth appears satisfied that despite the difficulty of 
perceiving the ultimate synthesis, the world must somehow be unified. The reader feels less 
sure. Knowing how deeply Ruth desires connection—remembering her hoarding of her 
grandfather’s flowers, seeing her longing to somehow know and understand her absent 
Aunt Molly, and recognizing that the erasure of “error” and “time” she imagines would 
reunite her with her dead mother—we suspect that Ruth’s math is not objective, but is 
instead driven by the desperation and profound need she feels in the wake of 
abandonment and loneliness.  
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In addition, for Ruth to sustain her ideas requires the continual repetition of 
conditional language that highlights the fictionality of her worldview. Ruth’s unified vision 
relies on Ruth’s liberal use of conditional language—“if,” “would,” “perhaps,” “at such 
times”—a conditionality revealing that the unity Ruth seeks can only be tenuous or 
provisional. As with the earlier tendency toward self-correction, the linguistic checks that 
occur throughout Ruth’s language here undermine the reader’s ability to accept wholesale 
any one of Ruth’s ingenious formulations. We admire Ruth’s creative connections but 
suspect that the resulting visions are elegant overreaches. Tellingly, just two paragraphs after 
Ruth’s initial attempt to turn a world of “error and accident” into wholeness and 
comprehensibility, Ruth and Lucille find themselves falling through what once seemed to 
be a solid, reliable structure: “This delicate infrastructure bore us up so long as we avoided 
roads and puddles, until the decay of winter became general. Such delicate improvisations 
fail. Soon enough we foundered as often as we stepped” (93). The supposed firmness of 
the ice mirrors Ruth’s vision of a satisfyingly unified world, but the ice is revealed to be 
unpredictable and unstable. The novel implies that Ruth’s explanations of the world as a 
unified whole are precarious “improvisations” that will continue to fail, an insinuation that 
is further reinforced by the repetitious structure of Ruth’s musings.  She repeatedly tries out 
different ways to justify that all things “foreshadow” that “the world will be made whole,” 
hinting that despite her exhilarated rhetoric, some part of her remains dissatisfied with her 
explanations. 
That there might be some distance between Ruth’s professed outlook and the 
overall narrative perspective has in fact been acknowledged by Robinson herself. When an 
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interviewer asked Robinson to comment on critics who complain that Ruth’s “tortured” 
logic is a flaw in the novel, Robinson defended the novel not by insisting that Ruth is right, 
but by clarifying that Ruth’s attempts to “reconcile herself” to suffering are part of a long 
philosophical tradition. Robinson specifies that Ruth is like the prophets in the Bible, or 
like Buddhists, in her efforts to alternatively “establish an equilibrium”—the 
boundarylessness that has been under discussion—or “establish freedom through a 
renunciation of the world”—the subject to which this chapter will turn next. Robinson 
acknowledges that despite the valid historical precedent for Ruth’s admirable and 
important attempts to make sense of existence, “There is no question that Ruth’s logic is 
under pressure.”57 Because the authorial irony distinguishing Robinson’s perspective from 
that of Ruth’s is relatively subtle, and requires significant readerly attention to discern, Ruth 
might be considered an instance of that unique persona, the unreliably unreliable narrator, 
to use James Wood’s term.58 Ruth is not insane, nor duplicitous; she is merely fallible, and 
has sufficient imaginative powers that readers must check their tendency to follow her lead 
all the way to the end. 
The tenuousness of Ruth’s quasi-ecological theories seeking unity give us good 
reason to suspect that the overall narrative perspective does not unequivocally endorse 
Ruth’s philosophical project of finding complete “equilibrium,” regardless of the historical 
precedent. An even more powerful reason is apparent in the novel’s identification of 
boundarylessness with annihilation. This association becomes especially apparent in Ruth’s 
climactic attempt to fuse with Sylvie, which manifests most dramatically when Sylvie leads 
                                                     
57 Robinson and Schaub, “An Interview,” 244.  
58 Woods, How Fiction Works (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008), 6. 
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Ruth to a crumbling homestead across the lake. Ruth describes herself in terms of extreme 
passivity: “…it was as if I were her shadow, and moved after her only because she moved 
and not because I willed this pace, this pocketing of the hands, this tilt of the head. 
Following her required neither will nor effort. I did it in my sleep” (145). Sylvie’s actions, 
coupled with Ruth’s desire for fusion, divest Ruth of her agency and start to erase her 
physical being as it is folded into Sylvie’s gestures and movements. Ruth happily concludes, 
“We are the same. She could as well be my mother. I crouched and slept in her very shape 
like an unborn child” (145). Critics depicting the novel as a story of female liberation tend 
to idealize this episode as a healing rebirth, a crucial step in Ruth’s rejection of patriarchal 
society and her journey to independence. However, those readings overlook the threat 
present in Ruth’s efforts. Far from being a healthy rebirth, the narrative demonstrates that 
Ruth’s desired merging with Sylvie would mean a “crouched” and infantile existence. This 
seems like an ignominious end for the spunky narrative voice that began the novel by 
assertively announcing, Ishmael-like, “My name is Ruth” (3). 
Ruth continues to follow Sylvie in a zombie-like shuffle, with “neither will nor 
effort,” but Sylvie leaves Ruth behind without warning in the cold and lonely valley. Sylvie 
eventually returns without explanation: Ruth says, “I could feel the pleasure she took in my 
dependency…Her expression was intent and absorbed. There was nothing of distance or 
civility in it. It was as if she were studying her own face in a mirror” (161). Sylvie’s response 
provokes Ruth’s anger—an expression of instinctual emotion that is almost without parallel 
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in the novel, with which a reader is likely to sympathize:59 “I was angry that she had left me 
for so long, and that she did not ask pardon or explain, and that by abandoning me she had 
assumed the power to bestow such a richness of grace…I would say nothing that might 
make her loosen her grasp or take one step away” (161). Ruth knows that Sylvie has made 
her suffer in order to heighten Ruth’s pleasure at her return, but Ruth swallows her anger 
because she so desperately requires Sylvie’s approval. Ruth is determined to do nothing to 
convince Sylvie that in fact the two are not one, for Sylvie is seemingly convinced that Ruth 
is not a fully independent person: she faces Ruth as a doubled self “studying her own face 
in a mirror.” To view this as an exultant fusion between self and other is only possible if 
one casts aside the pain and confusion of Ruth’s account. As Karen Kaivola has noted, 
“Ruth’s lack of clarity and eagerness to collapse distinctions by dissolving boundaries 
complicate a reader’s stance in relation to her. It’s very difficult not to be worried about 
Ruth.”60 We fear for Ruth because she seems not to recognize that acknowledging 
connection need not lead all the way to the utter absence of difference between identities. 
Whether Ruth is proposing implausible theories to unify the world or attempting to merge 
with Sylvie, the novel demonstrates the risk we take in celebrating fully deconstructed 
boundaries as liberatory. 
In the characterization of Ruth as worryingly fixated on dissolving all boundaries, 
the novel has a surprising resonance with several trenchant lines of critique of deep 
                                                     
59 The only other time Ruth expresses actual anger also appears in the context of attempted 
emotional bonds that become interrupted; it occurs when she remembers how her mother 
destroyed the letter the girls’ father sent them, preventing them from ever contacting him in the 
future. 
60 Kaivola, “The Pleasures and Perils of Merging,” 683. 
  
55
ecology, among them Plumwood’s charge that deep ecology is marred by its expansive 
holism. In 1985 Bill Devall and George Sessions expressed a key tenet of deep ecology 
when they proposed that thinking ecologically means recognizing that “[i]f we harm the rest 
of Nature we are harming ourselves. There are no boundaries…”61 Devall and Sessions 
emphasize that the recognition of no-boundaries is not an ethic but a phenomenological 
experience of interconnectedness. However, the relevance of the concept to ethics is clear, 
since a proper ecological consciousness entails that a human no longer sees his own 
interests as distinct from those of an owl or polar bear.  
Yet Plumwood points out that significant points of conflict arise between the 
constituent members of larger wholes, and that because deep ecological consciousness 
flattens difference, it is blind to these conflicts.62 Holism is comforting, but it evades life’s 
true messiness. Like the deep ecologists, Ruth is in danger of forgetting that “the premise 
that individuals are not absolutely discrete does not entail the conclusion that all relations 
are internal and that individuals are ontological chimeras.”63 Influenced by outdated 
ecological views of the natural world that emphasize balance and harmony, deep ecology’s 
phenomenological account of deep ecological selfhood extrapolates too far, moving from 
insights about interrelatedness all the way to an expansive Self dissolving into a boundary-
less world. 
                                                     
61 Devall and Sessions, Deep Ecology: Living as If Nature Mattered (Salt Lake City: Peregrine 
Smith, 1985), 68. 
62 Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 178. 
63 Richard Sylvan, paraphrased in David R. Keller’s “Deep Ecology” (Encyclopedia of Ethics and 
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Intriguingly, while ecofeminists including Plumwood and Ariel Kay Salleh critique 
the notion of deep ecological consciousness as encouraging an expansive self-realization 
that “spring[s] from the same motive to control which runs a continuous thread through the 
history of patriarchy,”64 Housekeeping associates Ruth’s pursuit of extreme holism with the 
loss of the self. This contrast between portrayals of ecological consciousness as egotistical 
and as ego-less suggests another problem with deep ecological notions of selfhood. One 
might reasonably wonder whether the self produced by metaphysical holism is 
problematically dominating in its radical expansiveness, or if is it problematically 
obliterating in its self-dissolution. That both extremes are possible outcomes of seeking 
ecological consciousness reveals a dissatisfying vagueness in the holism expounded by deep 
ecologists. Accordingly, while the novel dramatizes the attractions of a deep ecological 
holism—Ruth’s attempts to create total coherence are indeed beautiful, and sympathetic 
too, since they grow out of her attempts to heal herself—the novel ultimately undercuts 
metaphysical holism as an unsatisfying solution to the world’s true complexity.  
By and large, the problems with the total eradication of boundaries are more 
evident to the reader than to Ruth herself, but Robinson does lend Ruth flashes of similar 
insight. As the narrative develops, it incorporates moments in which Ruth questions her 
obsession with fashioning unity. For instance, having experienced the temptation and perils 
of merging with Sylvie, Ruth re-conceptualizes her mother’s death in parallel terms, as a 
mistaken attempt at union. She speculates, “I think it must have been my mother’s plan to 
rupture this bright surface, to sail beneath it into blackness” (163). She pictures her 
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mother’s suicide as an effort to “rupture” the water and pass into a world of general “flux” 
(163). Ruth imagines that her mother, like her, struggled to reconcile herself to the 
fragmented world, speculating that Helen envisioned her death as a way to “sail beneath 
[the bright surface of life] into very blackness” (163). Aberration is on the surface; totality 
rests underneath—a vision that greatly resembles Ruth’s earlier insistence that underneath it 
all, the true nature of the world is not fragmentation but wholeness. But as Ruth recognizes, 
her mother does not succeed in her quest for, for “here she was, wherever my eyes fell, and 
behind my eyes, whole and in fragments, a thousand images of one gesture, never dispelled 
but rising, always, inevitably, like a drowned woman” (163). Memory means that her 
mother cannot dissolve; death has actually magnified Helen’s existence, since now she 
returns “inevitably, like a drowned woman” again and again to the surface of Ruth’s mind. 
The passage’s form reinforces Ruth’s attempts to make peace with a world that is a 
complex, interrelated network of phenomena, knit together loosely—we might say, with the 
stitches showing—rather than tightly. In the line “whole and in fragments,” wholeness and 
fragmentation are for once not contrasted, sitting as they do on either side of the 
conjunction. Ruth is no longer using her capacity for language to wrestle fragmentation into 
submission. And in the subsequent scene, Ruth, still sitting silently with Sylvie in their 
stolen boat, admits that “[i]f I had one particular complaint, it was that my life seemed 
composed entirely of expectation. I expected—an arrival, an explanation, an apology. There 
had never been one…” (166). Considering the mysterious, traumatic circumstances of 
Helen’s sudden suicide, one can hardly blame Ruth for desiring apologies and clarification, 
but Ruth’s wish for a final “explanation” is impossible and destructive. Things happen that 
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simply cannot be accounted for. The need now is for her to move on: she must “pass out 
the sight of my grandfather’s empty eye” (170). First attempting to do so through “dreadful 
effort,” Ruth relinquishes control and ceases to struggle so much, to fight against the 
world’s unpredictability. As Sylvie and Ruth rest, their boat follows the current (170). At 
least for now, Ruth concedes that her yearning for a world of structure and stability asks too 
much.  
If by the end of the novel Ruth has begun to reconcile herself to the world’s 
fragmentation, it may be because she has acknowledged that a fusion with Sylvie is not 
possible—nor is it desirable. Full merging never comes to fruition. While much has been 
made of Ruth’s de-corporealizing language at several points in the novel,65 a crucial passage 
toward the end of the narrative makes us re-evaluate the idea that de-corporealization is the 
end toward which the novel moves: 
Memory is the sense of loss, and loss pulls us after it…There is so 
little to remember of anyone—an anecdote, a conversation at table. But 
every memory is turned over and over again, every word, however chance, 
written in the heart in the hope that memory will fulfill itself, and become 
flesh…Sylvie did not want to lose me. She did not want me to grow gigantic 
and multiple, so that I seemed to fill the whole house, and she did not wish 
me to turn subtle and miscible, so that I could pass through the membranes 
that separate dream and dream. She did not wish to remember me. She 
much preferred my simple, ordinary presence (194-195).  
Ruth has been parted from all of her family members save one, so she understands the 
magnification of influence that someone has in absentia. Memory means that the absent 
person looms large. Yet the passage tempers that message by pointing out that no amount 
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of remembered words can replace flesh. Memory cannot compensate for the quotidian, 
embodied experience of someone’s “simple, ordinary presence.” Earlier, after Sylvie had 
abandoned her in the crumbling homestead, Ruth had concluded that “[i]t is better to have 
nothing, for at last even our bones will fall. It is better to have nothing…Let them come 
unhouse me of this flesh, and pry this house apart” (159), but this later passage undermines 
that earlier divestment of embodied selfhood. Ruth reestablishes her “ordinary,” physical 
presence, one that rests between complete expansiveness and disappearance–she is neither 
“gigantic and multiple” nor “subtle and miscible.”  
Despite these moments, Ruth is not completely at home in the world at the end of 
the novel. She perhaps no longer conceives of herself as “unhoused flesh,” but she eats 
little and says even less, and she acknowledges that in her days as a waitress she cannot 
identify with the customers who readily celebrate rituals of nurturing and sustenance. 
However, Ruth no longer looks for transcendence and escape in the way she once did: she 
informs the reader that she now recognizes that the dead and the living cannot be 
reconciled, for “[b]y some bleak alchemy what had been mere unbeing becomes death 
when life is mingled with it. So they seal the door against our returning” (215). Moreover, 
she has accepted that her mother’s abandonment is “the common experience. They walk 
ahead of us, and walk too fast…the only mystery is that we expect it to be otherwise” (215). 
As much as we might wish it to be otherwise, the world does not provide wholeness, 
restoration, or stability.  
Ruth’s struggle to reconcile herself to our fragmented, complexly interrelated world 
suggests to the reader that the truth of human connection to environment, like human 
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connections to other humans, rests uneasily somewhere between a strict and dualistic 
self/other split and a fully deconstructed division between subjectivities.  Thus the novel 
parallels Plumwood’s proposal that, on the one hand, “radical exclusion [between self and 
other] corresponds to the conception of self as self-contained and of other as alien which 
denies relationship and continuity,” on the other hand, “incorporation corresponds to the 
totalising denial which denies the other by denying difference, treating the other as a form 
of the same or self.”66 What we must do, then, is to continually negotiate between the 
equally problematic “Desert of Difference” and “Ocean of Continuity.”67 Like Plumwood, 
Housekeeping insists on both continuity and difference, and it suggests that we reside in the 
uncomfortable space between those two extremes. The world refuses us our fantasies of 
safe, masterful separation from nature, and it also resists our fantasies of harmonious 
holism. But that does not preclude being awake to the world with which we are 
coextensive—not a world of unity and completeness, but one full of surprises.  
 
IV. A Story Flourishes In a Sleeve of (L)imitation: A Word for Environmental 
Representation 
In a 1993 interview, Robinson declared, “I want to make people love where they 
are. I think that the best defense, the best sort of on-the-ground defense for any landscape 
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is to love it.”68 Here Robinson asserts narrative’s ability to forge affective ties to the land, ties 
that she thinks have ethical potential to act as “the best defense” for a landscape. 
Robinson’s statement about writing as a kind of environmental activism complicates her 
statement in her interview with Schaub that she does not and would not write stories about 
environmentalism–and also implicitly disputes critics who are skeptical about the value of 
literature’s indirect, mediated representation of nature through language. Dana Phillips, for 
instance, writes, “why environmental literature should be deputized to make the presence 
and reality of the natural world available to us by proxy, when the world lies waiting to be 
explored by book worms and bold adventurers alike, is a question insufficiently 
mooted…in ecocriticism.”69 Phillips believes ecocriticism has not answered that question 
because it cannot be answered—one reason he has been seen as “denying any legitimacy 
whatsoever to literature as a conduit of environmental representation.”70 Phillips’s concerns 
about representation are joined by those of other critics, including Timothy Morton, who, 
like Phillips, is deeply skeptical of vivid description and emotional immediacy.71 In 
Morton’s view, writers’ attempts to “convincingly…render” natural surroundings entice us 
to “switch off our aesthetic vigilance” (35). He characterizes absorption in a literary world 
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as naïve, even ethically compromised; writers who attempt to absorb our attentions are 
devilishly tempting us. 
Robinson presents a very different view about the value of proxy environments and 
the role of immediacy in literature. To one interviewer, she explained:  
…when I’m in the middle West, the paragraph that I’m always asked 
to read is, ‘I love the prairie’ (246)—and there are all of these people who 
say, ‘I’ve always felt that but I’ve never said it’—or the three of them having 
supper together when the kid is coming in from the cold. These are things 
that are very moving to people, and the reason they’re moving is because 
they’re commonplace. Everybody knows what these things are. When you 
are presenting people with what they know in a way that makes them 
understand the sweetness of it, they recognize that, because at some level 
they have felt the sweetness of it, but for whatever reason other people have 
to sort of put the blessing on it and say, ‘Look what this is’... (141-142). 
Robinson delights in literature’s capacity to make people contemplate something that they 
have “felt but…never said.” In her account, literature is not slavishly mimetic, but it is 
nonetheless capable of “presenting.” Literature says, “Look what this is,” and though the 
things we are called to view do not comprise a literal re-creation of the world, they may 
create an impression of truthfulness that resonates with and can even “enhance” our lived 
experiences of that world (142). In Robinson’s view, “presenting people with what they 
know” in a way that “makes them understand the sweetness of it” is a function of literature 
that both gives pleasure and has an ethical purpose. Robinson defends the value of 
describing the plain aspects of experience when she says “I think that the everyday…is 
undervalued, and that the most commonplace things are, in fact, the ones that are the most 
available to being thought of as sacred” (141). Description is not boring or superficial for 
Robinson, nor is representation automatically inept; rather, they can serve as part of that 
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“on-the-ground defense” that allow for literature to take on a political or ethical 
significance.   
In Housekeeping, we find a narrative that embodies Robinson’s claims for the 
value of literature’s representational capacity, as Robinson renders landscapes and aims for 
affective immediacy. At the same time, though, the careful reader can recognize how the 
novel’s representation of the environment—emerging as it does out of Ruth’s imaginative 
rhetoric, which makes no pretense at reproducing the world perfectly or comprehensively—
avoids being reductive or naïvely mimetic. On the one hand, the novel delights in the 
figurative and imaginative dimensions of language; the novel often describes natural 
landscapes as highly malleable by the human imagination. In doing so, the novel reminds 
us that nature described in language is always subjective, partial, and mediated. On the 
other hand, the narrative repeatedly undermines and complicates this constructivist view by 
returning us always to sensuous description, re-placing us in an ecological context in which 
a (fictional) tree might comment on trees-in-the-world and how we relate to them. The 
following passage is a case in point:  
The shore drifted in a long, slow curve, outward to a point, beyond 
which three steep islands of diminishing size continued the sweep of the 
land toward the depths of the lake, tentatively, like an ellipsis…At [the 
point’s] foot a narrow margin of brown sand abstracted its crude shape into 
one pure curve of calligraphic delicacy (113).  
These lines explicitly depict the lake as a text that Ruth is reading. The shore calls to mind 
a curving comma, the islands an ellipsis. The sand becomes script. The imagery reveals 
how readily a human perspective on nature is overlaid with oneself—one’s losses, desires, 
fantasies. A few paragraphs later, Ruth’s hints that the lake is serving as a repository for a 
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panoply of desires and fears become even more explicit. Ruth recounts: “the surface of the 
bay seemed almost viscous, membranous, and here things massed and accumulated, as 
they do in cobwebs or in the eaves and unswept corners of a house” (113). The lake seems 
to have become a symbol of symbolism itself: it is indeterminate, a “membranous” blank 
slate on which “things” cohere and “accumulate.” The lake could hardly be depicted as 
more constructed and pliant. For awhile, then, the lake seems to act not as evidence of 
Housekeeping’s use of language to point at the world—or, to use Robinson’s phrase, to “put 
the blessing on” embodied experience—but as a demonstration of Housekeeping’s 
“intractable textuality,” as Buell once put it.72  
On the other hand, our attention is apt to be caught by the incongruity of using 
such spatial, material vocabulary as “massing” and “accumulating” in what seems to be a 
fully de-materialized construct. Seeing physical imagery used in this way highlights not only 
the power and primacy of language to shape our experience of the world, but it also 
suggests, as Susan Squier puts it, that “material conditions shape and reshape what can be 
put into words.”73 Readers’ previous experiences with the behavior of cobwebs and unswept 
corners are what allow the simile to work; if cobwebs suddenly became, for instance, brittle 
instead of sticky, Robinson would have had to use a different term to make the comparison 
work in the same sense. Without certain circumstances being present in the world, and 
experienced by us as language-wielders, the figurative language would not communicate the 
intended meaning. Even in the use of figurative language the novel is suggesting that 
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language is not an utterly free-floating and arbitrary system, but is dependent in a real (if 
indirect) way on physical conditions. 
What is more, the initial formulation of the lake as a book continues to develop as 
Ruth’s cautious language in the passage hints that viewing the lake as pure symbol can only 
be partial and temporary. She says that she is witnessing one part of the lake that is “set 
apart” from the rest, and only “here” does the lake appear so “viscous” (113). The 
subsequent mention of things gathering together on the lake “as they do in cobwebs or in 
the eaves” begins to reinscribe the lake as an ecological figure, reorienting it in a material 
register by comparing it to other humble natural features, as does the subsequent imagery 
of the “warm and still and replete” bay water (113).   
Even if the reader does not take notice of the subtle way the passage begins to 
complicate the image of lake-as-text, the passage quickly presents even more direct 
reminders that lakes are not just symbols, but places—places of daily pleasures and 
sustenance. Growing hungry, Ruth and Lucille “toss pebbles at dragonflies” and catch fish, 
“opening the belly of each fish as we caught it from gills to tail and gutting it with our 
thumbnails” (113).  The heady language of Ruth’s extended metaphors falls away as the 
girls are immersed in “predation,” gathering ripe huckleberries and clumsily roasting their 
perch on a makeshift spit (114). Tossing the guts to the raccoons, Ruth is no longer musing 
about the lake in abstractions, at least for now. While Ruth is attracted to reading the lake 
symbolically—especially, as that most dominant other, death—she also continually comes 
around to a view of the lake as an elemental part of the ecological world with which human 
bodies are necessarily interpolated. That is not to say, though, that the lake is a 
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romanticized space of harmony; Ruth and Lucille’s sustenance is depicted as a violent 
internalization of the living matter they kill or harvest.  
In Ruth’s continually shifting interpretations, the novel calls the reader’s attention to 
the ways in which language inevitably encloses and transforms the material, fleshy world, 
while simultaneously reminding readers that that world has an independent and vital 
existence. Conveying this message, Housekeeping resonates with the desire for a “vibrant 
materiality” capable of acknowledging “the capacity of things…to act as quasi-agents or 
forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own” expressed by ecological 
materialists.74 While Housekeeping does occasionally instill natural features with a sense of 
agency (e.g., that “exhaling” lake), the novel’s vibrant materiality most powerfully emerges 
from Ruth’s flexible, continually revised perspective. The novel’s technique of constructing 
creative figurations that never fully resolve or cohere has been pithily described by 
Robinson herself. She says,  
You can create an absolutely dazzling metaphor that seems to be 
resolving things and making sense of things, and then you can collapse the 
metaphor, and what you’re left with is an understanding that’s larger than 
you had before, but finally it is a legitimate understanding because you 
know it’s wrong or you know it’s perfectly partial.75 
With these words in mind we can add a new wrinkle to the earlier discussion of how Ruth’s 
contemplations of the lake repeatedly move from one set of associations to another. 
Robinson’s commentary suggests that the success of these passages lies, paradoxically, in 
their failure. In the perfect partiality of its metaphors, the novel demonstrates the inability 
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of any comprehensive vision to “make[] sense of things.” But because this partiality is so 
often achieved by “collaps[ing]” the metaphorical use of nature motifs with a return to 
physical, sensuous aspects of the environment, the novel reminds us that while nature 
discussed in language is necessarily constructed and subjective, there nevertheless exists a 
real world with which readers have pressing and inescapable physical engagement, and 
which literature represents despite the imprecisions and slippages necessitated by the 
medium of language.  
For Robinson, then, the inability of language to fully replicate or penetrate the real 
is not something to mourn—she is not aiming at a mimetic goal of perfectly replicating the 
world in language or suggesting that there are “one-to-one correspondences between 
language and reality.”76 Instead, Robinson suggests the possibility of creating a suggestive 
vision that rings true, but that subtly acknowledges its own imperfection. Robinson 
exemplifies the ability of a writer to both enchant readers with the sensuous spell of 
language and also to hint at what is being left aside when understanding nature as a pure 
resource for highly abstracted figuration. Perhaps there is a balance to be found between 
absorption and vigilance. 
Similar points about how complex mimesis might countermand the problems with 
naïve realism have been made before, but Robinson’s reflexiveness is something different 
from the typical postmodern knowing wink. 77 Robinson is driven not only by the need to 
acknowledge the slippage between word and world, but also by a desire to make room for 
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mystery—a favorite word of Robinson’s. Robinson’s religious sensibility and her literary 
influences inform her stance, which is a celebration of the powers of the human 
imagination that also acknowledges the world’s ultimate resistance to full comprehension. 
In an essay that alludes to her religious upbringing and the Calvinist Protestantism she now 
embraces, she reflects, “I have spent my life watching, not to see beyond the world, merely 
to see, great mystery, what is plainly before my eyes. I think the concept of transcendence is 
based on a misreading of creation. With all respect to heaven, the scene of the miracle is 
here, among us.”78 The sense that what is in front of us is both ordinary and beyond our 
ability to grasp connects Robinson to her American Romantic literary ancestors, figures 
including Emerson, Thoreau, Melville, and Dickinson.  
Robinson’s work, however, takes on a distinctly contemporary flavor in her 
insistence that even as we acknowledge that “the scene of the miracle is here,” we need also 
to remember that nature is not Nature; not a sublime, eternal realm beyond human 
interference. In her essay on “Wilderness,” Robinson makes an argument reminiscent of 
William Cronon’s critique of wilderness when she says, “Every environmental problem is a 
human problem…Wilderness has for a long time figured as an escape from civilization…I 
think we must surrender the idea of wilderness…”79 Robinson casts our tendency to identify 
“nature” with “wilderness” as a dangerous illusion and an evasion of responsibility, saying, 
“If it is no longer to be found in one place, we assume it exists in other places. So the loss 
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of wilderness always seems only relative, and this somewhat mitigates any specific instance 
of abuse…humankind still has to learn certain obvious lessons about living in the world.”80  
Housekeeping bears out Robinson’s sense that Americans err in imagining nature 
as wilderness, the opposite of civilization. As Housekeeping dramatizes through Ruth’s 
story, we do not possess a safe, bounded separation from the world—but neither can we 
achieve a transcendent vision of utterly unbounded selfhood. Instead, we occupy a 
paradoxical position: a “mingled nature” that is coextensive with the mysterious entities of 
water, earth, and air, without being self-same with them. That this view emerges out of the 
very aspects of Robinson’s prose that might be dismissed out of hand as naively realist—her 
roundly characterized first-person narrator and her closely observed interior and exterior 
landscapes—suggests that an unstinting critique of ecomimesis risks flattening and reducing 
literature possessing its own subtle brand of subversion.  
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CHAPTER TWO      
Bearwalking Women, Wisecracking Skunks, and Generous Studs: Louise Erdrich’s 
Trickster Ecology 
I used to make the circuit as a trader at the western powwows, though I am an 
urban Indian myself…I liked it out there in all that dry space; at first that is…It was restful, a 
comfort to let my brain wander across the mystery where sky meets earth. Now, that line 
disturbs me with its lie. Earth and sky touch everywhere and nowhere, like sex between two 
strangers. There is no definition and no union for sure. If you chase that line, it will retreat 
from you at the same pace you set. Heart pounding, air burning in your chest, you’ll 
pursue. Only humans see that line as an actual place. 
—The Antelope Wife 
In this passage from Louise Erdrich’s The Antelope Wife, Klaus Shawano 
recounts how he once admired the way the horizon marks the line between earth and sky. 
Its contour was a pleasure to contemplate, exemplifying the “mystery” of where one thing 
is distinguished from another, or where one thing meets another. In the wake of a failed 
love affair, his feelings have changed. The passage concludes with Klaus avowing that 
“Like love, you’ll never get there [to the horizon]. You’ll never catch it. You’ll never 
know.”81  
Klaus’s meditation on the horizon suggests the travails of romance, but in a broader 
sense, the passage is a commentary on the illusoriness of evident and knowable boundaries. 
As a line separating two realms, the horizon offers “comfort” to Klaus, but if this vision of a 
clearly drawn boundary is comforting, it is also a “lie.” The passage shifts to the second 
person and the narrator addresses the reader directly—“you” will “chase that line,” he says, 
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and “it will retreat from you.” The narrator imposes on the reader his own desperate belief 
in the line “as an actual place,” and the reader’s failed pursuit demonstrates the 
impossibility of that line’s existence. No matter what you do, it “retreat[s] from you at the 
same pace you set.” Like Klaus, the reader must concede that regardless of effort, the line 
remains a paradox, existing “everywhere” and “nowhere” simultaneously (AW, 21). Having 
been initially drawn to the horizon’s mystery, to its refusal to be a simple and stable line, 
Klaus nonetheless expresses deep regret that the horizon cannot be known; it cannot be 
caught. This desire for mastery has infiltrated Klaus’s human relationships too, leading him 
to nothing but disappointment and despair.  
This passage crystallizes Erdrich’s interest in—and her concomitant distrust of—
strict, unyielding boundaries. As in Marilynne Robinson’s Housekeeping, Erdrich’s work 
features repeated references to boundaries, lines, limits, margins, edges, and borders. 
However, whereas Robinson depicts an American culture in which an attraction to stable 
boundaries is a pervasive, long-established feature defied only by a few extraordinary 
individuals, in Erdrich’s work this attraction is an always already problematic trait at the 
heart of a conflict between cultures. Indeed, across Erdrich’s many novels, short stories, 
and even in her memoirs, boundaries are most often figured in terms of trauma to Native 
Americans; they are depicted as the distressing outgrowths of white culture and capitalistic 
land practices. The ancestral lands of her Anishinaabe relations most clearly manifest 
Erdrich’s critique.82 Erdrich’s stories repeatedly disdain the “lines” strictly imposed on the 
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landscape and censure the measurements that reduce a habitat to “cubes” and “squares” to 
be divvied up between individual property owners.83 In Robinson’s Housekeeping, as I 
have argued in Chapter One, the language of boundaries conveys one woman’s awakening 
to interconnections that few others perceive. Robinson uses the bildung novel of 
development, a keystone, individualistic genre of Western literature to tell this story of an 
expanding consciousness. By contrast, Erdrich weaves a story of a whole community 
threatened by imposed boundaries through her use of many distinct voices, recurring 
characters, and overlapping storylines. Erdrich combines the technique of using multiple 
narrators drawn from William Faulkner and other modernists with the fluidity of 
Anishinaabe oral storytelling to tell the stories of “contemporary survivors” who live “in the 
wake of catastrophe”; a catastrophe vividly testified to by the lines slashed across 
Anishinaabe land.84  
The traumatizing lines drawn on the land speak to the historical context behind 
Erdrich’s stories, and specifically to the Dawes Act—an 1887 federal policy that divided 
communal tribal lands into individual allotments. The passage of the Dawes Act was a 
historic shift in policy, but the ideologies that motivated and justified the Act were not new. 
The backers of the Act believed that Native Americans could become civilized by 
                                                                                                                                                 
Heritage [Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 199], 15). I do, however, use other names 
(Chippewa or Ojibwe) when discussing texts themselves that use that term. 
83 The reference to lines is drawn from Tracks (New York: Harper Perennial, 1988), 9. Subsequent 
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Harper Perennial, 1994), 234. Subsequent citations will appear within the text. 
84 Erdrich identifies telling survivor stories as a “task” that Native American writers “must” 
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accepting the concept of private property, owning land, and converting to an agricultural 
lifestyle.85 This identification of acculturation with private property can be traced to John 
Locke, who claimed that the “industrious and rational [man]” will “appropriate” and 
“inclose” [sic] land that had previously been uncultivated.86 Those people who do not 
“improve” the land but leave it “lying waste in common” are inferior.87 As C.B. 
Macpherson has argued, above all, the Lockean approach to democracy glorified 
possessive individualism, advocating for man as the “owner of himself,” the sole 
“proprietor of his person or capacities.”88 In a Lockean view, self-determined man takes 
dominion over land by mixing his labor with it—turning it into property. Locke’s possessive 
individualism contrasts with indigenous philosophies that emphasize mutual dependence 
between the entire host of beings who comprise a given environment. In a traditional 
“kincentric ecology,” present within Anishinaabe culture, land is not a commodity 
individuals have the right to claim; rather, it is a habitat populated by an interconnected 
network of beings with responsibilities to each other.89  
                                                     
85 Senator Dawes himself stated, “Till these people will consent to give up their lands, and divide 
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With this context in mind, I want to suggest that Erdrich’s imagery of strict 
boundaries critically registers the decline of a kincentric worldview in favor of possessive 
individualism. The first part of the following chapter is dedicated to developing this claim 
in several stages. I first explore Erdrich’s imagery of traumatically divided land and suggest 
how this imagery reflects the persistent suffering caused by the conversion to a system of 
private property ownership. I then expand my consideration of traumatic boundaries from 
those on the land to those that appear in other contexts. Erdrich’s desire to represent the 
traumas of property divisions can account for her recurring use of language related to lines 
and limits, but only in part, for across Erdrich’s work boundaries appear elsewhere: in 
addition to lines on the land, she also depicts problematic divisions between humans and 
nonhuman species, as well as harmful separations between humans and their fellow 
humans. In connecting these varying kinds of boundary imagery, I move beyond the 
observations found in existing scholarship about how Erdrich’s work relates to the Dawes 
Act. Reading these different kinds of divides, I propose that Erdrich has a broader 
ambition than merely registering the effects of federal land policies. Instead, her works seek 
to expose the larger cultural ideology of self-rule that motivated and justified those policies.  
In Erdrich’s fiction, traumatic lines may be powerful and pervasive, but they are not 
unassailable. Indeed, my central claim in the second part of the chapter is that Erdrich 
represents the boundary as something meant to be challenged; what is more, she suggests 
that the Anishinaabe storytelling tradition provides the means for this challenge. To 
develop this claim, I consider lines that are successfully crossed, rather than those that—like 
property lines—separate and confine. In Erdrich’s narratives, imagery of crossed lines is 
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often associated with trickster characters; clever, willful mischief-makers. The trickster is a 
central figure in Native American storytelling who, as Lewis Hyde suggests, is above all else 
a “boundary-crosser,” travelling across literal, physical divides as well as breaching social 
distinctions.90 Drawing on Hyde and other theorists who propose the critical potential of 
the trickster, I argue that Erdrich harnesses the power of the trickster to countermand 
separations and reimagine connections. Erdrich does so, I suggest, by depicting trickster 
characters trespassing boundaries in three different contexts. First, I argue that the 
trickster’s identity transformations redraw the lines between humans and animals; second, I 
demonstrate how his pursuit of sensorial pleasures expands a sense of self past personal 
boundaries; third, I suggest how his humor displaces a notion of human superiority and 
separateness. Through these means of challenging divisions, Erdrich confronts the reader 
with a world of rambunctiously interacting, co-implicated agents—a vision quite different 
from the tidy, private boundaries cherished by John Locke and his successors.  While this 
trickster mode of resistance is always partial and inadequate, under siege by the force of 
history, the influence of modernity, and the threat of skepticism, Erdrich nonetheless 
invests trickster’s antics with a real, if imperfect, power. 
In order to make this argument, I read Erdrich’s larger oeuvre as essentially one 
large novel, a strategy that is not without risks. My approach comprises its own kind of 
boundary-crossing, discounting the separation between different books, disparate 
publication dates, and differences in genre and historical context across works. Erdrich’s 
writing style and publication history establish a certain amount of precedent for this 
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impertinence: she writes separately published but deeply interconnected stories across 
which characters and plotlines recur; she also sees her work as constantly evolving, even 
after publication, and has revised and republished several of her novels in different 
formats. In a 2001 interview she even disclosed that she’s “finally figured out” that she is 
really “just working on one long novel.”91 Perhaps, then, my tactic of bringing together 
many of her works to read them as one larger story is not so risky after all, despite the 
relative dearth of scholarship approaching Erdrich’s work in this manner.92  
I. Drawing Lines: The Threat of Boundaries 
In Tracks, white surveyors enter the reservation and begin to “draw lines across the 
land” to prepare it for logging (9). The use of the verb “draw,” with its connotation of a 
creative activity, is an ironic one, since surveying the landscape presages the destruction of 
the trees and “all that lived in their shadows” (209). This instance of connection between 
division and destruction is characteristic, I want to suggest, of Erdrich’s tendency to figure 
boundaries on the land as traumatic impositions—introductions that brutalize the land and 
its human inhabitants. Nanapush, one of the oldest surviving men in the tribe and one of 
the novel’s two narrators, convinces the reader of the devastating impact of these “cut[s]” to 
the land made by the invading “profit-seekers” (209, 9). He speaks achingly of staring 
blankly at a foreclosure map, a document covered in “lines” delineating which “allotments” 
will be sold or forfeited to the government (173). He warns Fleur Pillager that the 
                                                     
91 Erdrich, “Louise Erdrich,” Interview with Alden Mudge, BookPage, April 2001, 
https://bookpage.com/interviews/8091-louise-erdrich#.V777BpgrKCg. 
92 Existing scholarship does often consider together the more clearly interconnecting plotlines or 
recurring characters—for instance, some writers group certain of her novels together as the “Love 
Medicine novels” or the “Matchimanito novels”—but few publications traverse her work more 
broadly. 
  
77
surveyors’ work threatens her ancestral dwelling place, saying, “The land will go…The land 
will be sold and measured” (8). Since we expect land to be measured and then sold, the 
passage ironically reverses the order here. The distinctive syntax prioritizes the 
measurement of the land itself. In doing so, it implies that measurement is not merely a 
means by which the land will be lost, but rather an inherently injurious tactic, dividing the 
natural, freeform complexity of a landscape into rigid little squares. These divisions have 
such a negative impact on tribal life that Nanapush conceptualizes time itself as being 
divided into “before the boundaries were set” and afterwards (32). 
Negative depictions of land-based boundaries appear throughout Erdrich’s novels, 
and are especially apparent in her fiction set in a more distant past. The motif of the 
traumatic boundary there reflects the historical contexts of Erdrich’s interwoven stories of 
Anishinaabe life. In The Last Report on the Miracles at Little No Horse, an omniscient 
narrator explains how the land’s appearance in 1912 embodies a complex set of historical 
power struggles. The narrator describes how arbitrary divisions are made based on who is 
currently in authority: 
The reservation at that time…[appeared] solid only on a map, taking 
in and cutting out whole farms, sometimes on the say-so of the 
commissioner, or the former agent Tatro, and other times attempting to 
right itself according to law…As with most other reservations, the 
government policy of attempting to excite pride in private ownership by 
doling parcels of land to individual Ojibwe flopped miserably and provided 
a feast of acquisition for hopeful farmers and surrounding entrepreneurs. 
So the boundaries came and went, drawn to accommodate local ventures—
sawmills, farms, feed stores, the traplines of various families.93  
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The “law” that Erdrich references is the Dawes Act, which in 1887 disbanded communally-
held tribal lands and distributed plots to individuals. The purpose was to encourage Native 
Americans to farm, but for cultural and logistical reasons, Native Americans were ill-
equipped for agricultural success.94 The consequences for Native American life were dire. 
When farms failed, the plots would typically go out of Native American hands altogether, 
into the hands of white settlers, and between 1887 and 1932 Native American landholdings 
were reduced by roughly two-thirds.95 In short, as Erdrich’s description in The Last Report 
indicates, the introduction of property boundaries served to benefit everyone but the 
Anishinaabeg.  
With this context in mind, we might better understand how Erdrich’s imagery of 
imposed boundaries dramatizes the negative consequences of an historical transition to 
private property imposed upon Native American societies. In her historical novels in 
particular, Erdrich emphasizes the devastating impact on communal cultural identity. The 
story of the Kashpaws’ betrayal of Nanapush and Fleur, told in Tracks, is an apt example. 
The Kashpaws band together with Fleur and Nanapush in a desperate effort to save all of 
their plots from forfeiture, but the Kashpaws secretly arrange to save their own more 
monetarily valuable allotment at the expense of Fleur’s parcel. When their duplicity is 
discovered, Nector Kashpaw attempts to justify himself using “words about land value, and 
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the convenience of a house nearer the crossroads” (211). Nector’s excuses about “land 
value” and “convenience” mirrors the capitalistic assessments of the white land agents; he 
has acceded to their worldview, one which treats nature as a resource to be evaluated 
according to profit potential and accessibility. As Nanapush puts it, Nector has chosen 
“foresight, shrewdness, greed, all that would make him a good politician” (209). The 
description of Nector as “shrewd” indicates the degree to which Nector’s attitude has been 
shaped by the dominant (white) cultural position, for shrewdness is depicted as the trait that 
distinguishes whites from Native Americans. Elsewhere in the novel Pauline Puyat, a half-
crazed part-Anishinaabe girl who wants to erase her Native American heritage, suggests that 
God had “obviously made the whites more shrewd” (139). Pauline intends this as an 
indictment of the Anishinaabe people, but the novel’s depiction of Nector as a calculating 
politician complicates Pauline’s appraisal of shrewdness as a desirable trait.  
The story of Fleur’s dispossession reflects the larger theme that the division of the 
land ensures loss of culture. Pauline’s characterization, too, connects the land’s divisions to 
cultural erasure, though she celebrates the change. Toward the end of Tracks, Pauline 
smugly declares that “a surveyor’s crew arrived at the turnoff to Matchimanito…and set to 
measuring. Surely that was the work of Christ’s hand…the land will be sold and divided” 
(205). When Pauline credits the measurements and divisions to Christ, who in her fantasies 
is a blue-eyed white man, her narrative identifies Christianity and capitalist land practices as 
two facets of a destructive cultural ideology. In addition, Pauline’s identity toward the end 
of the novel ominously aligns her with the measurements of the surveyors: she becomes an 
arithmetic teacher, attempting to “add” the souls of children to those she has already 
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“numbered” (205). We suspect she will wreak further havoc, and we are not surprised 
when, in subsequent novels and stories, we see Pauline continually associated with similar 
rational language and similar traumas. 
In Erdrich’s more contemporary settings of the 1980s and 1990s, the historical 
Dawes Act is now a century in the past. Its repercussions, however, are quite present. 
Erdrich’s contemporary tales counter the myth of the vanishing Indian by representing the 
Anishinaabe as a living people with both strengths and shortcomings, fully engaged with 
contemporary America. However, very real threats to the tribe’s cohesion and continuance 
still exist, and foremost among them is the issue of land. In these contemporary settings, 
the boundaries of private property are depicted in terms of continuing trauma. In The 
Round House, for instance, property lines are a threat to justice. The investigation into a 
vicious rape is stymied by confusion over whether the rape took place on or off the 
reservation—a situation that exists because of the confusing patchwork quilt of different 
kinds of land ownership in the area, including reservation land, privately owned land, and 
land leased to whites by the tribe.  
In The Bingo Palace, boundaries are associated with cultural erasure and racism. 
As young Lipsha drives by the “shelter belts and fields that divide the world into squares” 
he imagines “the chaos underneath.”96 He sees “the signs and boundaries and markers on 
the surface” which are “laid out strict.” His narration defamiliarizes the farmers’ plots that 
must seem unremarkable to many readers, uncovering the contingency of the 
contemporary landscape. While the strictness of the agricultural fields is seemingly 
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intractable, Lipsha is aware that the divisions are only superficial, “so recent” that they bring 
to mind “how little time has passed since everything was high grass, taller than we stand, 
thicker, with no end” (234). Lipsha imagines the geography of the past as a profligacy that 
contrasts with the land’s current monotonous divisions. “Beasts covered it,” he continues. 
“Birds by the million. Buffalo…No ditches. Sloughs, rivers, and over all the winds, the vast 
winds blowing and careening with nothing in the way to stop them” (234). As the mention 
of the vanished buffalo suggests, the physical demarcations of the farms embody the legacy 
of white domination. They are visual signifiers of the racist discourse about primitivism and 
civilization. In place of the grass and animals “with no end,” now the land is carved up, and 
the blowing wind runs continually into obstructions, just as the freedom of Native 
Americans themselves has been curtailed by centuries of oppression.  
When Lipsha is kidnapped by a group of men led by the bigoted Marty, the 
relationship between property lines and racism becomes even more evident. Marty plans to 
forcibly tattoo Lipsha with an image of his home state, Montana. Lipsha asks Marty’s 
companions “Are any of you guys from any other state?” in the hopes that they will agree 
to tattoo him with a different shape (80). Unfortunately the men hail from Kansas and 
South Dakota, and Lipsha reflects, “It isn’t that I really have a thing against those places, 
understand, it’s just that the straight-edged shape is not a Chippewa preference. You look 
around, and everything you see is round, everything in nature. There are no perfect 
boundaries, no natural borders except winding rivers” (80). Lipsha’s humorous 
commentary compactly suggests several reasons that the Chippewa sensibility chafes against 
“straight-edged” shapes. For one thing, these divisions are artificial, as Lipsha indicates 
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when he contrasts Montana’s man-made edges with an undulating river’s natural boundary. 
But the “perfect boundaries” of Montana, South Dakota, and Kansas also disturb Lipsha 
because they physically manifest the trauma wrought on his people, as the partition of land 
into arbitrary regions, cities, states and so on was one part of the dispossession and 
disenfranchisement of Native Americans. The division of the freeform landscape into 
artificially square states might be “perfect”—as in, entirely straight—but Lipsha’s 
commentary underscores the violence inherent in this unnatural sort of perfection. 
Lipsha’s story in The Bingo Palace dramatizes how even for Erdrich’s Native 
American characters living in the twentieth century, private property continues to chafe. In 
the stories set in the more distant past, boundaries divided the tribe and frayed their social 
fabric; in Erdrich’s more contemporary tales, the boundaries of twentieth century America 
interrupt characters’ ability to connect their heritage. Like all of the young characters in 
Erdrich’s novels, Lipsha negotiates his identity and seeks a “place...[to] fit”—although his is 
perhaps an especially desperate search for connection, given his uncertainty about his 
parentage (9). While he critiques the sharp edges of Western culture, his own desires and 
behaviors have been infected by the very value system he has been claiming to reject. After 
scorning square states as “not a Chippewa preference” because they artificially divide up 
the natural complexity of the environment, he suddenly realizes that his own most prized 
object demonstrates his hypocrisy. He reflects, “Only human-made things tend toward 
cubes and squares—the van, for instance. That is an example. Suddenly I realize that I am 
driving a four-wheeled version of North Dakota” (80).  Lipsha’s successful use of his luck 
to acquire the van has backfired. The van is not a mark of success, but an indication that he 
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has internalized the norms of Marty and his ilk. His treasured van reflects the same 
divided, measured, and parceled mentality of personal property visible in the artificial 
boundaries between states. Lipsha is horrified by the significance of this association, since 
he has become indoctrinated into the very culture that dehumanizes him. Lipsha’s story is 
joined by similar plotlines in Erdrich’s other contemporary settings, including the story of 
Jack Mauser’s failed subdivisions, Richard Whiteheart Beads’s toxic waste-disposal 
corporation, and Lyman Lamartine’s tacky fake-tomahawk factory.97 In all of these 
instances, Anishinaabe or métis (mixed-heritage) characters are alienated from sustaining 
culture and community by the sharp edges of private property.  
I have been arguing that Erdrich’s recurring imagery of boundaries registers the 
longstanding impacts of federal land policies on Native American life. That said, fields and 
forests are not the only places where boundaries materialize: the motif appears throughout 
Erdrich’s work, in many seemingly disparate contexts. In some instances, these divisions 
exist between humans and other species. In Tracks, for instance, Pauline fights to keep her 
body separate from animals wherever possible; she runs away rather than touch the “skins 
of animals” and refuses “to prick [her] fingers with [porcupine] quills” while beading (14). 
In The Bingo Palace, when Lipsha spends a night in the woods, he fears the entrance of 
“invisible intruders,” including the deer that he imagines “could step on me down here on 
the ground” (196). He longs for separation, wishing he had “at least built a little place for 
                                                     
97 Jack Mauser’s unsuccessful housing developments appear inTales of Burning Love (New York: 
HarperCollins, 1996), while Richard Whiteheart Beads’s shady garbage business appears in The 
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The Bingo Palace and Love Medicine (Revised ed., New York: Harper Perennial, 1994), 4. 
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myself up in the trees” and curls deeply into his sleeping bag, shouting periodically to stave 
off each fresh “advance of nature” (196). At other times, the boundary at issue is that which 
divides humans from other humans. In The Last Report, we read that Father Damien (also 
known as Agnes, a woman pretending to be a priest), struggling with attraction toward 
Father Gregory, is separated from him by “a double wall of books stacked between them,” 
a “blanket divider,” and finally, by the “boundaries of skin” (199-200). When in The Bingo 
Palace Lipsha is living in Minneapolis, he is depicted as “building up a seal of corrosion, 
hardening himself”, language that mirrors the description in Love Medicine of his mother 
June as having “hard and brittle” skin that keeps the world out (8).98 
Why are all of these boundaries at stake? I want to propose that it is because 
Erdrich’s larger target is not the capitalist land system itself, but the cultural ideology that 
lies behind it. The author of the Dawes Act, Congressman Henry Dawes, stated that to be 
civilized meant that one would “wear civilized clothes…cultivate the ground, live in houses, 
ride in Studebaker wagons, send children to school…[and] own property.”99 His faith in the 
civilizing power of property ownership and agriculture was founded on a long tradition of 
liberal individualism in Western society, one which took an especially firm root in 
American culture. Founding fathers and early European settlers alike took inspiration from 
John Locke, who proposes that land is meant to be owned and controlled by individuals in 
a system where “self-interested, industrious men” can increase the worth of their private 
                                                     
98 Erdrich, Love Medicine, 4. 
99 “Archives of the West” (PBS Interactive 2001) 
http://www.pbs.org/weta/thewest/resources/archives/eight/dawes.htm. 
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landholdings.100 In this view, American-ness becomes “inextricably bound up with…[an] 
ongoing effort to divide and privatize the land according to capitalist precepts.”101 
The influence of liberal individualism on seminal definitions of American identity 
is evident as early as J. Hector de St. Jean de Crèvecoeur’s Letters from an American 
Farmer, published in 1782. As Crèvecoeur’s narrator Farmer James, demonstrates the 
influence of liberal individualism as he identifies property ownership with exhilarating 
autonomy. Farmer James proclaims “The instant I enter on my own land, the bright idea of 
property, of exclusive right, of independence exalt my mind.”102 If the American citizen is 
defined by his “exclusive…independence,” it is an independence proved through his 
dominion over his individually-held land. A liberal individualist perspective conceives of 
land as a commodity which can be redeemed from its so-called unproductive state by the 
self-motivated efforts of the diligent individual. A century later, in his famous frontier 
thesis, Frederick Jackson Turner attempted to answer the same question that motivated 
Crèvecoeur’s text: what is an American?103 Turner’s answer, like Crèvecoeur’s, placed 
liberal individualism at the heart of American identity. Turner proposes that confronting 
and taming the frontier’s wilderness creates a spirit of independence that became a 
quintessential American characteristic.104 Turner controversially posited that American 
                                                     
100 Laura L. Basson, White Enough to be American?: Race Mixing, Indigenous People, and the 
Boundaries of State and Nation (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 16. 
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103 See Turner, The Frontier in American History (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920). 
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civilization relies on the continued existence of so-called free land (which, in reality, was 
already occupied by Native Americans). In these influential voices, self-rule proved by 
dominion over nature is the defining feature of an American. 
These ideological bases for the Dawes Act, however, are odds with an ecological 
view that emphasizes reciprocity between interrelated, non-hierarchical beings, or what 
Raramuri anthropologist Enrique Salmón has termed a “kincentric ecology.” Salmón 
defines a kincentric ecology as the belief that “plants, animals, humans, stones, the land, all 
share the same breath.”105 Implicit in this idea is the sense that nonhuman beings, even what 
would typically be considered inert matter, are agential and interacting with humans, rather 
than humans merely acting upon them. Given that he is generalizing about a single 
indigenous worldview, his claims bear our scrutiny.  
However, several Anishinaabe sources do confirm the importance of such an “all 
my relations” perspective to Anishinaabe culture. In his discussion of the Anishinaabe 
creation tale, Anishinaabe scholar Lawrence Gross interprets the tale as a lesson about 
environmental kinship, saying, “The old Anishinaabe felt they were in a relationship with 
other-than-human people or, more to the point, they saw other than-human people as 
relatives.”106 Like Gross, Anishinaabe environmental activist and writer Winona LaDuke 
emphasizes connectedness and mutual dependency of all aspects of creation as a central 
                                                     
105 Salmón, “Kincentric Ecology,” 1328  
106Anishinaabe Ways of Knowing and Being (Farnham, GB: Ashgate, 2014), 210. That’s not to say 
that this relationship is a perfectly harmonious; Gross says, “as we all know, family relationships are 
filled with delight and fraught with difficulty” (210).  
  
87
belief of the Anishinaabe people.107 LaDuke uses the even more communal-sounding 
phrase “all our relations,” which has been adopted by many other thinkers and writers, 
including Deborah McGregor, an Anishinaabe woman from Wiigwaaskinga (Birch Island, 
Ontario). In an essay titled “Honoring Our Relations,” McGregor explains how the 
relational aspect of Anishinaabe culture anticipates current environmental debates.108 Like 
King and Salmon, McGregor contrasts the reciprocity of the Anishinaabe philosophy with 
a Western perspective, which McGregor accuses of imagining that the environment is 
“somehow separate from us.”109 All of these voices concur: human identity is inseparable 
from the earth and all the active, embodied forms of life who inhabit it. The similarities 
between what Salmón calls a kincentric worldview and the interests propelling the material 
turn in ecocriticism have prompted several scholars to note, quite rightly, that New 
Materialism is not altogether new after all; considerations of relational being and the agency 
of the material world are already present in many indigenous philosophies.110 
Within Erdrich’s fictional universe, traditional kincentric views clash with dominant 
American mores. It is that “old longhair” Nanapush, one of Erdrich’s most recurring and 
most beloved characters, who most vigorously conveys a traditional kincentric outlook 
(Tracks 208). In The Last Report on the Miracles at Little No Horse, Nanapush preaches 
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a message of interdependence to Father Damien, who incorporates it into his personal 
belief system despite being white and Catholic. In a letter to the Pope, Father Damien asks 
his interlocutor to “Consider the word spirit, manidoo…and all of the forms in which it 
resides” (315). He says, “what we [Westerners] call vermin, insects, the lowest form of life 
are [in Ojibwe culture] manidooens, little spirits, [in a] philosophy that so unites the 
smallest to the largest, for the great, kind intelligence, the Gizhe Manito, shares its name 
with the humblest creature” (315).111 The way the Anishinaabe people emphasize 
resemblance and consistency even between creatures with greatly disparate sizes implicitly 
contrasts with a Western Linnean taxonomy that aims to distinguish and categorize species 
according to a clear hierarchy.  
Elsewhere, Nanapush actually embodies the profound connection between the land 
and its native inhabitants. Nanapush hears and feels the loggers’ axes not as a bystander to 
destruction, but as one being destroyed. He tells us, “I weakened into an old man as one 
oak went down, another and another was lost, as a gap formed here, a clearing there, and 
plain daylight entered” (9). The “gap” and “clearing” push apart the trees that once formed 
a dense forest; likewise, the humans who are part of this ecosystem are threatened with 
disintegration. Like other members of the tribe, Nanapush is newly transformed into a 
breakable being: “Days passed, weeks, and we didn’t leave the cabin for fear we’d crack our 
cold and fragile bodies…there were many other people who died in this manner, of the 
invisible sickness” (6). Nanapush links the destruction of the forest to human disintegration 
                                                     
111 Father Damien’s characterization here is consistent with how Margaret Noodin describes these 
spirits; she says, “Manidoog can be the smallest part of the world personified or a kind of grand, 
indescribable beauty.” See Bawaajimo: A Dialect of Dreams in Anishinaabe Language and 
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and death, depicted in images of “invisible sickness” and the “crack[ing]” of “fragile 
bodies.”  
Nanapush’s viewpoint is sympathetic, but it is not the only one portrayed in 
Erdrich’s work. Erdrich accentuates the wealth of perspectives present in the Anishinaabe 
community about which she writes, especially in her use of multiple narrators, and the view 
of Anishinaabe culture that emerges from these many voices is far from monolithic. 
Nevertheless, Erdrich’s works do not exactly remain neutral; even as she sensitively 
explores the various ways contemporary Native Americans live, her works consistently 
suggest the value of Nanapush’s kincentric philosophy. As P. Jane Hafen puts it, “The 
earth and tribal peoples have a symbiotic relationship; they are mutually self-defining” and 
“Forgetting reciprocal dependence leads to destruction.”112  
In the character of Lyman Lamartine, for instance, Erdrich powerfully represents 
just how easy and just how perilous this forgetting can be. Lyman is the big cheese on the 
reservation due to his business acumen and wealth, but in The Bingo Palace narrator 
Lipsha begins to question whether Lyman is actually a “bland Velveeta” whose plan to 
build a casino is economically sound but ethically suspect (15). When Lipsha reluctantly 
accompanies Lyman on a vision quest near Fleur Pillager’s land, Lipsha comments on the 
irony of searching for spiritual illumination from the very place one plans to carve up and 
bulldoze. He says, “I can’t figure Lyman here. We are nearing the very same rolling, sweet, 
wooded hills that he wants to use for the big casino that he plans…I know that Lyman has 
thought out consequences and big-time benefits, but I believe, now, that he hasn’t really 
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examined the personal” (190). For Lyman land and animals are resources, not kin, and 
thus the issue is not “personal” at all.  
It is when Lyman travels to a casino gaming conference that the destruction caused 
by this impersonal ideology becomes especially evident. Surrounded by artificial opulence 
demonstrating the final results of business principles like his own, he is “anxious and 
uncertain” (89). His hotel room is no escape: the “jungle bronze” décor includes a “vast 
and tigerish” bed, furniture covered with “oil and black leopard spots…chairs of molded 
plastic. Green shag carpeted the floor, long flows of greasy yarn” (89). The room is a 
bizarre recreation of a natural environment, right down to the grasslike green carpet. 
Seeking to dull his anxiety, Lyman orders item after item, including a diet soda, a fruit salad 
that looks “as though plastic wrap was molded to [it],” and—in a clever nod to Lyman’s “big 
cheese” status—a plate of “Super Grande Nachos” (90-91). As this orgy of consumption 
culminates, Lyman experiences no relief. In fact, while his “outside expression” is “fixed, 
serene,” the “real face that was hidden” wears an expression of “bewildered dread” (92). 
Far from being a proudly self-sufficient landowner à la John Locke, Lyman is distressingly 
alone, and when in the next scene he desperately pawns the sacred peace pipe handed 
down through generations, his spiritual solitude is complete.  
Lyman is no villain; his enthusiastic entrepreneurship is driven in part by his desire 
to improve his struggling community’s future. Nonetheless, his characterization is a darkly 
humorous commentary on the dangers of rejecting reciprocal dependence. Instead of 
exploding old limitations, Lyman has created new boundaries, even within himself: at the 
end of the casino conference, Lyman is “two people then, split” and things have “soured” 
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entirely (93). In this way, Erdrich suggests that his actions are ironically similar to those of 
the white capitalists who created the limits he sees himself as working against. 
II. Trickster Overruns All Boundaries 
When boundaries gall, the temptation must be to breach them—and in The Blue 
Jay’s Dance, one of Erdrich’s memoirs, she playfully recounts her decision to do just that. 
She remembers becoming obsessed with the fence that separates her from a wildlife park. 
“Walking along the boundary of the park no longer satisfies me,” she complains; she is 
“rankle[d]” by the “deceptive stability of that fence.” 113 Erdrich is irresistibly drawn to move 
across this dividing line and reveal it for what it is: flimsy and contingent. “Longing fills 
me,” she exclaims; “I am filled with a poacher’s lust, except I want only to smell the 
air…From that moment I begin to see the fence as permeable, it is no longer a fence…I 
know I must trespass” (180). She steps across.  
Erdrich’s self-description resembles a trickster figure, a mischief-maker featured 
across many storytelling traditions, including that of the Anishinaabe—and, as I will argue, a 
persona that Erdrich adapts to great effect. Tricksters are known for their shape-shifting 
abilities, for their voracious sexual appetites, and for their facility with language. They are 
playful wordsmiths and hilarious joke-tellers. These attributes have in common the larger 
theme of transgression: above all, the trickster occupies a liminal position, allowing him to 
cross and re-cross boundaries.114 This movement is where the value of the trickster lies, for 
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in his peregrinations, trickster renders fluid and contingent what appeared to be 
intransigent. As A. Joseph Ward puts it, “Trickster’s value to humans is…in his ability to 
suggest alternatives to what seems fixed.”115 It is in trickster boundary-crossing, I want to 
propose, that Erdrich finds the critical potential to counter the ideology of possessive 
individualism. 
In The Blue Jay’s Dance Erdrich’s border-crossing consists of a literal act of 
trespass across property lines, but her fictional tricksters’ incursions are more subtle. Their 
boundary-crossings occur in three primary ways, all of which build on traditional trickster 
attributes: first, the trickster’s identity transformations redraw the lines between humans 
and animals; second, his pursuit of sensorial pleasures expands a sense of self past personal 
boundaries; third, his humor displaces a notion of human superiority and separateness. 
These trickster crossings might be different than Erdrich’s self-described barrier-hopping, 
but the subversive potential is the same. Like Erdrich’s step that reveals the fence to be 
“permeable” and thus “no longer a fence,” trickster crossings instantiate an ontological shift 
(BJD 180). The cherished American notion of the autonomous, self-determining human is 
revealed to be as unreliable as that flimsy fence.  
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a. Where Species Meet: Trickster Transformations 
“Nanabush” (also called Nanabozho or Wenebozho, among other spellings) is the 
most prominent Anishinaabe trickster. Basil Johnston describes Nanabush as an 
“intermediary on earth between different species of beings.”116 To fulfill this purpose, 
Nanabush has “powers of transformation….[he can] become a corporeal being of any 
species such as a willow tree, a beaver, a stump, or even a cloud” (159).  Erdrich’s 
Nanapush is her take on the Nanabush figure, and Nanapush shares many attributes with 
the Nanabush of Anishinaabe stories, including a transformational capacity and the 
tendency of playing mediating role between humans and nonhumans.117 These trickster 
characteristics allow Nanapush to facilitate blendings between humans and animals, 
transformations that suggest the power of a kincentric view.  
In Tracks, for instance, when Nanapush guides Eli Kashpaw in a hunt, Nanapush 
upends species dichotomies in favor of images of physical overlap and connection. When 
Eli distractedly wanders further away from his prey, forgetting “what he hunted, what sign 
to look for or to follow,” Nanapush is able to mediate between Eli and the moose, despite 
being physically left behind in the cabin (101). Nanapush can see “the track of Eli’s 
snowshoes” in front of him and can influence Eli’s actions, and he “exert[s]” himself in 
order to properly guide Eli’s shot, using his songs to “direct[] it to fly true” (102-3). 
Nanapush’s guidance allows for Eli and the moose to become enmeshed. When Eli kills 
the moose, the passage’s imagery draws increasingly intimate intersections between Eli and 
the moose’s body. Eli is depicted as being engrossed, drawn in by the moose’s flesh—“The 
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warmth of the carcass dizzie[s] him”—and then melding with the animal physically as he 
“carefully remove[s] the liver, slice[s] off a bit” to eat (103). Eli affixes the butchered 
animal’s body to himself, and the passage’s verbs develop an increasing enmeshment 
between the two beings as the moose is “secured,” “fitted,” “knotted” “bound” and 
“wrapped” to Eli’s flesh (103). This imagery of attachment complements the imagery of 
ingestion; both underscore that human existence is predicated on animal lives. 
Physical dependence is only one part of a kincentric ecology; equally important is 
recognizing that the non-humans with whom we are integrated are agents in their own 
right.118 In the moose hunt, animals are depicted as the driving forces behind the embodied 
connections. When Nanapush recounts how he gains his ability to direct Eli’s actions, he 
says, “I began to sing slowly, calling on my helpers, until the words that came from my 
mouth were not mine…until the song sang itself, and there, in the deep bright drifts, I saw 
the track of Eli’s snowshoes” (101). After petitioning the “helpers”—animal spirits called 
manitous—to assist him, Nanapush becomes a conduit for words that are not his own.119 By 
merging his consciousness with that of the spirit, Nanapush relinquishes the perception of 
complete individual autonomy. His verbiage changes from “I sang” to “the song sang 
itself,” and the deletion of the active human subject (“I”) conveys that the actions that 
follow are not under Nanapush’s singular control.  Paradoxically, Nanapush is able to gain 
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power explicitly because he is subordinated; he is able to guide the hunt because he knows 
that he relies on a network of other beings.  
Moreover, Eli’s successful hunt is due not only to the influence of the manitous, 
Nanapush, and his own actions; it also relies on the moose’s will. In a Western view, the 
moose belongs to two categorizations that would typically preclude agency—he is both a 
dumb animal as well as recently deceased. Erdrich’s telling upends those classifications by 
depicting the moose as a participant in this inter-species negotiation. After the moose is 
killed, the text implies that the moose has been participating in—or even directing—its own 
death and butchering. When Eli hoists the moose’s carcass, the glove-like fit between Eli’s 
body and that of the moose obscures whether Eli is co-opting the animal’s vigor or whether 
the moose is remaking itself through Eli. Initially, the human is the agent—Eli “presse[s] to 
himself a new body”—but soon the moose seems to exert itself: “The meat [stands] on its 
own in pieces, a moose transformed into the mold of Eli, an armor that would fit no other” 
(103, 104). The sentence structures make the “meat” and the “moose” into characters, 
lending them active roles in their transformation.  
The moose’s active involvement in his demise is consonant with the Anishinaabe 
belief that when hunted with respect, animals give themselves to the hunter.120 In keeping 
with this vision of hunting as a joint pursuit involving multiple wills, the moose’s death has 
incorporated various actors—Eli, Nanapush, and the animal spirits—into a swirl of 
interrelated identities. All possess some measure of agency, yet none can stand on his own. 
As Nanapush and Eli share the lifegiving meal made possible by the moose, Nanapush 
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declares to Eli that “You’re my son” (105). This brash declaration evidences Nanapush’s 
trickster impulsiveness (one good meal and he’s claiming paternity!) while also making a 
genuine statement about the bonds that have been solidified through the hunt. As the 
boundaries separating human-self and animal-other have been negotiated and crossed, 
multiple kinships have been acknowledged: those between the manitous and humans, the 
moose and humans, and now, those between the lonely Nanapush and the needy Eli.  
I have been emphasizing how Erdrich draws on Nanabush’s traditional trickster 
capacities, but Erdrich also tells tales of transformations that go against the grain of 
tradition. One way that she alters tradition is in relation to gender: while in the traditional 
trickster tales on which Nanapush’s characterization draws, trickster is almost always male, 
Erdrich is not content to restrict trickster power to male characters.121 In Tracks, Fleur is 
characterized as a female trickster who has some aspects in common with Nanabush, but 
who ultimately possesses her own twist on a traditional trickster identity. Like Nanabush, 
Fleur’s identity is not limited to her human embodiment: she has a mysterious alliance with 
a lynx-like lake spirit named Misshepeshu. She is also what is known as a bearwalker, a 
sorcerer who can take either a human or an ursine form: as Fleur’s footsteps move deeper 
into the woods, they gradually change into bear tracks. 122 While bearwalkers aren’t 
traditionally considered tricksters, in Fleur’s characterization Erdrich combines some 
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aspects of bearwalking—strength and courage—with more trickster-like characteristics 
including laughter (Fleur is said to laugh with a bear’s chuffing cough) and sexual power. 
Perhaps Fleur’s greatest transformation, though, occurs through childbearing, when 
she gives birth to Lulu—who in turn becomes quite a trickster, as we will see later in this 
chapter. For this form of transformation to come to fruition, Fleur must express an identity 
that incorporates her animal kin. First, she channels all of the animal spirits that run 
through her. She calls out in the voice of the loon, the turtle, the eagle. Most powerful of all 
is the bear’s “low rasp,” and soon an actual bear appears, wandering blindly into the house 
where Fleur is in labor. When Fleur sees the bear she is “filled with such fear and power” 
that she gives birth immediately (60). Recounting the story, Nanapush speculates that this 
could be a spirit bear since it disappears suddenly into the woods, leaving no tracks behind. 
Thus the bear’s pivotal entrance might be understood as an assertion of part of Fleur’s own 
identity. Further supporting this possibility is the fact that bears signify strength and courage 
in Anishinaabe stories, and Fleur’s bearwalking occurs during her fiercest effort.123 But if we 
try to determine whether the bear is a bear or solely a dimension of Fleur’s own 
personality—in other words, if we attempt to decide whether Fleur is rescued by an other, 
or by her self—we see that Fleur’s fluid, kaleidoscopic characterization renders the 
distinction moot. In Fleur’s labor, as in other scenes in which animals and humans 
encounter each other, humans are depicted not as clearly separated individuals but as fluid 
personas penetrating and being penetrated by nonhuman bodies, consciousnesses, and 
                                                     
123 Johnston, Ojibway Heritage, 53. 
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agencies. As Erdrich’s trickster characters negotiate human-animal boundaries, they reveal 
that any line that would divide a human from her animal others is provisional. 
In fact, Erdrich’s images of human-animal blendings comprise one part of her 
larger theme of the mutual constitution between all parts of the environment. In The Last 
Report on the Miracles at Little No Horse, Agnes (also known as Father Damien), 
contrasts the animistic worldview embodied in the Anishinaabe language with the gender 
dualism reflected in English. Instead of the English practice of categorizing nouns by 
gender distinction, in the Ojibwe language, everything is either “alive or dead.” She 
explains, 
Each thing is either animate or inanimate, which would at first seem 
remarkably simple and sensible, for in the western mind the quality of 
aliveness or deadness seems easy to discern. Not so. For the Anishinaabeg, 
the quality of animation from within, or harboring spirit, is not limited to 
plants and animals. Stones, asiniig, are animate, and kettles, akikoog, alive 
as well…there is room for individual preference, too. Some old men believe 
their pants are animate….Ojibwemowin is a language lean in objects. That 
leaves its bewildering wealth to reside in the storm of verbs and verb forms 
(257-258). 
 
Agnes characterizes Ojibwemowin by contrasting it with the strict and singular 
categorizations of Western thinking. Her story about the word “pants” changing depending 
on the speaker’s level of frustration with his clothing vividly suggests that the Ojibwe 
language constructs identity in a much more flexible way than English. Ojibwemowin relies 
on a “storm of verbs and verb forms”; it is a language emphasizing action, not being. In 
other words, in contrast to English noun assignments, which are static, Ojibwemowin 
constructs identities that come into being through particular deeds. Because identities come 
into being through specific actions, they are contingent and changeable based on 
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subsequent interactions. Erdrich’s tricky transformations between beings emphasize the 
fluidity of both human and animal identities; identity only emerges through interactions 
and these interactions never cease. The animism embraced by Agnes enlarges that theme 
by representing every form of identity as fluid and ever-emergent, continually being created 
and recreated in relation to other “harboring spirit[s].”  
Linguistically, the imagery of blending and reciprocity function as contrast to those 
moments of traumatic division I have explored above. But if we want to read these 
moments as representing a vision with philosophical or ethical relevance for contemporary 
readers, we inevitably run into complications. Considering the passage above, for example, 
we see that working against the compelling vision of de-colonization presented in Father 
Damien’s story is the evident irony of this passage being written in English, the very 
language being critiqued. Readers may well wonder: does Erdrich herself have the kind of 
“Western mind” that the passage derides? Could there even be a true escape from such a 
mind? Agnes’s commentary points to the tension between Erdrich’s aim to “protect[] and 
celebrat[e] the cores of [Native American] cultures left in the wake of the catastrophe [of 
extermination and cultural erasure]” and Erdrich’s own complex position—including her 
significant Western education, limited knowledge of her ancestral language, and her 
commercial success as a widely read contemporary American writer. 124 From a certain point 
                                                     
124 For Erdrich’s statement about celebrating core cultures, see “Where I Ought to Be: A Writer’s 
Sense of Place.” In terms of educational background, Erdrich was one of the first women who 
graduated from Dartmouth College, and she went on to earn a Master’s degree at Johns Hopkins. 
(See “Louise Erdrich on Drawing Inspiration from Native American Heritage,” Interview with Bill 
Moyers, April 9, 2010, http://billmoyers.com/content/writer-louise-erdrich/.) In early interviews, 
Erdrich mentions that she does not speak the Anishinaabe language (sometimes called 
Ojibwemowin) but by 2010 was giving interviews in which she extolled the importance of learning 
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of view, Erdrich may be seen as a safe part of the world of measuring and selling that, as I 
have been arguing, her novels seem to critique. Moreover, while Erdrich’s attempts are 
informed by both her personal engagement with the legacies of Anishinaabe culture and 
her historical research on traditional beliefs, her representations of human-nonhuman 
relationality risk being received as problematically romanticized or essentialist—or perhaps, 
to be fair to Erdrich, it is taking these moments out of their original contexts and bringing 
them together that risks domesticating her work in this way. 
Erdrich is clearly sensitive to just such concerns—she has indicated as much 
repeatedly in interviews where she discusses her mixed heritage (she has German, French, 
and Anishinaabe ancestry), her hesitations about being labeled a Native American writer, 
and her worry that she might be received as didactic.125 One way she attempts to resist being 
read in this manner is by regularly incorporating ironic winks that offset the more earnest 
characterizations of Native American tradition. For instance, while Nanapush’s 
characterization in Tracks suggests the power of a kincentric ecology, Erdrich also takes 
care to warn readers away from any simplistic reading of his insights about nature. When 
Nanapush brags about his hunting prowess, he claims, “I think like animals, have perfect 
understanding for where they hide, and in my time I have tracked a deer back through time 
and brush and cleared field, to the place it was born. You smile!” (40). The interjection at 
                                                                                                                                                 
the language and described her own efforts to do so. Peter G. Beidler and Gay Barton point out 
that while the 1984 publication of Love Medicine had barely any Ojibwe words in it at all, the 1993 
revised version added many. (See A Reader’s Guide to the Works of Louise Erdrich [Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 2006]).  
125 See interviews with Joseph Bruchac, Hertha D. Sweet Wong, Nancy Feyl Chavkin and Allan 
Chavkin, and Bill Moyers. Full citations appear in the Bibliography. 
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the end changes the tenor of the whole passage, implying that the reader is (or should be) 
skeptical of Nanapush’s outrageous claims. This example encapsulates just how useful the 
trickster figure proves for Erdrich, who is invested in writing stories that do justice to her 
Anishinaabe heritage but is also anxious not to be received as overtly doctrinaire. For while 
the trickster is unmistakably part of Anishinaabe tradition, his traditional role is, 
paradoxically, to disrupt convention. He embodies the fluidity of identity, thereby 
undermining our uncritical acceptance of any stable, singular—or in other words, 
authentic—vision of tradition. Accordingly, the trickster transformations in Erdrich’s relate 
to her desire to both convey the value of a relational ecology and to warn readers against 
accepting any generalization about tribal wisdom as definitive.  
This strategy does risk being received as a defensive attempt to try to have it both 
ways—certainly, it requires a tricky balancing act, as Erdrich must successfully complicate 
her depictions of a kincentric view without simply ironizing the whole theme.126 Concerns 
about identity and reception are not so easy to dispel, and this might well be the reason 
Erdrich largely avoids depictions of shapeshifting and animal agency in contemporary 
settings.127 Scenes of traumatic divisions appear regularly across all of her works, suggesting 
the ongoing traumas of a private property system, but the scenes of human-nonhuman 
transformation I’ve analyzed above all come from stories set in the historical past. I do not 
think Erdrich intends her stories about human-animal transformation to have a merely 
                                                     
126 Of course, she could also be attempting purposefully to ironize the whole theme. However, while 
irony is an aspect of Erdrich’s writing about nature, there simply isn’t enough irony to outweigh the 
repeated affirmative depictions of the crucial bonds between human and nonhuman members of 
the environment. 
127 With a few notable exceptions, including the skunk in The Bingo Palace, which I will attend to 
later in this chapter. 
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ethnographic role—Erdrich’s depictions do challenge readers to reconsider dominant 
cultural assumptions about human autonomy and animal passivity—but if we take Erdrich’s 
contemporary settings into account, her work as a whole registers the trauma of private 
property much more clearly and unambiguously than it does the exact form of a 
contemporarily practicable environmental view that might counter those traumatic 
boundaries.  
However, that does not mean that Erdrich’s contemporary stories doom their 
characters to lives of despair, nor does it mean that there is no contemporary value for 
relational views of being. Instead, as I will argue in the next two sections, Erdrich’s latter-
day tricksters effect their own kinds of transformations using pleasure and humor, efforts 
that join those of the historically distant characters.  I read these as Erdrich’s attempts to 
ameliorate traumatic separations through affect and language.  
b. The Pleasure of Mixing: Trickster Attachments 
If, as I have been arguing, Erdrich’s work engages with one essential attribute of the 
trickster—shapeshifting—a second trickster attribute is equally important to Erdrich’s work: 
sensuality. In traditional oral tales, tricksters are often depicted voraciously pursuing 
gratification.128 Erdrich’s characters seek out sex and other forms of bodily enjoyment just as 
avidly. In his famous anthropological study of the trickster, Paul Radin proposes that by 
                                                     
128 See Franchot Ballinger, Living Sideways: Tricksters in American Indian Oral Traditions 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004), 91. 
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defying taboos, trickster acts as a “relief valve” to “blow off the steam of social friction.”129 In 
this view, the outrageous sex acts in trickster tales offer psychological relief by providing a 
safe and temporary means to cross social boundaries. Erdrich adjusts and expands the 
taboo-breaking potential of trickster’s lustfulness. Rather than providing a way to overturn 
internal social norms, pleasure challenges imposed social limitations: repression and 
isolation. In extolling the virtues of self-control and autonomy, American culture tends to 
repress our embodied desires and our entanglement with others. Within Erdrich’s fictional 
universe, pleasure trickily allows the body to become a site of resistance to this repression.  
As we have seen, divisions on the landscape are markers of trauma. In a similar 
vein, those humans whose bodies are closed-off and tightly guarded from the pleasures of 
the world are the most wounded. Foremost among these characters is Pauline, who adopts 
a Catholic faith that views the body’s desires with suspicion.130 When Pauline witnesses the 
physical attraction between Eli and Fleur, she announces that she is “repelled,” a word that 
means to be rebuffed but also carries with it the connotation of disgust (72). The 
ambivalence of the word reflects Pauline’s distrustful relationship toward her sexual desires, 
which is also apparent in her description of Eli and Fleur’s sexual connection: 
Some days I saw the signs, the small dents of her teeth on his arms, 
the scorched moons of bruises on his throat. Or I sensed touching, an odor, 
a warmth like sun streaming down on skin for an afternoon. In the morning, 
before they washed in Matchimanito, they smelled like animals, wild and 
                                                     
129 David Williams’s paraphrase of Radin can be found in The Trickster Brain (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2012), 132. For the argument Williams is paraphrasing, see The Trickster: A 
Study in American Indian Mythology (New York: Shocken Books, 1972). 
130 Erdrich has said that “Organized Christian religion is more often about denying the body when 
what we profoundly need are rituals that take into regard the blood, the shock, the heat, the shit, 
the anguish, the irritation, the glory, the earnestness of the female body” (BJD 47). 
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heady, and sometimes in the dusk their fingers left tracks like snails, 
glistening and wet (72). 
 
The description of Eli and Fleur as rutting animals signals a certain measure of aversion, 
but the length of Pauline’s description contradicts her claim to be repulsed. She lingers on 
the “scorched moons of bruises,” the “warmth like sun” on the lovers’ skin, and the “wild 
and heady” scent of their bodies, and her language incorporates in rhetoric the 
sensuousness that she denies to herself in action. Pauline’s body also attests to her longing. 
She admits that “A heaviness spread between [her] legs and ached. The tips of [her] breasts 
chafed and wore themselves to points…” (72). Spurred by her lust, she seeks out a sexual 
encounter with Napoleon. This attempt at connection fails spectacularly. The two of them 
“pressed together,” she tells us, with “eyes open, staring like adversaries,” and do not go 
through with having sex (73). Rather than a pleasurable embrace, her encounter with 
Napoleon is joyless and sterile. 
As Pauline’s religious asceticism becomes more extreme, she is increasingly 
characterized by images of isolation and control that contrast with the overlapping 
physicality—twinned bruises, mingled scents—between Eli and Fleur. Pauline begins to hold 
her urine all day long, denying her body’s needs with “furious concentration” and refusing 
herself “consolation and release” (148). She explains how she denies herself relief even 
when she is not fully conscious, saying, “At night I did not let myself to toss or turn for 
comfort, but only sleep on my back, arms crossed on my breasts in the same position as 
the Virgin received the attentions of our Lord” (151-152). Pauline fanatically confines 
herself to a position that symbolically reverses fully embodied sex acts. Night after night she 
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lies stiffly alone, artificially still, with “arms crossed” over her breasts. Pauline’s rituals are 
battles to “set new limits” on her body—a phrase that recalls the novel’s language about the 
whites who “draw lines across the land” (149, 9). Erdrich rhetorically links the profit-
seekers’ measurements with Pauline’s masochistic limit-setting on her body’s needs and 
desires. In doing so, she links Catholicism and capitalism as parts of a destructive majority 
culture. Just as the cubed-up farmland is the legacy of capitalism’s logic, Pauline’s life-
denying persona is the result of white cultural domination. As Erdrich puts it in Last 
Report, Pauline is the “warped result” and the “residue” of history (158). 
Pauline’s character is an outgrowth of the past, but Pauline’s abnegation of life is 
not the inevitable outcome of history. One pivotal scene suggests the healing potential of 
pleasure, which is capable of breaking down even Pauline’s most rigidly guarded 
boundaries. A wretched Pauline is gently washed and cared for by Fleur and Fleur's 
daughter Lulu. Pauline imagines this as a temptation, with Fleur in particular as a devilish 
character. “I stepped into the warmth,” she tells us. This “warmth” seems to recall the fires 
of hell, and Pauline's physical enjoyment of the heated water spurs what she describes as 
her abandonment of her religious conviction. She explains, “Fleur washed me, but I 
warned myself not to experience any pleasure. I sat down in the water, felt its heat as a 
sharp danger, but then I forgot” (154). She continues, 
The child soaped my back…I gave her my hand. She washed each 
finger, then each toe…Fleur poured a pitcher of warm water over me and 
then began to shampoo my head and hair. It was so terrible, so pleasant, 
that I abandoned my Lord and all His rules (154). 
 
Fleur and her daughter offer Pauline the gift of an intimate connection, and Pauline 
responds, offering the child her hand. Erdrich writes about Pauline’s breakdown of control 
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with so much tenderness and sensuality that the reader cheers Pauline's lapse. Pauline 
confesses, “I…let the water course over me and let the hands on my hips, my throat, my 
back, my breasts, the cupped hands under my chin and around my feet, break me down” 
(154-155). Water is poured and hands are laid on a penitent—this is a scene of baptism, 
albeit an inverse baptism, one that seeks to free Pauline from the bonds of her ascetic faith. 
Her boundaries are overridden as the water “course[s]” over her and “the hands” gently 
caressing her limbs “break [her] down.” Fleur is being kind, but she is also being tricky, 
using pleasure to undermine Pauline’s strongly guarded perimeters in much the same way 
that Nanapush uses teasing to break Pauline out of her stubborn humorlessness. In the 
wake of this experience, Pauline is characterized by a happy expansiveness that contrasts 
with her wretched limit-setting. Afterwards, Pauline reflects “the wind was like an elixir that 
put me mindless and at peace. I felt no jealousy or zeal” (155). The relinquishment of strict 
boundaries provides solace, and now the wind is an “elixir” that heals her.  
 Pauline is too stubborn, or too wounded, to remain “at peace” for long, but others 
succeed where Pauline fails. Erdrich especially emphasizes the ability of sexual pleasure to 
counter isolation and disconnection. In The Bingo Palace, Zelda has stifled her love for 
Xavier Toose; refusing to be “overtaken,” she exists thereafter “in the dark cell of her 
body.” Her body, ungenerous and unshared, has become a prison. As an old woman, she 
discovers belatedly how wrong she was to “deny[] herself everything tender, unspoken, 
sweet, generous, and desperate.” Zelda worries that it is “too late for them to do anything 
but smoke the pipe together,” but when she visits Xavier for the first time in thirty years, 
their romance is rekindled. “She left the car,” the narrator recounts, and “stood before 
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Xavier, new as if naked, but she had no shame. They walked toward the house and left the 
pipe in its leather wrappings in the front seat.” With the pipe abandoned in the car, we 
know that what Zelda and Xavier share will not be tobacco. This is the last we hear of 
Zelda in this novel, suggesting that readers are meant to accept her long-delayed sexual 
awakening as a “passion” that liberates her sequestered persona (BP 243-247). There are 
plotlines similarly suggesting the redemptive power of sexual pleasure appear in many of 
Erdrich’s novels, including The Last Report on the Miracles at Little No Horse, Tales of 
Burning Love, and The Antelope Wife.  
That is not to say that pleasure is a universally accepted good among Erdrich’s 
characters. Lulu Lamartine is notorious for her sexual prowess, and she attracts judgment 
and even some fear. She testifies, “No one understood my wild and secret ways. They used 
to say Lulu Lamartine was like a cat, loving no one, only purring to get what she wanted” 
(LM 272). Nonetheless, Lulu is characterized by an expansiveness, vulnerability, and 
generosity that contradict those who judge her pursuit of gratification to be pure selfishness. 
She explains,  
I was in love with the whole world and all that lived in its rainy arms. 
Sometimes I’d look out on my yard and the green leaves would be glowing. 
I’d see the oil slick on the wing of the grackle. I’d hear the wind rushing, 
rolling, like the far-off sound of waterfalls. Then I’d open my mouth wide, 
my ears wide, my heart, and I’d let everything inside (LM 273).  
 
Lulu’s expansive stance is figured as a stance of bravery and defiance to a world that tells 
her to be circumscribed, to accept constrained circumstances. She says, “it was that spirit 
[the spirit of boldness and cleverness”] who taught me that to laugh or to cry was all the 
same, and who gave me the strength to spit pain in the face and love the world in joy” (LM 
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247). Lulu’s characterization draws on the immense libido of the traditional trickster, but in 
Erdrich’s stories, her sexuality is subversive not because “her licentiousness is a danger to 
the social fabric,” but because her embrace of embodied pleasure allows her to survive, to 
be grateful for what beauty the world offers despite suffering, and even to draw the tribe 
together in creative ways.131 
Pleasure links humans together, but in Lulu’s characterization this connection 
expands to include nature as a whole. The “spirit” she describes, the one that drives her to 
defy pain, allows her to see the beauty that exists even in this damaged world. Lulu 
continues, “And the spirit said, Look around you and if you think all there is to see is a 
rotten hole, look again and see the color and the beauty and the constant life of the earth” 
(Miracle 247). Lulu’s receptivity connects her to all beings, to the “constant life of the 
earth,” and her sexual voraciousness is indeed outrageous, but it is also an expression of 
her stubborn love for this world.  
Accordingly, Lulu’s openness takes on an ethical valence. In Love Medicine, Lulu 
proclaims, “All through my life I never did believe in human measurement. Numbers, 
time, inches, feet. All are just ploys for cutting nature down to size. I know the grand 
scheme of the world is beyond our brains to fathom, so I don’t try, just let it in” (277-278). 
For Lulu, measurement is a pitiful attempt to domesticate the rich complexity of the 
world’s “grand scheme,” and she suggests that this impulse to quantify and control is an 
ugly attribute of the dominant culture that can be tied to genocide. She says, “I don’t 
believe in numbering God’s creatures. I never let the United States census in my door, 
                                                     
131 Ballinger, Living Sideways, 88. 
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even though they say it’s good for Indians…I say that every time they counted us they knew 
the precise number of us to get rid of (278). In depicting Lulu’s rejection of “numbers, 
time, inches” and “feet” as “ploys,” Erdrich is not earnestly suggesting that contemporary 
Native Americans can simply throw out their rulers; Lulu’s statement is clearly meant to be 
comic. But Erdrich suggests that there is something truthful in Lulu’s identification of 
measurement and rationality with genocide by allowing her rejection of the census stand in 
contrast to the profit-seekers who divide the land; to Pauline’s praise of the surveyors’ 
measurements as part of Christ’s divine plan; even to the Kashpaws when they choose land 
based on convenience.  
Lulu’s decision to “let [the world] in” in this quotation is almost identical to the 
language in The Last Report about Lulu “let[ting] everything inside” (273). The 
resemblance between the two passages, one of which rejects measurement and the other of 
which defends Lulu’s sexuality, evinces the link between these two aspects of Lulu’s 
persona. Both are part of her trickster refutation of boundaries in favor of seeing the world 
as a fenceless expanse of opportunity. When Lulu enters the room, “the ordinary world 
suddenly seemed tenuous, odd”; she makes people feel “the drift of chance and 
possibility” (LR 3).  In trickster fashion, she reveals that what seems “ordinary” is in fact 
“tenuous” and vulnerable to challenge. She embodies the chance and unpredictability out 
of which prospects emerge—like nature itself. Lulu uses all tricks at her disposal to cleverly 
recover great swaths of stolen or forfeited Native American land: she is “out to reclaim the 
original reservation, no less” and dedicates herself to “tear[ing] away government property” 
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(129, 2). Critics have sometimes appraised Lulu as an “earth mother,” but her persona is 
closer to an ecowarrior than to a stereotypical feminine nurturer. 132 
In traditional tales, trickster sexuality is nonprocreative.133 This sterility is part of 
what makes trickster sex liberatory, for it takes place outside the norms of marriage and 
reproduction. However, Erdrich’s tricksters partake in generative sex, Lulu included. 
While Lulu might not be a gentle, nurturing Mother Nature figure, she is a mother: Lulu 
has nine different children with several different fathers. Lulu’s prolificacy reinvigorates the 
tribe; as one critic puts it, she “almost singlehandedly repopulates the reservation”; what is 
more, she “knit[s] the tribe into one big family through [her children’s] many fathers,” 
weaves together a new communal identity.134 In Lulu’s characterization we see one way 
Erdrich adds a twist of her own to trickster’s subversive power. In the cultural and historical 
context of Erdrich’s stories, the best trick is not to have endless sex without children, but to 
save one’s people from erasure.  
As much is also evident in The Last Report when Nanapush defends polygamy to 
Father Damien by telling a story about how the Creator gave his people “a special love skill 
that they could always use in times of crisis” (95). This romantic-sounding “love skill” is 
actually the ability to have sex again and again without succumbing to exhaustion. 
Nanapush tells of how this gift comes in handy during a time of great suffering. The tribe is 
                                                     
132 Kenneth Lincoln calls Lulu a “dark earth mother” in Ind’in Humor (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 248. Malcolm Jones labels her “part earth mother, part strumpet” in 
Conversations with Louise Erdrich and Michael Dorris, edited by Allan Chavkin and Nancy Feyl 
Chavkin (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1994), 7. 
133 Hyde, Trickster, 8. 
134 Jeanne Rosier Smith, “Comic Liberators and Word-Healers,” inWriting Tricksters: Mythic 
Gambols in American Ethnic Literature (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 80. 
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faced with extinction, and Nanapush’s mother, a “wise[]…strong and powerful” woman, 
exhorts the tribe to “make babies in their sorrow” (95-96). She selects the “strongest and 
handsomest young man” to impregnate the women (96). “[He] did a lot of work all that 
night,” Nanapush recounts, “and the next and next—but the women kept him fed and warm 
and they all got pregnant” (96). Reproductive sex becomes “work,” an act of defiance and 
restoration. Nanapush concludes by saying that these nights of lovemaking “re-created our 
tribe…So you see, that which you Catholics abhor—our gift, which is to mazhiwe at any time 
of the day or night—is why remain strong and why we have not died out” (96). In a reversal 
of convention, the pregnancies are what allow this to become a story of trickster sex, for it is 
through the fruitfulness of pregnancy that the sex becomes rebellious. The tribe survives, 
knitted back together through the actions of the “generous young stud” and his many 
partners (96). 
These dozens of pregnancies join Lulu’s potent maternity to indicate Erdrich’s 
interest in motherhood, an experience which inevitably involves transformations, pleasures, 
and both physical and spiritual border-crossings. Many of transformations of motherhood 
involve pain, rather than pleasure, and in her memoir of motherhood especially Erdrich 
does explore the “the blood, the shock, the heat, the shit, the anguish, the irritation” of the 
childbearing body (BJD 47). She also underscores the potential for mother-child 
interdependence to be almost intolerable. She says that love of an infant “is twinned love, 
all absorbing, a blur of boundaries and messages. It is uncomfortably close to self-
erase…The self will not be forced under, nor will the baby’s needs gracefully retreat” (4). 
The demands of a child are “uncomfortable” and sometimes even appalling. Just as often, 
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though, Erdrich depicts the stretched boundaries of motherhood in terms of pleasure. This 
is especially true in Erdrich’s representations of breastfeeding. In both her fiction and 
nonfiction, Erdrich writes about breastfeeding in terms of agreeable intensity: phrases like 
“tender joy,” “pleasurable burning,” and “deep rightness” (AW 7, BJD 135). Erdrich even 
suggests that the satisfaction of the nursing relationship is such that perhaps what 
nineteenth-century male writers longing for “oneness” really wanted was not transcendence 
or epiphany but “to be women nursing babies” (BJD 148).  
Part of the joy of breastfeeding, implies Erdrich, is the washing away of boundaries 
in favor of plenitude. Nursing dissolves easy distinctions between individuals: as Jean Wyatt 
puts it, breastfeeding “dramatizes the impossibility of separating what belongs to the one 
body from what belongs to the other.”135 Compared with sex, breastfeeding even more 
dramatically emblematizes interconnection because of the intense and ongoing nature of 
the attachment: breastfeeding physiologically requires consistent interaction between the 
body of the infant and that of the mother. In one of her memoirs, Books and Islands in 
Ojibwe Country, Erdrich comments on the strength of the connection, saying “Sometimes 
I look at men, at the way most of them move so freely in the world, without a baby 
attached, and it seems to me very strange. Sometimes it is enviable. Mostly, it is not.”136 
Erdrich perceives complete independence not as a pleasure or an “enviable” freedom, but 
“strange,” a view that challenges an ideology of the human autonomy. Again, Erdrich 
                                                     
135 Quoted in Maureen Riche, “Waiting Halfway,” 61. 
136 Erdrich, Books and Islands in Ojibwe Country (Washington, D.C.: National Geographic, 2003), 
65. 
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herself is depicted as a kind of trickster, as her body undermines social norms that deem 
singularness possible and desirable. 
The transpersonal view of identity that Erdrich’s breastfeeding implies even extends 
into the nonhuman realm: in The Antelope Wife, for instance, Blue Prairie Woman 
nurses a puppy.137 As Maureen Riche asserts when analyzing Erdrich’s use of “the 
breastfeeding event” in the short story “Father’s Milk,” breastfeeding represents a relational 
indigenous ecology because it so powerfully embodies connection through an act that is 
“not the sole province of human beings.”138 Riche’s comment is true not only of “Father’s 
Milk,” but of Erdrich’s writing more broadly. Wherever it appears, breastfeeding actualizes 
embodied forms of connection not limited to one species. 
Breastfeeding might not be restricted to humanity, but it would seem to be only the 
purview of the female sex, which raises the question of whether Erdrich’s choice to invest 
maternity with so much power is troublingly essentialist.  However, Erdrich actually does 
not suggest that breastfeeding, or the embodied pleasures of motherhood more generally, 
are necessarily limited to biological mothers. In The Last Report, Agnes cradles baby Lulu 
and is “overcome with strange contentment, not maternal so much as fully human. During 
those visits she became a connected being” (184). The connection spurred by closeness 
with a baby is also available to men, as the story of male breastfeeding depicted in The 
Antelope Wife demonstrates. In the novel, Scranton Roy is a young white soldier who 
deserts from the army after killing an Indian woman during a raid. While running away he 
encounters an Anishinaabe baby whose mother tied her to a dog in order to allow her to 
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escape the slaughter. Seeking to quiet the infant, he puts her to his nipple: “She seized him. 
Inhaled him…His whole body was astonished…He couldn’t remove her then, and 
commenced to walk, holding her, attached” (6). Here the baby takes charge and, in a scene 
that recalls the moose and buffalo scenes, incorporates his body into her own—here, by 
“inhal[ing]” his nipple. Despite his “astonish[ment],” Scranton’s body reacts to her great 
need, and he begins to lactate. In doing so, he is transformed from a dominating individual 
into a responsive nurturer, integrated into a collective give-and-take. 
In Erdrich’s writing, breastfeeding joins other forms of pleasurable embodiment, all 
of which are depicted as trickily breaking down divisions. Whether she is writing about 
Fleur’s bathing of Pauline, Zelda’s healing sexual connection with Xavier, Lulu’s embrace 
of the whole world, or a mother’s “all absorbing” connection with her child, Erdrich’s 
considerations of sensual pleasure redraw the lines between individuals (BJD 4). 
Psychoanalytic and anthropological discussions of mythic tricksters propose that “the 
trickster oscillates back and forth between self-gratification and cultural heroism”; by 
contrast, Erdrich’s contemporary tricksters suggest these two positions are not mutually 
exclusive, but complementary.139 For “contemporary survivors” living “in the wake of the 
catastrophe,” choosing enjoyment is a form of cultural resistance.140 Assuredly, pleasure is 
not transcendent; it is not capable of completely and permanently dissolving all boundaries 
or healing suffering. It is not in itself an adequate political strategy of resistance. But when 
the dominant discourse preaches autonomy rather than reciprocal dependence, embracing 
                                                     
139 William J. Hynes, “Inconclusive Conclusions: Tricksters-Metaplayers and Revealers” in Mythical 
Trickster Figures: Contours, Contexts, and Criticisms, edited by William J. Hynes and William G. 
Doty (Tuscaloosa and London: The University of Alabama Press, 1993): 209. 
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the pleasure that connects us to others is an act of defiance. Lulu looks straight on at life’s 
pain and chooses to enjoy herself anyway.  
c. Joking Wisdom: Trickster Humor 
“…the rays killed the tumor and also zapped his funny bone.  He kept his taste, 
touch, sense of smell, and so on, but he lost an Indian’s seventh sense. He lost his sense of 
humor. Now he is the only Indian alive without one. It is a terrible burden”  
–The Antelope Wife 
Erdrich speaks of humor as “one of the most important parts of American Indian 
life and literature.” 141 She calls this humor “survival humor,” joining many other voices who 
have argued that Native American humor is a “survival strategy and healing ceremony.”142 
However, Western readers tend to overlook the humor of Native American writing, 
Erdrich’s work included. In one interview, Erdrich observed that while tribal people 
labeled Love Medicine “that funny book,” critics saw it as “devastating.”143 The humorous 
aspects of Erdrich’s tales cannot be discounted; even the most serious of the boundary-
crossings we have considered are also amusing. Lipsha’s wistful inquiry about whether any 
of the racists who threaten him hail from a less square state than North Dakota is darkly 
                                                     
141 “Louise Erdrich, Michael Dorris, and Laura Coltelli” from Winged Words: American Indian 
Writers Speak, in Louise Erdrich’s Love Medicine: A Casebook, edited by Hertha Dawn Wong 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 157. 
142 Nancy J. Peterson, “Indi’n Humor and Trickster Justice in The Bingo Palace,” 
 in The Chippewa Landscape of Louise Erdrich, ed. Allan Richard Chavkin [Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 1999]161-180) 164.  
143 Erdrich, “An Interview with Louise Erdrich and Michael Dorris,” 1986 Interview with Hertha D. 
Wong, in Conversations with Louise Erdrich and Michael Dorris, edited by Allan Chavkin and 
Nancy Feyl Chavkin (Jackson, Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, 1994), 49. In another 
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humorous. Eli’s hunt is impelled by starvation—no laughing matter—but Eli’s blunders 
during the expedition also call to mind his previous characterization as an incompetent 
lover who needs Nanapush’s sexual coaching. Fleur’s birthing scene depicts a struggle for 
survival; it also includes a comic interlude as a drunken bear reels near the laboring 
mother. While it is all too easy to miss it, these stories are funny. They skillfully embody 
the irreverent and mischievous spirit of the trickster. 
In these stories, as in all of Erdrich’s work, trickster humor is entertaining, but it 
also serves a key political purpose. In all of these scenes, characters—and readers—are being 
asked to exit their typical categories of experience; they are asked to move across 
boundaries. Humor assists in these acts of trespass, for it is itself a kind of boundary-
crossing. As Gerald Vizenor suggests, trickster humor deconstructs “terminal creeds”—the 
static, inflexible beliefs that confine us.144 The trickster meets us where we are comfortable 
or complacent or smug, and his irreverence undermines our complacency and reorients 
our outlook. Where we have accepted a certain narrative about the world, trickster humor 
muddies the waters, revealing that we do not know what we thought we knew. In this way, I 
suggest, humor proves an ideal tool to assist Erdrich’s desire to disruption of the stories we 
tell ourselves about human identity. Trickster humor facilitates Erdrich’s reenvisioning of 
the terminal ideology of the autonomous human in contemporary American culture.  
In The Bingo Palace, for instance, a skunk’s wisecracks and feisty antics indicate 
how interrelations continue to exist even when they are unacknowledged and unwelcome. 
Lipsha and his cousin Lyman pursue a spirit journey, a quest that readers might assume 
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would be quite solemn. Indeed, Lipsha assumes the same. He yearns for a “deep and 
amazing” vision, perhaps one that will provide guidance on the issue at the center of the 
novel’s plot: whether Fleur’s land should be used to build a grand casino. What Lipsha 
receives is not the lofty vision he expects. He wakes to the heavy weight of a skunk curled 
up on his chest. “This ain’t real estate,” drawls the skunk. Lipsha seeks a “by-the-book” 
vision and receives instead this very down-to-earth guidance. The skunk’s humor surprises 
and challenges Lipsha, asking him to reconsider what he thought he knew about vision 
quests; likewise, the skunk’s humorous pronouncement destabilizes the reader’s potential 
assumptions about land. To understand the land as real estate is to accept Western 
culture’s terminal creed about nature: that it is a resource for human use, a resource to be 
divided, bought and sold without consequence. To view the land as real estate is to 
consider nature a pretty view, not a part of us. In other words, to consider land real estate is 
to embrace the very opposite of a kincentric ecology. The skunk’s “crabby, drowsy voice” 
more effectively denounces this real estate view than rational argument or dry statistics ever 
could (200).  
Moreover, the skunk’s madcap behavior complements her critique of a real estate 
view by humorously depicting the relationship the inescapable entanglement between 
humans and their nonhuman kin. As the skunk nestles herself “heavily” into the nooks and 
crannies of Lipsha’s body, Lipsha tries to “ease [himself] back from her” but concedes 
“there is no hope of that.” Then, with a “smile of satisfaction” that seems to indicate that 
she is further cementing her message about “real estate,” the skunk lifts her tail and sprays 
Lipsha with a stink that “surround[s]” and “inhabit[s]” him. The skunk’s pervading scent is 
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“so powerful that [he does not] even recognize it as a smell. There is no before, no after, 
no breathing or getting around the drastic moment” (200-201). As the skunk stands heavily 
atop Lipsha’s body, her rancid spray invading Lipsha’s nostrils, the skunk humorously 
drives home her point about the natural world as something far more intimate than real 
estate.  
The paradoxical profundity of Native American humor is something critics have 
sometimes overlooked in Erdrich’s work; some critics have assessed the skunk scene as 
Erdrich’s a parodic vision quest, or simply as a failed ritual.145 The assumption seems to be 
that since Erdrich’s skunk is funny, his wisdom is a sham. But Erdrich warns us against 
dismissing humor; in a 1989 interview she declared, “The most serious things have to be 
jokes.”146 The startling, casual, and ungrammatical delivery of the skunk’s message is an 
exemplary instance of trickster as the wise idiot, “the speaker of sacred profanities.”147 
There is mockery in the skunk scene, but it is directed at our stereotypical expectations for 
how true vision comes about. Lipsha is as guilty of this as are readers: he remains 
stubbornly unwilling to receive the skunk’s wisdom, and when skunk continues to appear 
to Lipsha in his dreams, Lipsha gripes, “I got the wrong vision.” He complains that instead 
of the skunk, he should have received something more inspiring and powerful, something 
                                                     
145 Bill Ott calls Lipsha a “hapless lover” who “embarks on a traditional vision quest” but 
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like “horses who split the sky with their hooves. Or a bear, an eagle with a bald head and 
long brown wings” (220). Of course, these are pathetically stereotypical choices. If a real 
estate view is one kind of terminal creed, Lipsha’s faith in the romanticized, stereotypical 
Indian is another. Erdrich is poking fun at Lipsha’s superficiality, and she is also asking us 
to laugh at Lipsha’s refusal to receive the real wisdom offered to him from a source entirely 
unlike his imagined vision. Because Lipsha refuses to see the wisdom of humor, he 
becomes the butt of Erdrich’s joke.  
According to Gerald Vizenor, humor provides a tool for opposing the monolithic 
and monologic creeds of contemporary American culture. Trickster’s humor crosses 
conceptual lines, revealing the contingency of what was supposedly fixed.148 In Erdrich’s 
stories, teasing, in particular, is depicted as a way that humor can undermine too-easy 
assurances. For instance, in Tracks, Pauline complains that “Nanapush was sly enough to 
get the better of me sometimes by asking questions without limit or end” (145). Nanapush’s 
teasing questions trickily undermine Pauline’s singleminded acceptance of Catholic 
doctrine by leading her in directions that reveal her own hypocrisy or inconsistency. 
Pauline eventually rejects the wisdom offered by Nanapush’s banter, which suggests the 
limits of humor’s power. However, in The Bingo Palace, the outcome is different. The 
skunk’s sassy nagging, which serves a similar role to Nanapush’s teasing, does eventually 
break down Lipsha’s resistance to his ecological message. The skunk simply will not leave 
Lipsha alone; he needles Lipsha constantly, calling him “a slow learner” (219). And in 
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time, it works. When Lipsha makes his last speech about the casino—a speech that is 
seemingly directed at the reader—Lipsha’s words demonstrate that he has finally 
acknowledged the skunk’s acumen. Lipsha says, 
Money gets money, but little else, nothing sensible to look at or 
touch or feel in yourself down to your bones…Our reservation is not real 
estate, luck fades when sold. Attraction has no staying power, no weight, no 
heart (221).  
 “Our land is not real estate” was once an annoying ditty resounding in Lipsha’s head, but it 
is now the refrain at the heart of Lipsha’s sensibility. As Katrina Peiffer puts it, “The skunk 
of [Lipsha’s] absurd and embarrassing vision was on the money after all, in terms of 
speaking for the right of the land to be exempt from economic assessment.”149 Lipsha’s 
terminal creed of lofty wisdom arriving on the backs of soaring eagles has been thoroughly 
debunked in favor of the skunk’s comical, vulgar, but nonetheless sacred insight about the 
limitations of a real estate view.  
Trickster, according to Summer Harrison, can “challenge, without replicating, the 
‘fixity’ and ‘closure’ of dominant discourse.”150 Harrison explores Erdrich’s use of 
metafiction to reproduce this critical dimension of trickster identity, but humor is another 
means by which Erdrich undermines dominant concepts without reproducing their self-
important inflexibility. For instance, the nuanced way that Lipsha’s real estate view is 
overturned underscores Erdrich’s refusal to replace one arrogant view with another. At the 
end of his long struggle with what to make of the skunk’s words, Lipsha has acknowledged 
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“the money life has got no substance,” but he also concedes that you still “have to stay alive 
to keep your tradition alive and working” (173). His final position complicates any static 
and certain conclusion about whether the casino should be built, saying, “It’s not 
completely one way or another, traditional against the bingo” (173). The fluctuation of 
Lipsha’s final perspective contrasts significantly with the assurance of the dominant 
discourse, the monolithic real estate view that insists that all things can be reduced to their 
“economic profile” (BP 103).151 Lipsha’s rather open-ended vision echoes what Lawrence 
Gross says about trickster humor—it “tests tradition, and keeps it honest and flexible. The 
trickster tradition keeps the lessons gleaned from tradition ‘open to human revision’…This 
is different from the Western tradition in which it is common to view chaos as something 
to keep at bay.”152 Demonstrating Lipsha’s recognition of both the validity and limits of the 
skunk’s message, Erdrich evinces the comic worldview of the trickster. 
The evident buildup of the narrative toward Lipsha’s climactic epiphany about the 
bingo palace makes the importance of the skunk’s hilarity evident, but in other instances, 
trickster antics look like pure foolishness, and the sacredness of the humor is far from 
apparent. In Four Souls, for example, the ecological wisdom supposedly being produced 
by humor seems to be pure nonsense. When a hungover Nanapush wakes up in jail clad in 
his lover’s dress, he realizes he is late for a council meeting where the tribe will decide 
whether to sell a large parcel of reservation land for a tidy profit. He has been planning to 
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oppose the measure, but is unprepared. In typical trickster fashion he improvises 
spectacularly: he says he wears the dress as part of an earnest, holy appeal to Grandmother 
earth to find out what to do about the land. The lesson of the dress, he says, is that men 
should humble themselves to women, including to the earth:  
Listen, old fool, I heard the earth tell me. You are walking on my 
beautiful body…Poor man, decorated with a knob and a couple of balls. 
You’re only here on my patience and on the patience of women…I have 
given you all that you have…Now I ask you, what have you given me in 
return?153 
 
Readers are well aware that Nanapush has received no such message from the earth; he has 
been too busy entertaining his jailers in the drunk tank. What can the reader make of 
Nanapush’s claims for the earth’s rights? Given his use of vulgarities (“decorated with a 
knob and a couple of balls”) and gender stereotypes (the patient woman putting up with the 
buffoonery of men), it seems clear that at least on one level, the scene is a burlesque, 
poking fun at the stereotypical image of the Indian as the defender of Mother Earth.  
Amidst Nanapush’s talk of genitalia and his deployment of stereotypes, though, we 
encounter another level of meaning. In his seminal work on what he calls “Ind’in humor,” 
Kenneth Lincoln comments on Native American humor’s tendency toward what he calls “a 
comic double valence.”154 This double valence “involves ‘reversible’ play or reduplication 
with a twist…[it] compounds the simple and riddles the surface artfully. It may be an all-too-
human, bipedal fondness for having things more than one way—comic options, as it 
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were.”155 Nanapush’s argument for the earth demonstrates this comic double valance: the 
passage both works as a caricature of our expectation that the Indian will defend Mother 
Earth and a legitimate critique of the practice of treating land as a commodity to be bought 
and sold. While Nanapush’s spontaneously made-up message from Mother Earth might be 
insincere and uncouth, it works. The jolt of his shocking humor shakes the council 
members out of their mode of detached economic assessments. Instead of the dry language 
of real estate, Nanapush reorients the conversation to one about familial relationships and 
responsibilities. The members of the tribal council are asked to envision their long-
suffering mother standing in front of them, reminding them that she has “given [them] all 
that she has.” Rather than an abstract other, the land is a vividly personalized family 
member—a fed-up one, who now demands that it is their turn to support her for a change. 
The council, feeling sufficiently dependent on this Mother Nature who reminds them that 
they are “only here on [her] patience,” votes to reject the land settlement. An 
improvisational kincentric wisdom has been achieved through Nanapush’s foolish sagacity. 
As a trickster, Nanapush’s lies tell the truth. 
 
*** 
To think ecologically is to think about connections. In ecology, one never studies 
an organism in isolation: one always speaks of an organism and its environment. Ecology 
recognizes that any organism, humans included, cannot be conceived of alone, since an 
organism exists only in concert with a whole network of interacting beings and things: 
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animals, plants, bacteria, air, water, and soil. In this relational view, a person is not ever 
strictly human. By implication, humans are not nearly as self-reliant as we might wish to 
imagine. And if we are not separate from nature, we are not superior to it, either. As one 
writer puts it, when we perceive the world ecologically, “We are no longer the heroes of the 
story.”156  
A similar lesson is on offer in Erdrich’s literature. Joseph Bruchac has proposed 
that for Native Americans, laughter teaches “the importance of humility.”157 Erdrich’s 
trickster stories deliver lessons about personal humility, and they are also lessons about 
cosmic humility, about mankind’s true place in the universe. When Eli flounders uselessly 
in the snow drifts, he is saved not by his masculine power but because his trickster mentor, 
Nanapush, recognizes humanity’s dependence on their nonhuman relations. When Eli and 
Nanapush share the moose meat at the close of the scene the physical intermingling of men 
and moose further underscores this message. Lipsha approaches his vision quest in a 
competitive, individualistic manner, seeking out a stereotypical nature experience that will 
outstrip his cousin Lyman’s vision. It is only because the skunk forces him to relinquish 
control and take himself less seriously that he achieves any real insight. Appropriately 
enough, the wisdom Lipsha receives is also a message about humanity’s humbleness: the 
skunk’s statement that “This land ain’t real estate” insists that nature’s worth is not 
reducible to its economic value to human beings.  
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Thus we uncover a significant point of cohesion between trickster’s comic 
worldview and ecology: they both take us down a peg. Where American culture cherishes 
the notion of an autonomous, self-defined man; trickster laughs the self-importance and 
self-assurance implied in such a notion. And as Erdrich adapts trickster characteristics in 
her contemporary contexts, she suggests that whereas individualistic narratives of American 
identity celebrate the independence supposedly forged through controlling nature—taming 
the wilderness—Erdrich’s tricksters “poke fun at the premise that the great energy of nature 
can be truly controlled.”158 Erdrich uses the trickster to destabilize an American ideology of 
independence in favor of a complex web of rambunctiously interacting agents.   
Trickster also proves strategic for Erdrich in another way: Erdrich’s adaptation of 
trickster’s comic vision allows her to counteract the harmful divisions of possessive 
individualism in a manner that complicates pervasive stereotypes about Native Americans 
as “tearful ecologist[s].”159 Anyone writing about nature and Native American identity risks 
validating the notion that Native Americans are closer to Mother Nature and implicitly 
know how to live in complete harmony with her—a reductive, prevalent stereotype that has 
been called the “Ecological Indian.”160 While some Native Americans have evoked this 
seemingly laudatory image for their own political and social purposes, others are concerned 
with the damaging effects of this cultural symbol. 161 Erdrich included, it would seem: she 
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has commented acerbically on “the stereotype, the stoic, unflinching Indian standing, 
looking at the sunset.”162 The native as grave nature-lover, solemnly watching the sun go 
down in the West, is problematic in many ways, but foremost among them is the 
stereotype’s grim seriousness. Vizenor contends that such “tragic modes” of understanding 
Native American identity are culturally inaccurate “inventions and impositions” made up 
by a white culture that casts Native Americans as a “vanishing” race.163 Similarly, Kenneth 
Lincoln suggests that such “humorless stereotypes” of Native Americans are the guilty 
outgrowth of a long history of twinned domination of the land and Native Americans, 
which is why they arise in “the messy aftermath of abuses of America’s natives and nature-
at-large” (Ind’in, 4). 
Whites tell themselves sentimental tales about Native Americans and wilderness 
alike as sad victims of the march of progress, but these tales do nothing to stem the 
destruction. Such narratives are damaging in their tragic arc; looking backward at the 
supposedly pure, untouched wilderness and the noble, Ecological Indian with nostalgia and 
sentimentality, we free ourselves from responsibility. We cease to see and feel responsible 
for the still-existing, if less idealized and romantic, environment, and the very real Native 
Americans who in few ways resemble the sentimental Pocahontas who paints with all the 
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colors of the wind, or the crying Indian on the (in)famous poster, begging Americans not to 
litter.  
If nature abuse and ethnic domination are associated with humorlessness, it is a 
comic vision that comprises a truly subversive stance. Lincoln suggests as much when he 
ponders how Native Americans have survived  
…half a millennium of assault on two thousand indigenous cultures 
in the West? To be sure, it is not by casting themselves as victims…It is not 
in lamenting dispossession under the banner of Manifest Destiny, or in 
pitying themselves reserved through the odd idealism of our simultaneously 
obliterating and conserving national resources (‘reserves’ of virgin timber, 
wild animals, and Indians seem more accurately prisoner-of-war camps) (4). 
Lincoln proposes that it is “Indi’n humor” that allows Native Americans to persist. 
Through the exercise of a form of humor that adapts a “millennia-old” legacy of trickster as 
“comic teacher and holy fool,” Native Americans are “…exorcising the pain, redirecting 
their suffering, drawing together against the common enemy—cultural ignorance” (5). 
Lincoln’s emphasis on the comic joins that of Vizenor, who argues that Native Americans 
oppose “hypotragic intrusion[s]” through trickster stories, among other communal forms of 
comic discourse.164 Working within a comic discourse that “turn[s] aside the cold litanies 
and catechistic monodramas” of white civilization, Native Americans reject representations 
of themselves as tragic victims.165  
Whether they draw guffaws from readers or just elicit a raised eyebrow and mild 
smirk, Erdrich’s trickster boundary-crossings are undertaken in a similarly comic spirit. 
Erdrich’s anything-but-tearful ecologists bear out Lincoln and Vizenor’s claims for the 
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efficacy of trickster’s comic mode. In an American society raised on images of noble 
Indians, gently living on the earth they revere, the cross-dressing Nanapush’s drunken 
insults to the foolish men who seek to sell their land presents a different vision of what it 
means to be interconnected and mutually responsive. So too does Lulu’s daring and 
profligate embrace of the beautiful world—and the myriad of human lovers she brings to 
her bed. Even the most tender and profound mixings depicted, those between parent and 
child, are part of Erdrich’s comic vision. Consider, for instance, when Scranton Roy’s 
nipple is “inhaled” by the demanding baby who willfully sucks Scranton’s nipples raw; or 
when in her memoir Erdrich insists that it is the people who go around unattached to a 
baby’s mouth who are the strange ones (AW 6). Erdrich’s literature operates much like the 
subversive hilarity of the blue jay, that brash bird that Erdrich writes about in The Blue 
Jay’s Tale. The jay is “adaptable, clever, and unprincipled”; he is “ridiculous” (195). In the 
face of an imminent threat, he dances a “manic, successful jig—cocky, exuberant, entirely a 
bluff, a joke” (195). This jay’s dance is silly, but it also enough to make Erdrich “clench 
down hard on life” (195). In the same spirit, Erdrich presents readers with an exuberant jig 
urging them to embrace a world filled with all their inescapable relations. 
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CHAPTER THREE      
Permeable Bodies and the Trouble with Awareness: Richard Powers’s Two-Stranded 
Narrative Structure 
In Robinson’s Housekeeping, Aunt Sylvie keeps a gleefully messy house. The 
profusion of “crickets in the pantry, squirrels in the eaves, sparrows in the attic” denigrate 
domestic housekeeping as a foolish effort to mark out humans as separate from nature 
(99). As Ruth matures under Sylvie’s care, watery scenes of immersion and blending attest 
to her own recognition of her body’s participation in the world’s cycles. In Louise Erdrich’s 
work, images of intersection between seemingly distinct personas--including moose, deer, 
trees, lakes, and of course, humans—develop a vision of the world in which all beings are 
relations. 
In Richard Powers’s Gain, too, images of the human body’s intersections with the 
world proliferate. But as I want to argue in this final chapter, in place of the expansive 
relationality we have seen in Erdrich and Robinson, Powers’ connections offer a much 
more frightening vision of what it means to be inseparable from our environment. Gain’s 
darker forms of interconnection unfold through the juxtaposition of two narrative strands. 
The first details 170 years of capitalism by tracing the history of the Clare company; the 
other follows the life of Laura Bodey, a middle-aged Midwestern mom and realtor who is 
diagnosed with ovarian cancer. The story of Laura’s physical decline contrasts with the 
Clare’s rise from its humble beginnings making candles and soap to a transnational giant 
manufacturing a dizzying array of products. The two narratives coalesce as Laura and her 
family begin to consider whether her disease could have been caused by toxins from 
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Clare’s products or manufacturing practices. A class-action lawsuit against Clare is filed; 
nonetheless, the mystery remains unresolved, and Laura’s story ends without establishing 
any definitive causal link between Clare’s factories and Laura’s malignancy. The text’s 
central concern is not to establish this particular fact, but instead to explore what it means 
to be subjected to global processes and toxic corporate byproducts that are largely invisible 
but immensely powerful. 
Ecocritical assessments of Gain have been mixed. Jeffrey Williams concludes that 
Gain is not really an “eco-novel” per se since it offers no hope for a “life without 
corporations and modern production,” and thus no “prospect of returned nature.”166 Ursula 
Heise, too, asserts that the novel is far from perfect environmental writing, but rather than 
faulting Gain for its negativity, she alleges that the novel is entirely too reassuring.167 Heise 
reads Gain against Don DeLillo’s White Noise, analyzing both as instances of what 
Lawrence Buell has called “toxic discourse”: writing that expresses our fears of a poisoned 
world.168 Buell traces toxic discourse to Rachel Carson, delineating how her Silent Spring 
catalyzed anxiety about the ubiquity of potential poisons in a postindustrial world. Buell’s 
notion builds on what Ulrich Beck has termed “risk society,” the notion that life in 
modernity means contending with myriad risks that we struggle to understand, even with 
                                                     
166 Jeffrey Williams, “The Issue of Corporations: Richard Powers’s Gain,” Review of Gain, by 
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science’s help.169 Building on this line of thought, Heise argues that whereas DeLillo’s ironic 
style conveys the confusions of risk society, Gain’s depiction of toxicity is flawed by an 
omniscient narrator who folds complex systems into the “orderly progression” of history, 
giving readers an inaccurate sense of “comprehension and control” (175). 
Like Heise, I read Powers’s novel as a contribution to toxic discourse. A novel 
need not be a story about “returned nature” in order to count as an eco-novel. But one way 
I differ from Heise is in terms of what role the body plays in Gain’s toxic discourse. Heise 
suggests that for novel the “real problem of toxicity” is not material but a “complex 
technoeconomic system” (171). In making this suggestion, Heise downplays Laura’s body, 
implying that it is primarily a convenient means for Powers to thematize corporate control; 
by contrast, I emphasize Laura’s embodiment, as a catalyst for her ecological 
consciousness, and potentially for ours too (171). In fact, I assert, Powers’s depiction of 
Laura’s body dramatizes how the material self is inseparable from the economic, political, 
cultural, and scientific power systems in which it is interpolated, implicitly challenging the 
idea that we could locate a “real problem of toxicity” somehow beyond the body itself.  
Accordingly, in the first section of the chapter, I want to explore how Gain 
represents embodiment in terms of a terrifying form of vulnerability. Laura’s cancer spurs 
her increasing awareness of her body’s inescapable coextension with the environment, and 
she grows to recognize that her body’s most intimate workings are in fact not personal at all, 
but open to the byproducts of global capitalism. Laura’s expansion of vision is only partial, 
focused as it is on her particular case and limited by the information she is able to access, 
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but Powers uses the omniscient narrator and his sweeping historical narrative to allow the 
readers additional insights.  
In this way, Powers is, like Robinson and Erdrich, telling a tale about the power of 
expanded awareness, but more than the work of these other authors, the environmental 
imagination dramatized by this novel is distinctively global and cosmopolitan. Laura begins 
by attempting to identify which bath products contain problematic chemicals; she ends by 
concluding that “The whole planet” is “a superfund site.”170 If, as I’ve been claiming in my 
previous chapters, coextensive awareness means recognizing the participation of one’s body 
in the flows and exchanges of environmental materiality, Powers’s novel widens the scope 
of this imagination nearly as far as it can go. In the second part of the chapter, I highlight 
how this zooming out reflects his goal for the story to serve as a vehicle for the reader’s 
expanded awareness: as Powers has stated, he wants to prompt in the reader an “awakening 
in consciousness” like that which occurs to Laura—except he wants the reader’s 
enlightenment to be faster and more dramatic, and to extend further.171 He would like the 
reader to “complete the steps” begun by Laura by asking “‘What world have I been sold?’ 
and ‘What world do I want to live in?’” (LG 112) 
However, as I suggest in the third part of the chapter, even as Gain’s toxic discourse 
attempts to convince us of the dangers of ignorance, Gain also implicitly raises serious 
questions about ecological insight, even more serious than the reservations or qualifications 
present in Robinson and Erdrich. Housekeeping establishes Ruth’s rejection of the rigid 
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separations between civilization and nature as a form of countercultural acumen, but by 
injecting Ruth’s narrative attempts to erase all distinctions between things with an increasing 
measure of unreliability, Robinson suggests that a total oneness with nature is neither 
practicable nor desirable. Erdrich suggests that while comprehending the relationality 
between all forms of life is both subversive and healing, its power is partial: that Erdrich’s 
stories return again and again to characters, animals, and places suffering from 
disconnection in itself suggests that ecological consciousness might be ameliorative, but it is 
far from utopian. In his characterization of Laura’s difficulties obtaining objective and 
useful insights about embodiment and toxicity—and of the profoundly negative affects 
caused by what knowledge she does achieve—Powers even more dramatically demonstrates 
the roadblocks to ecological consciousness for ordinary mortals, and the inadequacies of 
the forms of awareness they can achieve. 
Furthermore, I suggest, Powers’s narrative structure itself dramatizes the difficulties 
of ecological awareness. As I’ve mentioned, Heise faults Powers’s structure, saying it falsely 
reassures readers of the comprehensibility of environmental risk. This critique might well 
have broader relevance to Powers’s larger body of work, since most of his novels are 
organized using a similar approach, and to ecocriticism as a whole. Indeed, scholars have 
built on her claim by suggesting the superior ecological sophistication of modernist collage, 
experimental eco-poetics, and so on, in an era of environmental risk.172 I complicate these 
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conclusions through my reading of Gain. I have a very different sense of how readers might 
react to Gain’s juxtaposition of two very different narrative strands and styles: the narrator’s 
all-seeing, magisterial vision, and the free indirect discourse that develops Laura’s more 
modest persona. I emphasize the ironic space that opens between these voices. We are, I 
think, right to be troubled that the only voice who can know what we all need to know is a 
godlike one. Given a narrative perspective that so dramatically contrasts with what the 
characters themselves are able to understand, Powers’s novel actually calls attention to the 
lengths to which fiction has to go to address our blindness.  
This line of argument represents a defense of Powers’s narrative structure—but it 
also concedes that Powers’s own vision of the novel’s political promise vis-à-vis its impact 
on the reader might be overly optimistic. Gain gives us good reason to wonder to what 
degree the enlightenment Powers seems to want readers to pursue is achievable. Indeed, in 
the last part of the chapter, I suggest how in several key ways Powers’s novel resists his own 
stated goal of encouraging the reader to forge an awareness with real-world applicability. 
Gain dramatizes how knowledge itself is not necessarily helpful. When Laura’s diagnosis 
makes her increasingly attuned to connections, the text suggests that her new consciousness 
culminates not in wisdom or ethical action, but in largely unconstructive paranoia. Given 
this characterization, the reader must wonder whether, even if we could achieve the 
immense insight of the narrator, the extra perception would prove at all helpful. 
Furthermore, Gain deconstructs evident solutions to the toxicity enabled by corporate 
dominance by satirizing naïve forms of environmentalist thought, but declines to present 
what more sophisticated and effective responses might look like.  
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These evident tensions—one might even say contradictions—between how the novel 
attempts to validate awareness and depict its inadequacies reflect Powers’s dilemma: 
Powers wants to write a novel with a nuanced view of corporations and toxicity, not a 
simplistic tale proposing that corporations are evil, individuals are victims, and that by 
gaining a little knowledge and a little concern, individuals might reclaim power. But given 
the effectiveness with which the novel complicates Laura’s quest for knowledge and 
control, it is difficult to see how the novel might act as a charge to the reader. Gain makes it 
clear that consumer behavior has been complicit in creating this system in which 
individuals find it difficult to comprehend the forces that shape their world, but it is harder 
to see how we might be empowered to attack the monster of our own making. Accordingly, 
my reading of Powers’s novel suggests that the novel ultimately problematizes an ethic of 
coextensive awareness. 
I. “Home” Invasions and Toxic Interconnections 
Early in the novel, Laura lies in a hospital bed, awaiting diagnosis after her biopsy. 
She longs to be back in her own home. “The full moon shines above her empty house,” we 
read, “Such a moon, were she home in bed, would keep Laura awake all night. At home 
she would lie stretched out in moonlight’s cool puddle. Lie on her abdomen—no sign of 
pain; not even tender—gazing out at the tops of the trees” (52). Laura imagines home as the 
place where under a benevolent moon and sheltering trees she would be cleansed and 
whole, a vision that reflects the American discourse about homeownership as security, 
independence, even well-being. Then the passage shifts. Laura remembers leaving the 
window open to air out the house while she is gone, and suddenly the free indirect 
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discourse is supplanted by the narrator’s voice, informing us of what really resides in the 
fresh breeze that now makes its way inside: 
She left the window open just a crack…The breeze that flushes these 
rooms imports its own aromas: stubborn lilacs and stultifying magnolias. 
Ozone from dry lightning, forty miles distant. Swiss almond decaf from the 
new coffee shop, half an hour from its red-eye opening. Organophosphates 
wafting in from the south farms. Undigested adhesives slipping up Clare’s 
smokeless stacks. The neighbors’ gerbil food and scoopable cat litter wafting 
over her fence in two parts per billion. But mixed together in the air’s cross-
breeze, these smells sum to a shorthand for freshness (53).  
When Laura enjoys the smell of spring from inside this cherished space, she is neither 
sequestered nor safe. The seemingly innocent breeze bears with it all manner of chemicals, 
including grotesque and potentially dangerous “Organosphosphates,” a coldly scientific 
word that overturns the cozy, domestic imagery of scented lilacs and magnolias referenced 
earlier. In Robinson and Erdrich, homes left open to the elements metaphorize forms of 
freedom and expansiveness. In Housekeeping, especially, open windows signify a kind of 
bravery—Sylvie’s refusal to be conventionally female. In Gain, however, the same image 
signifies danger. The penetration of the home by a jumble of natural and synthetic 
chemicals, from locations near and far, is particularly alarming for its mundaneness. They 
simply slip “over the fence” (53). The very ordinariness of the situation makes it all the 
more frightening. The passage demonstrates one way the novel develops its dark vision of 
interconnectedness: by depicting toxins as invisible home invaders, Powers establishes that 
openness is a liability.  
Probably the only site more associated with privacy and security than one’s home is 
one’s body, and the second way Gain suggests the dangers of interconnection is by 
depicting bodies unwittingly under siege. In the passage about the seemingly fresh spring 
  
137
breeze, Laura worries that “Someone might walk into her unguarded house and pillage it. 
Might pull up in a Mayflower van, posing as professional movers…Banks or the 
government might exercise eminent domain” (54). Appearing directly after a catalog of 
chemicals and a reference to Laura’s biopsy wound, the language here implies that Laura’s 
body is its own kind of “unguarded house.” Laura is helpless against the entrance of 
chemical invaders; they slip easily past her defenses and make themselves at home. The 
laundry list of omnipresent smells ranging from decaf coffee to cat litter have indicated that 
this is not a unique event: all manner of chemicals have been crossing her body’s barriers 
for as long as she has been alive. Laura’s bodily integrity is not so much comprised as it has 
never existed. This collapse of clear identity boundaries is depicted as a perilous form of 
vulnerability. The imagery of intrusion and takeover—of thieves entering by masquerading 
as movers and of powerful entities pushing out the original homeowner—also presages the 
discovery that Laura does in fact have cancer. Malignant cells disguising themselves as 
healthy ones have spread throughout her body, declaring their own eminent domain. 
It might appear that in this passage, Powers is eliding the significance of Laura’s 
body by projecting threats to autonomy and safety onto the home rather than explicitly 
detailing how toxins infiltrate the physical self. However, staying focused on the home 
usefully reflects Laura’s own perspective: early in the novel, Laura rarely considers how 
embodiment means exposure. The dramatic irony means that unlike Laura, the reader 
realizes that the body is always at the center of things. Laura can only perceive the 
distinctive scent of this breeze because actual molecules physically enter her body and send 
signals to her brain—although they are invisible to her, and she is unconscious of their 
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existence. The passage highlights how alarming and yet how quotidian it is to be subjected 
to the penetration of one’s physical barriers without one’s knowledge or consent. Laura 
might not yet recognize the extent of her vulnerability, but the readers are already intuiting 
that like the home, the body is a border that is too easily crossed.  
This frightening collapse of boundaries between one’s body and one’s environment 
is enabled by another form of fluidity: the indistinguishability of chemicals from each other. 
The narrator informs us that the scent in Laura’s home is comprised of ozone and 
adhesives and gerbil food. He even knows the concentration, at “two parts per billion” (53). 
But for mere mortals like Laura the scents are blended together too intimately to discern 
what is what; as the scents are “mixed together” in the “cross-breeze,” they all blend into 
one another and “sum to a shorthand to freshness” (53). It is the blending that is especially 
menacing. The indistinguishability of supposedly discrete elements is a source of 
endangerment. Even if we become aware that toxins may lurk in our air, we have no way of 
separating things out enough to discern where the danger lurks: with the innocuous comes 
the noxious, and there is no way to judge. In Erdrich and Robinson, border-crossings 
gather speed as they go along: they build on each other, culminating in more 
comprehensively fluid boundaries. In their work, this is most often figured as a welcome 
phenomenon, a gathering of subversive forms of being. In Gain, too, one form of identity 
collapse builds on another one, but this buildup of effects is not welcome. 
As this key passage demonstrates, early in the novel, even before Laura’s diagnosis, 
Powers is developing the trope of dangerous permeability. Variations on the trope follow. 
As Laura’s cancer progresses, the rhetoric shifts from establishing openness as a liability to 
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also exploring the body’s alterability by whatever invades. The novel widens our sense of 
where toxicity might come from and how agential it might be, and the language becomes 
increasingly gothic. When Janine, an African American woman distributing religious 
pamphlets, comes to Laura’s door, she tells Laura that her own husband died of cancer—
“Jimmy,” she says, worked in “Operations and Maintenance” at Clare (215). He “was 
handling that stuff all the time. Chloro this and ethylene that. Pouring out paint cans full of 
solvent…Half those men are sick with something or other now” (215). The name Clare is 
deeply ironized: instead of the clarity and purity the company wants the name to evoke, 
Janine associates it with murky, obscure threats.  
These are threats that spread through the world. When Laura protests that she 
never worked for Clare, Janine responds “I think it’s in the air and in the water, and now 
it’s in the ground. Builds up in the food. Every year a little more. You don’t have to work 
for them. They’ll come to you. You don’t even have to live in town” (216). From “Chloro 
this and ethylene that” Janine’s language grows even more vague, granting this unspecified 
chemical threat the complete and monstrous anonymity of “it.” In Janine’s telling, the 
invading threats are simultaneously enormous and invisible and unnamable; only the 
traumatic alterations to the body testify to their potent existence.  
Janine is one of several powerful voices proselytizing about how Laura’s very cells 
may have been infiltrated and compromised. Elsewhere, Laura’s ex-husband Don explains 
to Laura that “one theory” about ovarian cancer “is that certain ring-shaped molecules…get 
taken up into the tissue of women….These fake estrogens somehow trick the body, signal 
the reproductive system to start massive cell division” (363). Compared with Janine, Don is 
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seemingly a more authoritative and scientifically literate interlocutor, sprinkling his 
explanations with technical terms and references to his inside “sources” of epidemiological 
information. But his rhetoric draws its force from images of trespass and transformation 
that are consistent with Janine’s folksier characterization of environmental hazards (364).  
The novel’s rhetoric of ingestion, too, suggests the grotesque consequences of the 
body’s absorbency. We are what we eat, and Laura and her children are avid consumers of 
comestibles that are barely recognizable as food. A shopping trip produces whole catalogs 
of strange foodstuffs: “corn dogs that Tim eats…right out of the pouch…nonstick 
polyunsaturated maize oil spray…squeezable enriched vegetable paste” (27). Powers 
augments the oddity of these products by giving many of them inane names ranging from 
peanut sheets to Cool Juice and skip-dippers (31, 32). These appellations are just 
embroidered enough to make the products seem more like alien invaders into our bodies 
than a form of nourishment. The novel contrasts the repulsiveness of taking these things 
into our bloodstreams with the casualness with which they are ingested, as in one scene 
where descriptions of consuming processed “harvest burger[s]” and “Thirst-Aid” and 
“loganberry-kiwi seltzer” are sandwiched between Laura’s fretting about her teenagers 
reading inappropriate magazines and playing violent video games (30).  
One reviewer of the novel, assessing Powers’s fondness for cataloguing product 
names, dubs them “digs at modern consumer society” that “bring to mind Don DeLillo at 
his most facile.”173 Other critics have similarly suggested that for Powers, specific bodies are 
not so much his topic as they are a means to critique our contemporary social form—or 
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they go even further, claiming that Gain depicts corporations attaining a body as individuals 
become increasingly disembodied.174 Certainly, consumer society comes under fire in 
Powers, but Gain’s preoccupation with the processed, barely-recognizable foods is better 
understood as part of a larger project: an account of how the body’s vulnerability combines 
with the forces of late capitalism to create illness and disease, rather than merely a “dig” at 
the vacuousness of consumerism.  
Lending support to this claim are the ways in which the passages listing product 
names also deconstruct our tendency to imagine that contemporary culture renders the 
body unimportant. Early in the story, as she unpacks her groceries, Laura still has the 
capacity to imagine that bodies have grown increasingly inconsequential: “At day’s end,” 
she muses, “we’ll all be disembodied. Mobile microcomputer puppets doing our shopping 
and socializing. Human heads pasted onto modem bodies…” (32) These thoughts are likely 
to sound familiar to readers who have heard similar lamentations about how screens are 
making us into zombies, with our senses dulled to the real world. Concerns about how 
technology has disconnected us from the sensuous world are widespread enough that 
“nature-deficit disorder,” Richard Louv’s term for the phenomenon, has achieved wide 
circulation.175 Innovations including agriculture mean that our daily lives are less centered 
on bodily experience—not having to be obsessed with where our next food or water will 
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come from, or not having to be attuned to our senses to avoid predation—though of course, 
this mode of being divorced from nature might be considered a form of freedom. But 
Laura’s postulations that we are in the process of completely transcending embodiment 
become deeply ironic when Laura’s increasingly sick body asserts itself. She is painfully 
reminded of how much she has always, unthinkingly, relied on its health. The risks to the 
body have changed through time, and perhaps too has our awareness of our bodies—but 
embodiment, and the body’s permeability by the environment, are not themselves 
historically contingent. 
Further undermining Laura’s dismissal of the body is the fact that Laura’s 
perspective is not even original: when she talks of a “disembodied” world made possible by 
technology, her words echo Clare Inc.’s advertisements. In one ad late in the novel, for 
instance, Clare intones: “Let a robot do that dangerous welding. Make a thinking machine 
manage those books. It’s a dirty job, but who says some body has to do it? Thanks to 
remarkable changes in human industry, we’re now embarking on a new age of free time 
and opportunity” (374; emphasis in the original). Juxtaposed with Laura’s ailing body, the 
idea that modern industry has freed us from the bondage of embodiment seems especially 
foolhardy. When it comes to the novel’s unflattering depiction of consumer culture, the 
point is not just that the products are ridiculous simulacra and we are absurd for imagining 
that they will satisfy us; it is that their popularity indicates a broader naiveté about our time 
as a post-embodiment era. Gain critiques illusions of disembodiment as a new form of our 
longstanding longing for transcendence. By telling ourselves that we have been released 
from the slings and arrows of material reality, we unjustifiably diminish our sense of risk.  
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The emphasis on Laura’s embodied selfhood and her body’s vulnerability to the 
world suggests how Powers’s novel acts not just as a critique of “daily life in millennial 
America,” as Bawer puts it, but as an instance of toxic discourse, or what Buell calls “the 
rhetoric and ethics of imagined endangerment” (Writing 27).176 As Buell explains, rather 
than thinking about nature in terms of sanctuary (the way “preservationist” rhetoric does) 
or as a set of resources to be managed (the way “conservationist” rhetoric does), toxic 
discourse envisions nature as a set of compulsory and potentially risky connections. As he 
puts it, “the nature that toxic discourse recognizes as the physical environmentno l humans 
inhabit is not a holistic spiritual or biotic community but a network or networks within 
which, on the one hand, humans are biotically imbricated [like it or not]” (45). This toxic 
view of nature is distinct from that of the authors considered in the first two chapters of this 
dissertation. Neither Robinson nor Erdrich characterize nature as an uncomplicatedly 
pristine, pastoral space, but it is nonetheless the case that in their connections to nonhuman 
world, their characters do find something we might call wild, something that offers a 
meaningful and positive contrast to the dominant cultures in which they live. In Powers, by 
contrast, air, water, and soil have become the very things from which the individual might 
wish to escape. Instead of being freed by recognizing our interconnection with the world, 
we experience it as a form of bondage. 
Considering the novel as a form of toxic discourse—specifically, one which explores 
how the body’s inescapable vulnerability combines disastrously with the toxic byproducts of 
global capitalism—clarifies the characterization of its protagonist. Critics have sometimes 
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puzzled over Powers’s choice to depict Laura as relatively passive, even ambivalent. In his 
review of the novel, for example, Mark Shechner calls Laura a “frail and decent” woman 
who “seems, well, dumb.”177 One element that might lead Shechner to such a conclusion is 
Laura’s slowness to acknowledge that her cancer could be Clare’s fault. Some attempt to 
explain Laura’s characterization by suggesting that Don, as her conspiracy-minded ex-
husband, compensates for Laura’s complacency and offers the most meaningful resistance 
to Clare’s power.178 Others argue that Laura does eventually mount her own meaningful 
resistance when she agrees to join a lawsuit against Clare.179 However, if we recognize the 
personal, material form of risk to which Laura is being asked to concede, her reluctance 
makes more sense. Acknowledging the potential environmental causes for her cancer 
means admitting one’s complete vulnerability. If “it” is in the air, the water, the ground, the 
food supply, if “it” will “come to you” wherever you live, there is truly no escape. No longer 
is there any retreat, whether it is home, garden, or body. Far from fueling a healing 
integration or an expansive holism, Gain suggests that recognizing one’s intersections with 
the material world requires acknowledging that there is no respite from danger. It is a hard 
pill to swallow. 
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II. From Blindness to Sight: Powers’s Endorsement of Toxic Awareness  
If our contemporary world is a toxic one—our food suspect, our water 
compromised, even our breezes laden with dangerous chemicals—perhaps this condition 
has been born from ignorance. Perhaps we imagine we are somehow immune from the 
environmental risks we create. Perhaps Laura herself is complicit, in her reluctance to 
acknowledge her body’s insinuation in the world. In that case, a revitalized ecological 
awareness, however difficult, might represent the antidote. Ecocriticism has been 
consistently undergirded by a belief in the value of consciousness-raising. Scott Slovic, for 
instance emphasizes the ethical dimensions of awareness in a way that is characteristic of 
much ecocriticism. “Nature writing,” he claims, “is a ‘literature of hope’ in its assumption 
that the elevation of consciousness may lead to wholesome political change.”180 This 
ascription of awareness as a central goal of environmental writing is both a foundational 
and persistent feature of ecocriticism. In so-called first-wave ecocriticism, the development 
of a deep ecological awareness—what one might call a “web of life” view—was often posited 
as an ethical conversion engendered by good nature writing.181 Ecocritics have adopted 
increasingly skeptical views about these early “nature-endorsing” perspectives, but 
literature’s capacity to spark some form of ecological consciousness remains an idea in 
                                                     
180 Slovic, “Nature Writing and Environmental Psychology,” in The Ecocriticism Reader: 
Landmarks in Literary Ecology, edited by Cheryll Glotfelty and Harold Fromm (Athens, GA: 
University of Georgia Press, 1996), 368.  
181 As Fritjof Capra defines it, deep ecological awareness “is spiritual or religious awareness…the 
individual feels a sense of belonging, of connectedness, to the cosmos as a whole” (The Web of 
Life: A New Scientific Understanding of Living Systems [New York: Anchor Books, 1997] :7). 
Capra’s definition encapsulates deep ecology’s tendency to describe ecological consciousness as a 
pleasant, spiritualized sense of harmony. The implicit morality in such a vision has often been 
made explicit, as in the philosophy of Holmes Rolston III discussed later in the chapter. 
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which ecocriticism is invested.182 Even in Buell’s environmental justice-inspired analysis of 
toxic discourse, with its much less sunny view of what it means to acknowledge one’s 
imbrication in nature, “the shock of awakened perception” is credited as a crucial step 
toward spurring political change (Writing 35). 
These validations of awareness resonate with Richard Powers’s claims about his 
own work. Powers answers questions about his “political” goals for his novels by talking 
about the “awakening in consciousness” he wants to spur; the desire for readers to “come 
to a deeper awareness” as they digest his encyclopedic fictions (LG 116). Gain reflects this 
preoccupation with awareness in two ways. First, the novel depicts its characters as reluctant 
travelers toward truth; second, the novel attempts to position the reader as an active 
participant in process of illumination. 
For illumination to be necessary, blindness must be the default state. All of Gain’s 
characters exhibit naiveté and disengagement, to varying degrees, but it is really Laura, the 
middle-aged Midwestern mom, who typifies the collective blindness of middle-class 
Americans. She likes to imagine herself safe and protected: her home and garden a private 
haven, her body secured from disease and suffering. Even when faced with the death of her 
daughter’s best friend, she imagines it as an aberration: “Funerals are for my mother. I’ll 
never have to do any of this. Look at polio. Look at smallpox. Disease is just a passing 
holdover from when we lived wrong” (13). When it comes to consumption, too, Laura 
exhibits a blissful ignorance typical in our specialized economy. She buys products with 
                                                     
182 I refer to Kate Soper’s distinction between “nature-endorsing” and “nature skeptical” views, 
which is explored in What Is Nature?: Culture, Politics, and the Non-Human (Oxford, Cambridge, 
MA: Blackwell, 1998). 
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little knowledge about their modes of production, or even what they contain.   When she 
visits the supermarket, the sight of farmers fills her with a “vague shame”; their presence in 
Lacewood, with its “billion-dollar money machine,” seems “odd” and incongruous (27). 
These farmers, who live only a few miles away, seem to her like “a Stone Age tribe,” out of 
step with her own modernity. She labels their work “indispensable,” but she senses only 
vaguely to what degree her existence is entangled with theirs—and to what degree Clare, that 
shiny “money machine,” is actually wrapped up in the very agribusiness she has deemed 
incompatible with Clare’s modern image (27). Laura lives a comfortable life, predicated on 
her ability to remain relatively distanced from the very conditions that make her life 
comfortable.  
Gain acknowledges that corporate culture actively seeks to shield consumers from 
the full truth about the realities of production, health risks, and environmental costs. The 
spin-filled Clare advertisements and public relations announcements peppered throughout 
the novel especially testify to this, in their massaging of the truth and their slick 
manipulation of people’s anxieties and desires. But there is also another factor: like most 
consumers, Laura has not wanted to look too hard. Just as the Clare sons push aside their 
ethical qualms when faced with the siren song of incorporation and its promise of “gain 
without risk, benefit without cost,” Laura’s complacency is a form of self-delusion for the 
sake of ease (240). She tells herself that as a consumer, “All she can do is take” (27). She is 
hardly unique: even ever-curious Don sometimes finds it is easier not to see, as when it 
comes to the question of why the artificial lake in front of Clare Inc. never freezes. “Years 
ago,” the narrator informs us, “he used to wonder about it. Did heat from the plant keep it 
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clear? Proximity to all those people and machines? Some kind of thermal runoff?” (287) 
Don “liked to come up with different explanations, each more ingenious than the last. But 
nobody could tell him whether he was getting warmer or colder. At some point, he simply 
stopped wondering about it” (287). Partly from frustration and partly from ennui, Don 
simply stops seeing the lake in any critical way. The novel describes the lake’s refusal to 
freeze as “A classic joke around town,” suggesting that Don’s response is the usual one 
(287).  
Despite the barriers to knowledge, and the reasons why characters might prefer to 
stay blissfully ignorant, Gain depicts cancer as finally catalyzing Laura’s nascent awareness 
of interconnection, especially when it comes to her body’s inseparability from her 
surroundings. The increasing outrages of cancer treatment estrange her from her own body 
in a way that makes her wonder whether it has ever fully been her own; chemotherapy 
convinces her that “No one really knows their real body…No one knows what food really 
smells like” (129). What she learns about chemicals and disease further imperil her sense 
of individualism and privacy. Catalogs of potentially toxic products convey Laura’s sense of 
inundation: “Garden sprays. Cooking oils. Cat litter. Dandruff shampoo. Art supplies. 
Varnish. Deodorant. Moisturizers. Concealers. Water. Air” (323). In the end, she 
concludes, “nothing is safe. We are surrounded” (323). Laura now echoes the narrator’s 
rhetoric of the body under siege; her earlier vague worries about home invasion have 
transformed into specific concerns about how foreign matter infiltrates her body. As Laura 
learns more about the pervasive, potentially toxic products of global capitalism, she is 
becoming more like the narrator, and her voice more often becomes conflated with his.  
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By the end of the novel, as Laura lays dying, she avers that “A little space”—in this 
case the withdrawal of her kids into the hall for a moment—is “all the myth of the private 
that’s left to anyone” (392). This innocuous line gains significance by its thematic 
consistency with other passages demonstrating the incapacity for any body to remain 
separate from the rest of the world. In a pamphlet about the causes of cancer, Laura reads 
the admonition: “Don’t expose yourself to toxic chemicals at home or at work” (323). 
Given what she has learned about the ubiquitousness of toxicity, Laura is chagrined at the 
way the brochure attempts to offload responsibility for environmental toxicity onto the 
individual consumer. “There’s the catch,” she reflects, “They might as well say: Don’t get 
cancer” (323). She protests, “Well she hasn’t exposed herself. She hasn’t, knowingly or 
otherwise, as far as she knows” (323). Furthermore, “She hasn’t even been exposed. No 
Love Canal under the house. No Three Mile Island just across the river. Whatever she’s 
getting by chance or proximity is no more than anyone else in the known world is getting” 
(323). The repetitive and circular musing on “exposure”—whether she has exposed herself, 
whether she knows herself to have been exposed, whether exposure has happened to her—
underscores Laura’s shift in consciousness. She resents the pamphlet’s misleading 
emphasis on exposure because she recognizes that exposure is not a special or unique 
event—indeed, exposure’s opposite, enclosure, never existed.  
Laura has gained a contemporary form of ecological consciousness, a toxic 
selfhood: she acknowledges her inherent interconnection with the natural world; but more 
than that, she recognizes that in a heavily industrialized, global society, the risks involved in 
interconnection have changed and become harder to understand. Laura reflects with scorn 
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on her earlier “fantasy” that she could go “clean. Cold turkey” and buy only goods that are 
“above reproof” (323). After all, even if she could do so, “every plastic bottle of water she 
bought would just spew poisons somewhere else” (323). In a toxic world, we cannot change 
our fundamental vulnerability; protecting oneself only means redistributing the risk 
elsewhere.  
Cancer shifts Laura’s perspective significantly, but according to Powers, Laura’s 
story is secondary to the larger goal: to spark the reader’s awareness. In one interview, 
Powers muses, “I hoped that Laura's gradual awakening in consciousness following her 
cancer would strike the reader as too little, too late, thereby producing a dramatic 
discomfort that might encourage the reader to complete the steps that this woman had 
begun” (LG 111). The gap between what Laura knows and what she needs to know is 
intended to provoke in the reader a “dramatic discomfort” that will encourage the reader to 
“come to a deeper awareness of the material causes that control the terms of our existence, 
and to reach a more nuanced awareness of the myths that she has been asked to buy into” 
(LG 111). Powers contrasts Laura’s modest “awakening” with what the more sophisticated 
view he hopes readers will achieve. Powers does not state exactly how readers are meant to 
obtain this deeper awareness, but across his fiction, he uses two-stranded narrative 
structures aim to widen what a single, linear plotline focused on one protagonist can tell us. 
In Galatea 2.2, for instance, one plot about an author’s experiments with artificial 
intelligence is offset with a story of a past love affair, and in The Echo Maker, 
representations of the annual sandhill crane migration are paired with a jumbled, messy 
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exploration of the brain.183 And in Gain, it is the coupling of Laura’s story with the Clare 
narrative that allows readers the benefit of access to something that Laura herself does not: 
an inside perspective about the forces behind Clare and a birds’ eye view of largescale 
historical and social changes.  
The pairing of narrative strands allows Powers to augment Laura’s dawning 
reservations about the “myths” and “material causes” that “control the terms of our 
existence.” An excellent example is the way the larger narrative repeatedly builds on 
Laura’s insights about the illusoriness of privacy, taking her intuitions and putting them into 
a far broader historical and social context. For one excellent example, we can look to the 
juxtaposition between Laura’s death and the subsequent scene. As I have mentioned 
before, Laura’s death is described in terms of an abandoned privacy, which connects this 
passage with the others wherein Laura recognizes that her supposedly autonomous 
existence has always been an illusion: “The kids slip down the hall, leaving Don alone with 
her for a minute. A little space, all the myth of the private that’s left to anyone. ‘Lo,’ he 
says, ‘La. I love you?’ Who knows what she hears” (393). From this somber domestic 
scene, contained within one sterile hospital room, the novel zooms out to a dynamic, 
imperious depiction of how a camera gets made: “It all starts in sun,” begins this tale of the 
networked, interconnected, global processes of production. This fairytale opening is 
followed by a description of how light is transformed by trees into energy that allows them 
to grow, and trees become timber mixed together with dozens of compounds in 
                                                     
183 Richard Powers, Galatea 2.2 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1995) and The Echo Maker 
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006). 
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“enormous chemical vats,” and on and on until it all adds up to an instant camera, a 
“wonder” that is also “cheap enough to jettison” (396).  
After pages detailing the history of this object, the reader suddenly realizes that this 
instant camera, forgotten in a hospital room, belonged to Laura, for on it are pictures of “A 
girl sowing a garden. The Million Dollar Movers Club, dropping by with chocolate and 
flowers. A woman blowing out the candles on a cake, the IV just visible beneath the sleeve 
on her robe” (396). This cosmopolitan camera enriches Laura’s reflections on privacy a 
few pages earlier: in a more comprehensive and visually dramatic way, it too testifies that 
Laura’s life was never fully her own. Even the insignificant and easy-forgotten camera used 
in Laura’s last months incorporated her into the life stories of thousands of other humans, 
animals, and objects.  
The passage describes the interactions between these transformed materials—
plastics, straw, nickel, cinnabar, materials from every imaginable locale on earth—as “the 
most heavily choreographed conference in existence” (396). The language of relationships 
and surprising interconnections seems to bespeak an ecological sensibility, but in this case 
the dance of cooperation and competition leads not to a flourishing, diverse, ecosystem but 
to a world full of risks--and for Laura, death. Powers’s choice to place this passage right 
after Laura’s death seems designed to further his goal to spur the reader to “reach a more 
nuanced awareness” than Laura herself is able to achieve. Laura’s own shift in 
consciousness is largely focused on the risks of toxic byproducts; only in brief glimpses did 
she sense how inseparable the story of toxicity is from the story of global capitalism. By 
historicizing corporations and connecting their rise to the environmental conditions that 
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put Laura at risk, Powers suggests that business history is always already a form of toxic 
discourse.  
The most dramatic example of how the Clare narrative extends the ramifications of 
Laura’s story is found in the story of how Clare “goes green.” Clare’s image has been 
tarnished by the company’s association with defoliant used in the Vietnam War, and its 
CEO comes up with a surefire way to revitalize its public image: rebrand as eco-friendly. 
“To the consumer,” the narrator informs us, “Clare sold ecology in all sizes” (386). The 
company builds an “extremely popular” line of products cleverly named “Environomic,” a 
moniker that suggests there is no tension between economic and ecological health (386). 
Clare scientists invent the “first ever Environmentally Responsible polyurethane, marketed 
by an irresistible parrot who flew about the fume-free cans croaking ‘Pretty Polly’” (386). 
These are examples of the “saving genius” of Frank Kennibar, Clare’s CEO (386). He 
recognizes that “anything—anything at all—could become good business…Green, too, was a 
need” (386). When Kennibar recognizes that green is “a need,” he is speaking not of 
legitimately sustainable products but of the consumer perception that his choices are eco-
friendly. In fact, the actual material products change but little, as “[Clare] continued to 
make new things or at least new packages” (387). The superficiality of what constitutes a so-
called green product is apparent, given that what is new is primarily the packaging and the 
marketing, not the products themselves or their modes of production.  
Clare has found an elegant solution to its problem: capitalize on its own sins. The 
company begins to make “Solva, a laundry detergent for acid-rain-damaged clothes” (387). 
It sets up the “Cow’s Common Farms subsidiary, to make and sell health foods to 
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conscientious label-readers who would never have bought from a multinational 
conglomerate” (387). The fume-free cans that Pretty Polly markets explicitly gain their 
appeal in the context of Clare’s previous, fume-filled and ozone-depleting products, and 
the acid rain caused in part by pollutants released from Clare factories becomes an 
opportunity for Clare to make more money. This commentary expands and enriches 
Laura’s earlier conclusion that buying only goods “above reproof” is unattainable, giving 
the reader a greater sense of the manipulations and machinations that make guilt-free 
consumption nothing more than a pipe dream. 
The omniscient narration most often complements Laura’s perspective, further 
developing her incipient forms of awareness; however, the novel also periodically 
contradicts Laura’s conclusions, especially when it comes to Laura’s conceptualization of 
risk and institutional power. When compared with most examples of toxic discourse—from 
Silent Spring to Erin Brokovich—Laura is unusual in that she begins to perceive the depth 
of human endangerment but resists ascribing responsibility to anyone other than to herself 
for these dangers. When near the end of the novel she tells Don that she still does not want 
to pursue a settlement, she speaks to him from “her face’s withered sheet of muscle” (326). 
Even at this extremity of suffering Laura insists that “She is due nothing. No more than 
anyone else with a body…Everyone who lives here is on her own” (326). Don’s anger at 
Clare contrasts with Laura’s Zen-like acceptance of collective responsibility: in her mind, 
she is simply one of the unlucky ones who has to pay the price for all of us to live so well 
for so long. When a flier promising a thirty-day risk free trial arrives in the mail, she 
“[T]ries to imagine thirty days without risk. Even thirty seconds, with peace of mind…We 
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must be mad; that’s the only possible explanation. Thinking we could housebreak life, beat 
the kinks out of it…Complete, collective, species-wide insanity” (308). Laura’s assessment is 
that “collective” human nature is to blame; that “we” want more than is sustainable. 
“People want everything,” she croaks from her deathbed; “that is their problem” (390).  
Laura, then, conceptualizes risk in thoroughly egalitarian terms. Certainly, our 
endless desires are blameworthy, as Don too realizes when he comments that even a bomb 
won’t stop Clare “Just so long as people want what it does” (292). But the larger narrative 
also suggests that what Laura’s view does not acknowledge are the ways in which the 
distribution of toxicity is unjust. Janine, the woman who brings religious pamphlets to 
Laura’s door, perhaps puts the issue most pithily: “They’re supposed to spread the risks 
around? But they only want to play if they know they can win” (214). Since the reader has 
had significantly more access into Clare’s increasingly manipulative marketing, including 
the ways in which its greenwashing actively confuses consumers, the reader is likely to react 
to Laura’s noble refusal to offload responsibility by wondering: collectively we may have 
created the conditions under which Clare prospers, but are we all really equally 
responsible? And are we really all equally vulnerable? Laura is a white, middle-class 
consumer, and blaming collective desire reflects her personal experience with toxicity. But 
explaining her plight in these terms obscures how environmental risks are distributed in 
unfair and unjust ways—something Janine, as a black, working-class woman knows all too 
well. Laura’s cancer may well be random, but Janine’s husband is part of a group of Clare 
laborers who are now sick. Laura fails to fully acknowledge the insight central to 
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environmental justice: when it comes to the risk and rewards of business, all bodies are not 
equal.184  
I have been emphasizing how Powers’s narrative techniques—the omniscient 
narrator’s spatial and historical breadth, his access to insider knowledge about Clare, and 
the ways in which those features complement and complicate Laura’s own perspective—
embody his intention of guiding the reader’s awareness past that of the novel’s characters, 
but other readers have pointed to precisely these techniques as reasons to fault the novel. 
Foremost among critics skeptical about Powers’s novelistic approach is Heise. Heise 
critiques Powers for placing “high modernist fragments”—advertising clips, legal documents, 
and other snippets about Clare Inc.—into “an omniscient narration that provides the reader 
with just the kind of overarching and authoritative information that is usually not available 
in Manhattan Transfer, Ulysses, or Berlin Alexanderplatz” (174-175). In her view, Powers 
problematically undermines the “shock, surprise, and disorientation” of narrative collage 
by using an omniscient narrator that “restores context, control, and orientation to the 
reader” (175-177). Thus, says Heise, Powers’s narrative techniques undermine his central 
goal, to portray “individual powerlessness vis-à-vis…global power networks” (177).  But to 
argue this is to miss what, as I’m arguing, Powers is really attempting to do: not so much to 
convince individuals of their helplessness in the face of global capitalism as to historicize 
the corporation and portray the complexities of responsibility for our modern forms of 
                                                     
184 See, for instance, the work of Robert Bullard. His Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and 
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risk. Moreover, as I’ll now suggest, however much the omniscient narrator widens the 
scope of what can be known in terms of both space and time, it does not ultimately 
convince readers of the possibility of fully comprehending the global.  
The story of Clare’s incorporation crystallizes how Powers’s narrative voice wields 
great knowledge and control and simultaneously undermines the reader’s trust of this 
godlike position. The narrator explains incorporation with a decisive proclamation, saying 
that it: 
propel[led] the Roxbury soap works—and with it, all world history—
into its final, irreversible form. Such was all the nod needed to turn a 
handful of harmless beans into a beanstalk that, in time outgrew the world’s 
terrarium. The limited-liability corporation: the last noble experiment, 
loosing an unknowable outcome upon its beneficiaries (180).  
The narrator’s judgment is clear: the invention and sanctioning of the limited-liability 
corporation should be considered a decisive historical shift, one that in retrospect should 
be understood as a self-imposed burden. The passage is distinctly reminiscent of the 
famous opening anecdote of Rachel Carson’s quintessential toxic narrative, Silent Spring:  
There was once a town in the heart of America where all life 
seemed to be in harmony with its surrounding… Then, one spring, a strange 
blight crept over the area, and everything began to change. Some evil spell 
had settled on the community; mysterious maladies swept the flocks of 
chickens, and the cattle and sheep sickened and died… No witchcraft, no 
enemy action has snuffed out life in this stricken world. The people had 
done it themselves.185 
Like Carson, Power employs an omniscient narrator who speaks in the language of 
fairytale: Carson’s opening line “There once was a…” becomes Powers’s mention of the 
seemingly “harmless beans” from Jack and the Beanstalk. Like Carson, Powers then 
                                                     
185 Carson, Silent Spring, 40th Anniversary ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2002), 1-3.  
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transitions abruptly from fairytale mode to apocalyptic rhetoric. Carson’s green, 
harmonious town becomes a community on which an “evil spell had settled” and 
“mysterious” illnesses prevail; likewise, Powers’s enchanted “terrarium” world becomes a 
doomsday landscape upon which the “unknowable” effects of incorporation have been 
“loos[ed].” Carson’s conclusion, voiced by the narrator, is that “The people had done it 
themselves,” through using pesticides and herbicides that poison the entire food chain. In 
Powers’s toxic narrative, the suggestion, less directly voiced, is that incorporation has 
catalyzed our collective malady. Laura could not extrapolate this interpretation from the 
data available to her—but the reader can, given the narrator’s assistance not only in terms of 
historical information but also in terms of rhetorical strategies that orient the reader in 
relation to that history.  
However, even as Powers relies on the narrator to impart valuable insight to the 
reader, he also problematizes the narrator’s stance. Through his insertion of fairytale 
language into this narrative, Powers signals that the narrator’s perspective—his godlike 
knowledge and quasi-scientific authority—is itself a kind of fantasy. The estrangement of the 
reader from the narrator’s perspective is also amplified by the narrator’s hyperbolic 
persona, which is not only authoritative or confident, but clever in a way that tends to grow 
tiresome. Consider, for instance, this roundabout explanation of Benjamin Clare’s 
depression: “his means and will evaporated more or less in tandem. He lived only to lose 
lucidity, for, lucid, he had lost the point of living” (167). Sentences like this may well 
alienate the reader; the narrator’s persona hardly seems human, much less imitable. His 
intimidating command of knowledge and history seems more likely to disempower the 
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reader than convince her of the accessibility of social systems and the comprehensibility of 
risk.  
In the end, then, I am not convinced that the controlling narration necessarily 
inspires in readers a similar sense of control. Instead it seems likely that the very apparent, 
heavy-handed authority of the narrator will lead readers to conclude that in their real lives—
absent this guiding voice and its assertive rhetoric—they are like Laura, lost in the 
wilderness of information. Gain calls attention to the lengths to which fiction has to go to 
address our blindness. In this way, the larger structure of the novel actually complicates the 
seeming transparency and assurance of the narrator’s language and resists the conclusion 
that contemporary texts must draw on highly experimental media to convey contemporary 
environmental threats. 
III. The Trouble with Awareness 
Scrutinizing the omniscient narrator unearths a strange paradox arising from 
Powers’s narrative structure: while the division between Laura’s story and the history of 
Clare allows for the reader to gain a more nuanced, sophisticated perspective compared 
with the story’s protagonist, the narrative structure also makes evident just how elusive 
comprehensive awareness might be. The way forward for readers is therefore thorny at 
best. As I will suggest in this section, Powers’s novel attempts—but ultimately fails to 
sustain—an uneasy balance between validating awareness and depicting its limitations. Even 
as the novel attempts to tell a story about the importance of awareness, it also undermines 
our sense of how awareness might serve as a rejoinder to corporate power and toxic risk. 
Gain’s tensions and contradictions suggest that Powers is trying to have it both ways: on the 
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one hand, he is deeply reluctant to relinquish the idea that knowledge matters, and 
therefore that stories have profound ethical and political potential; on the other hand, he 
knows that it is not necessarily a lack of knowledge that keeps us from acting how we ought. 
The novel dramatizes that latter point by figuring awakening as a largely painful process, the 
pain of which is largely without payoff.  
In the work of both Robinson and Erdrich, experiences of connection not only 
provide legitimate ecological insight; they also offer a certain measure of healing. In 
Housekeeping, Ruth’s dawning awareness of her imbrication in the wider environment 
helps her reject social pressures to adopt a conventional female identity. In Erdrich’s work, 
moments of expansive relationality pleasurably offset the separations of a fragmented tribal 
community. By contrast, Laura’s new consciousness is fundamentally painful. Laura’s visit 
to the Harvest Fair contains especially vivid depictions of how seeing is a form of suffering. 
“Now that Laura looks,” reads the passage, “it seems a kind of epidemic. Not just that 
packed cancer room at the hospital…Everybody is battling cancer. Why did she never see 
these people before?” (242). Laura perceives a plague that was once invisible to her. 
Everywhere are diseased and dying bodies: “A boy two years younger than Tim…his skin 
an eerie green. The bared, patchy head of a woman hoisting a papoose and swigging apple 
cider…a college-age kid with a backwards ball cap and iodined arms” (242). With Laura’s 
new perception, Lacewood has gone from a pleasant hometown to a dystopia. In this 
context, ignorance would seem preferable to the awful enlightenment brought about by 
“look[ing]” and “see[ing]” (242).  
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As Buell explains, in toxic discourse the rhetoric of a “rude awakening” (in which 
an individual recognizes that instead of a pastoral space he occupies a “world without 
refuge”) typically sets the stage for characters’ antitoxic resistance, in the form of a “moral 
passion cast in a David vs. Goliath scenario” (Writing 37, 38, 40). Accordingly, one might 
expect Laura’s awakening, however painful and disturbing, to be figured as a necessary step 
toward resistance, or what Slovic terms “wholesome political change.” However, the novel 
contains little evidence to support such a reading. On the contrary, the Harvest Fair passage 
presents the opportunity for Laura’s experience to mean something and then snatches it 
away. The other cancer sufferers at the fair are described as comprising a makeshift 
community of sorts—for “they recognize [Laura] too…give her that silent salute, eyes held a 
fraction too long in regrettable kinship” (242). This “secret-society handshake” might have 
served as the first step toward the creation of a kind of coalition, a communal response to 
the profoundly isolating experience of disease, or even the beginnings of a grassroots effort 
to fight back against the potential environmental causes of their shared malady—but here 
the moment is one of superficial connection only.  
Laura remains insistent on the fact that she is in this alone. When a father of a girl 
with leukemia asks Laura to join his support group, Laura demurs. “‘Oh. No thank you,” 
Laura pleads” in response to his invitation (244). Her new sight has no social meaning; 
instead of a productive outcome of suffering, it is represented as merely another insult of 
the disease. Similar moments are peppered throughout the narrative, as when Laura 
laments how her new vision of how deeply corporations have woven themselves into our 
lives even estranges her from her children: “Her own kids now seem like walking 
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billboards to her, their legible clothing proclaiming, Kiss Me, I’m Current, I’m Knowing, 
I’m Pliant, I’m Lost” (346). The insertion of that technically unnecessary word, “own,” 
before “kids” emphasizes Laura’s suffering; even her own flesh and blood have become 
wretched “walking billboards.” 
Instead of the determination of a David up against a Goliath, awakening spurs 
estrangement, disorientation, and ultimately, disengagement. As Laura becomes more and 
more awake to how profoundly the world is one “without refuge,” her sight catalyzes 
paranoia. Laura begins to imagine the ubiquitousness of corporate presence in her life as a 
kind of insect swarm: “It’s as if the floor she walks on suddenly liquefies into a sheet of 
termites….Clare hiding under the sink, swarming her medicine chest, lining the shelves in 
her basement…” (345). This is a classic example of a trope common to toxic discourse, that 
of chemicals assuming a gothic anthropomorphic agency, but it is not accompanied by the 
typical affective transition from “the shock of awakened perception” to the determination 
and hope necessary for activism (Writing 35). Instead, Laura concludes that “her vow” to 
clean her life of toxic Clare products is “hopeless” (345). When thereafter the narrator 
refers to “the newspapers, Don, the lawyers” as being “outraged,” their increasing anger 
contrasts with Laura’s move toward ambivalence (345).  
As Gain’s plot develops, the novel seems increasingly to be deconstructing the 
notion that awareness galvanizes ethical impulses. As Heather Houser points out in her 
book about ecosickness narratives, learning to recognize interconnectedness can actually 
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“derail ethical energies.”186 She explains, “As the connections that wonder generates 
multiply and tip into paranoia and projection…interconnectedness can in fact cut off 
generative relations of care” (81). Houser is writing about a different Powers novel, The 
Echo Maker, but her conclusions might apply equally well to Gain. As Laura’s ability to 
view connections expands, it produces immobilizing affects. Directly after imagining 
chemicals as termites burrowing deeply into her house, Laura glumly concludes that “Every 
hour of her life depends on more corporations than she can count,” and thus ends her last 
attempt to forge an existence discrete from Clare (345). Afterwards, she retains her new 
sight, but without any suggestion of its use: “She never knew what this place really looked 
like while she was living in it. Now that she lives elsewhere, she cannot believe what she 
sees. Once you learn a new word, it’s everywhere. The world is a registered copyright” 
(346). Compared with when she lived in this house innocently, Laura now “lives 
elsewhere”—her whole worldview has been renovated by cancer. But learning a new word 
only means she sees it everywhere, not that she can or will do anything about it. Within 
Laura’s plotline, at least, the seeming ethical potential of her expanded awareness has 
fizzled out.  
Both Robinson and Erdrich gesture toward the ethical implications of 
interconnection; both imply that pleasurable experiences of connection lead to an 
awareness of interdependence that is a superior alternative to the hierarchical vision of 
human exceptionalism it replaces. That is not to say that either author can be read as 
identifying a harmonious holism with moral perfection—indeed, as I argued in Chapter 
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One, Robinson’s novel identifies Ruth’s obsession with forging an extreme version of 
holism as a death wish, and Erdrich demonstrates that conceiving of nonhuman beings as 
relations rather than subhuman others does not guarantee their good treatment, as we saw 
in Chapter Two. Yet for both authors, gaining awareness of interconnection is a profound 
epistemological shift that, while it does not necessarily in itself comprise a fully fleshed out 
environmental ethic, it is at least a precondition to it. In Powers, the link between one’s 
awareness of interconnection and ethics is significantly murkier. In fact, the novel gives us 
good reason to whether there really is such a link at all.  
Powers’s proclamation that Gain’s political purpose comes from how it catalyzes 
the reader’s awareness is further destabilized by the mismatch between the kind of 
awareness Gain might spark versus what is called for by toxicity. As Ulrich Beck points out, 
it is only with “the ‘sensory organs’ of science—theories, experiments, measuring 
instruments” that many modern risks become “visible or interpretable as hazards at all.”187 
Threats like radioactivity, pollutants, and climate change are not directly perceptible; our 
knowledge of them is inherently mediated by experts discussing science which is itself 
uncertain. Beck calls our necessarily indirect and uncertain knowledge of risk “second-
hand non-experience” (71-72). Curiously, Gain registers the exact same point about the 
difficulty of perceiving and judging risk: at several points, the novel represents the 
inadequacy of our senses when it comes to risk, as when Laura’s cancer prognosis can only 
be calculated with “what they call multivariate analysis,” and she bemoans the difficulty of 
understanding what all these numbers mean. “If only numbers were like perfumes,” she 
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laments, “If every probability had its distinct color” (109).  The novel asserts the difficulty 
of judging hazards and determining cause-and-effect. Simply looking harder does not 
necessarily help: after all, even the scientists disagree about what constitutes adequate proof 
that cancer is caused by one chemical or another.  
This points to a fundamental contradiction: while Powers says he wants the reader 
to “complete the steps that [Laura] has begun,” Gain dramatizes Beck’s point that 
laypeople cannot easily theorize risk—and in fact, these risks are difficult even for 
professionals to understand. In other words, Powers seemingly envisions his reader as 
doing more of the same—more of what Laura was doing prior to her death—even as the 
novel dramatizes that a change in degree, rather than kind, will not be enough.  
Powers says that readers are meant to extend what he calls Laura’s “incomplete 
story of awakening,” but he gives us little reason to believe that readers’ experiences will be 
galvanizing in a way that Laura’s never is. It is doubtful that Powers’ readers are better 
positioned toward awareness and agency than Laura herself—a character with significant 
education and cultural capital—except insofar as they have read this book. This hardly 
seems adequate to counteract the novel’s very convincing representations of the logistical 
and affective roadblocks to full awareness, much less meaningful action. Powers seems to 
be expecting from the reader a state of ever-accruing knowledge and constant vigilance. As 
one reviewer pithily puts it, the novel cautions “buyer beware.” 188 But we should note that 
the character within the novel who most closely embodies that position, Don, serves as a 
rejoinder to the efficacy of vigilance. Don pushes himself to always keep his eyes open. He 
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believes that “the world owe[s] him a perpetual explanation…everything ha[s] a secret angle, 
waiting to be figured…” (181). His constant attempts to make the world answer to him are 
exhausting to him and to his loved ones. Reflecting on her divorce, Laura concludes that 
she “got tired of trying to get him to take the world at face value” and it was “Such a relief, 
finally, breaking free. The freedom to breathe, to be ignorant of the worldwide 
conspiracy…” (182) Concluding the book, the reader might feel the same relief.  
In these ways, Gain suggests that more knowledge might actually be considered a 
form of useless suffering rather than the instigator of upright action. The novel provides us 
with a huge amount of information, but simultaneously, through the characterization of 
Laura and Don, makes us wonder whether information brings us any closer to knowing 
what to do. What is all of this knowledge for, in the end?  The issue is of course one with 
pronounced relevance for ecocriticism. Tackling just such a question, environmental 
philosopher Holmes Rolston III reflects a larger tendency in environmentalism and 
ecocriticism (although often going unstated), that awareness has an implicit, even automatic, 
ethical function: 
 What is ethically puzzling and exciting is that an ought is not so 
much derived from an is as discovered simultaneously with it. As we 
progress from descriptions of fauna and flora, of cycles and 
pyramids…planetary opulence and interdependence, to unity and 
harmony…arriving at length at beauty and goodness, it is difficult to say 
where the natural facts leave off and where the natural values appear.189  
Rolston III is specifically positing that knowledge of the harmony of ecological systems, 
when comprehensive enough, spontaneously culminates in moral values. Rolston III’s 
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association of ecology with inherently positive terms like “opulence” and “harmony” is a 
deep ecological viewpoint that has fallen acutely out of fashion. But his philosophical 
position, that when one learns enough or sees properly, one instinctually achieves ethical 
insight, is one with continuing relevance. Gain, as I read it, disquiets this notion.  The 
narrator revels in providing us with an abundance of explanation of what is, but as a whole 
the novel destabilizes the suggestion that there is a clear line from “is” to “ought.”  
The complexities introduced by Powers’s encyclopedic approach to fiction have by 
this point in the chapter begun to come into focus. But of course, Gain is not just 
Infofiction—it is also using a common narrative technique for dramatizing environmental 
toxicity: presenting an individual human body as an analogue for ecological health. I have 
already suggested some of the ways that the sweeping omniscient narration both supports 
and undermines Powers’s stated goal of inducing in the reader a politically relevant 
awareness; I want also to say a brief word about how Powers’s novel also has a troubled 
relationship to the trope of the sick body.  
Materialist ecocritics have celebrated the potential of stories exploring embodied 
experiences of toxicity. Stacy Alaimo, for instance, explores how what she calls “toxic 
memoirs” that give personal accounts of environmental illness may “provoke material, 
trans-corporeal ethics that turn from the disembodied values and ideals of bounded 
individuals toward an attention to situated, evolving practices” (BN 22). In the introduction 
to her book on ecosickness in contemporary writers ranging from David Foster Wallace to 
Leslie Marmon Silko, Heather Houser, too, proposes that the “sickness trope…involve[s] 
readers ethically in our collective bodily and environmental futures,” despite the concern 
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she evinces in her subsequent discussion of The Echo Maker that if awareness of 
interconnection goes too far it end in paranoia rather than a care ethic (3). As prominent 
voices in the material turn, Alaimo and Houser concur that in the face of environmental 
discourse that can be alienating for its abstraction and intellectualism, stories about sick 
bodies insist on the embodied, personal experience of material connections. 
The diseased body trope celebrated by Alaimo and Houser is powerful for its 
simplicity, accessibility, and emotional power, but it has inherent shortcomings as well. 
Greg Garrard argues that while using health provides a “readily understood, emotive way” 
to represent complex matters such as environmental toxicity, it is also fraught with issues—
foremost among them accuracy.190 Human health is tied to environmental health in 
complex ways, and one cannot consider the individual body as a simple synecdoche for 
planetary health. As Garrard puts it, “human health is in myriad ways dependent upon 
ecological health…[but], like the biochemical interaction, competitive or cozy, of the roots 
of fen plants, you will never know just by looking and imagining” (501). If we could rely on 
our intuitions about the world to be correct, science would not need to exist; its purpose is 
to elucidate for us what is non-obvious about the way the world functions. Ecology is “an 
organized admission…that we are, to put it politely, prone to error when we [attempt to find 
patterns in nature]” (501). Felt experience is powerful, but it is no direct access to truth. 
Garrard urges us to remember that “far from conveniently aligning with our discursive 
constructs, ecology is something we are constituted to be likely to be wrong about most of 
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the time” (502). Here we come to the crux of the dilemma: while Gain emphasizes that for 
its characters “looking and imagining” are not enough, these are the very same tools Gain 
offers to the reader. Paradoxically, Gain employs the trope of the sick body while it 
thematizes the shortcomings of this technique. 
Even if we put aside philosophical concerns about the possibility and the ethics of 
awareness, it is far from clear that a newly educated and invigorated reader would find 
pragmatic outlets for action. The difficulty is evident even in Powers’s interviews, where he 
speaks enthusiastically about the political valence of his novel but is tellingly vague about 
what exactly the reader might be compelled to do after turning the last page. Powers affirms 
his desire for the reader to “complete the steps that [Laura] has begun,” but when asked 
“What would those steps be?” he gives little sense of what exactly might be involved, 
talking in rather general terms about readers learning more and asking questions (LG 111). 
The interviewer has to press: “What do you think needs to be done, extrapolating from 
Gain?” (112) Powers responds by again avowing the importance of awareness and the 
possibility of agency: “Connect. Inform yourself…the politics of my writing hover around 
this idea that yes, we have constructed our buildings, but no, they don’t have to construct 
us…If we keep from lying to ourselves” (112). Powers’s eagerness and sincerity about the 
political relevance of his novel is clear, but it is evident why the interviewer has to keep 
asking follow-up questions about what exactly the novel might spur readers to do: Powers’s 
responses are frustratingly nebulous, his language falling into platitudes about connecting 
and being honest.  
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The difficulty of speaking not only about problems, but about solutions, is even 
more starkly apparent in the novel itself. While Powers wants to believe that the novel 
might energize readers to take real-world action, the novel works primarily as a 
deconstruction of evident responses to corporate control and the concomitant ecological 
degradation. Generally speaking, there have been two main types of response to ecological 
crisis: anti-consumerism and scientific/technological optimism. In his discussion of these 
two camps, Richard Kerridge explains their origins and touches on the problems with each. 
Anti-consumerist thinking, he explains, “is likely to have been influenced…by Deep 
Ecological ideas about the need for humanity to…relinquish some traditional aspirations to 
control natural processes.”191 Moreover, “nostalgia plays a part in this alienation from 
consumerism,” as anti-consumer environmentalists look admiringly toward a past when 
people were fewer and lived more lightly (374). By contrast, the second approach places its 
faith in “technological solutions that may also generate ‘green growth’” (374). Proponents 
of inventing our way out of crisis point out that anti-consumerism is politically unpopular; 
furthermore, with few exceptions, “the people who profess the most concern about 
environmental problems have as much difficulty in changing their habits as everyone else” 
(374). Gain addresses these two main perspectives, although sophisticated versions of these 
positions are absent; Powers represents simpler versions of both anti-consumerism and 
technological optimism that have significant credence in American culture—and then lays 
bare their inadequacy. 
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In recounting Clare’s story, Powers establishes that from the beginning, Americans 
have been telling ourselves that the unsavory side effects of industrialization could be 
mitigated by science and technology. After the Civil War, for instance, Ben Clare begins to 
worry about pollution, musing that “Human progress had already taken a considerable toll. 
The very gas lamps that lifted the pall of night also issues a rising tide of coal tar treacle” 
(163). For scientist Ben, this represents an intriguing puzzle. He concludes that “the fault 
lay not in our desires but in our infant chemistry” and optimistically concludes that 
deliverance is at hand: “Who knew what chemistry might emancipate from the fecal paste? 
Just as the manumission of our slave class required terrible, swift slaughter, so might 
humanity as a whole have to pass through a darker valley before ingenuity freed it from 
material bondage” (163-164). The antique-sounding simile is not so different from 
contemporary voices who propose that in our own “darker valley” of pollution, extinction, 
and climate change, our best hope lies in technological innovation. Ben’s cheerful 
assessment is somewhat undermined, though, by the fact that he drives himself mad 
attempting to find a scientific formula that will “free[] the human race from its bodily 
ransom” (166). Moreover, the subsequent century-plus of business and environmental 
history recounted in the Clare narrative suggests that despite the increasingly astonishing 
inventions wrought by science and technology, they cannot keep pace with the crises they 
instigate.  
The novel’s ending serves as a last rejoinder to the optimism that we can invent our 
way out of our muddle. Laura’s son, Tim, joins a research group and devises an algorithm 
to predict how protein sequences will behave, a promising step toward making “a universal 
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chemical assembly plant” that can produce “anything the damaged cell called out for” 
(405). The imagery describing Tim’s algorithm positions the cell as a consumer, and Tim 
as the industrialist who is attempting to assuage the consumer’s desires—comparisons that at 
this point in the novel cannot fail but trouble the reader. The hint that technology and 
science are merely another instantiation of consumer desire and capitalistic production 
subsequently becomes explicit when Tim suggests they draw on his Clare settlement 
money: “The sum had been compounding forever, waiting for a chance to revenge its 
earning…Tim suggested that it might be time for the little group of them to incorporate” 
(405). Given the novel’s by-now well-developed comparison between capitalism’s pursuit of 
endless growth and cancer, the reference to Tim’s settlement as that which has been 
“compounding forever” hints ominously that instead of wreaking revenge on the system, 
Tim is being reincorporated into it. Tim’s invention is looped back into the fundamental 
problems of corporate capitalism already established by the novel: the pursuit of endless 
growth that the novel suggests is a similarity between cancer and capitalism, but also the 
diffusion of responsibility involved in a limited-liability corporation, which in practice 
amounts to a green light for corporations to do anything they like. In this way, the novel 
exhibits significant skepticism that science and technology offer us a way out. 
Gain’s skepticism toward a technological solution to environmental degradation is 
joined by an equally jaundiced view on nostalgic anti-consumerism, which becomes 
apparent in several key scenes that satirize the tendency to view “natural” as synonymous 
with pure and healthy. When a cancer-ridden Laura receives chemotherapy, the nurse tells 
her that the chemical they use is extracted from tree bark—all natural!—and Laura 
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cheerfully reflects, “How can tree bark hurt you? Tree bark is 100 percent natural. The 
Native Americans used to make all sorts of things out of tree bark” (126). Laura’s 
subsequent reactions testify that traditional does not mean gentle, and natural does not 
mean benign. “The completely natural toxin is set to drop into her for the next twenty-four 
hours,” the narrator announces; soon thereafter he flatly reports that “By 7 p.m., bliss is 
gone” (126). In its place is pain, delirium, and a dizzying list of new chemicals intended to 
offset the negative effects of the ones she has previously ingested. The passage is 
complemented by many others in which back-to-nature rhetoric is disabused as profoundly 
naive, as when new-Age types counsel Laura that positive thinking is better than drugs, or 
push herbal remedies that “boost your immunity system” (152). In an ironic twist, the 
woman who gives Laura those immunity-boosting remedies, seemingly as part of her 
rejection of the big money of pharma and Western medicine, turns out to be part of an 
Amway scheme. Powers presents readers with a frightening catch 22: while chemicals might 
have gotten Laura into this mess, evincing a back-to-nature mindset neither assures health 
nor escapes corporate consumerism. 
Clare’s history, too, criticizes several variations on back-to-the-land rhetoric by 
portraying how the corporate machine capitalizes on just these kinds of narratives. The first 
is the romanticized vision of Native Americans communing with Nature. The narrator 
explains how in the 1840s, as an anti-industrial sentiment takes hold in American culture—a 
“widespread disenchantment” with “manufactured sorcery”—so too does a picture of the 
tragic noble Indian who lived “in harmony with the measureless tangles of life” (132, 131). 
The same nation that “footed the $30 million bill for Jessup and Taylor’s extermination of 
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the Sac and Fox and Seminole” now yearns for the “Indian’s Arcadia” that they have 
destroyed (132). The Clare brothers turn this backlash against business into a business 
opportunity, inventing “Native Balm” soap, invested with a vaguely medicinal smell, 
stamped with the image of a “noble Brave” (134). Employing the unofficial tagline, “The 
Red Man never worried about his skin,” Clare peddles this vision of purification and 
primitivism, selling ream upon ream of “Native Balm” soap to the very consumers who in 
theory oppose everything Clare stands for. Advertising takes the notion of living closer to 
nature, capitalizes on it, and reifies it, creating an endless loop of profitability. When in the 
twentieth century, Laura imagines that her tree-bark chemotherapy drugs must be gentler 
because the Native American tribes used just such an ingredient, she echoes the very ideas 
that Clare used to promote its soap. The connection exhibits the perniciousness of the 
“ecological Indian” myth while demonstrating that contemporary notions about all-natural 
products are as superficial as their predecessors.  
A similar phenomenon occurs in relation to agrarianism. In one advertisement, we 
see how Clare trades on notions of Protestant work ethic and the Midwest as America’s 
heartland: 
In the quiet, meandering Sawgak Valley in rural Illinois, the people 
love the land they work so fiercely…faith and effort combine to keep the 
region as fortunate as any place…Clare has more than twenty production 
facilities on every major landmass but the icy ones…As corporate bodies go, 
ours has grown beyond belief in this short century. But however big a body 
gets, there’s still no place like home (157-158). 
Again, nostalgia plays the key role here. Despite its sprawling size, we are encouraged to 
identify Clare with traditional values, with quaintness, with home. Clare paints itself as living 
in harmony with the rhythms of nature, just like the community full of simple folks who 
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“love the land they work so fiercely.” The advertisement humanizes the corporate body by 
projecting itself onto the physical bodies of locals. As Clare sells its products to the rest of 
the world, in part what they are selling is this vision of America. The emptiness of this 
gesture is clear when at the end of the novel the Sawgak Valley is abandoned for a 
machiladora in Mexico, and Lacewood is left economically devastated.  
Neither the vision of ecological sainthood offered by Native Americans nor 
agrarianism offer valid modes of response to the toxic power of the corporation. Nor are 
they legitimately environmental positions, since they actually abet further consumption and 
exploitation of resources. Gain, that is, develops Simon Estok’s point that “Fetishizing 
[nature] doesn’t free it from misuse but encourages and facilitates such misuse.”192 Vague, 
nostalgic nature worship is worse than useless. Perhaps a more precise, historicized form of 
anti-consumerism might in fact constitute a powerful form of opposition to a wasteful 
culture; perhaps there are forms of scientific and technological progress that would escape 
the worst of corporatism’s ills. But Gain gives us little sense of what those positions might 
look like. In the end, then, despite Powers’s insistence on awareness as the central point of 
the novel, the novel both undermines our sense of the achievability of a meaningful 
awareness and deconstructs our sense of how knowledge might be applied.  
*** 
The mismatch between Powers’s vision and his novel itself is not inherently 
problematic. Writers should not be depended on to be critics of their own work, and 
Powers has no obligation to write any particular kind of novel. But the ways in which Gain 
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itself does not fulfill Powers’s descriptions of it are intriguing ones. Gain gives the lie to 
Powers’s sunny assessment of how easily sweetness and light get along in literature. The 
novel demonstrates the difficulty of doing justice to both within the confines of one 
consistent, harmonious work of art. 
As a writer of fiction, Powers can be cerebral to a fault, as critics have often noted. 
Gain sometimes subordinates convincing character development to the story’s message in a 
way that flaws the work. Do we really believe that Laura asks herself: “What rises or falls in 
the country of human ransom when a fireproof safe goes up in smoke or a coffee maker 
arrives in the mail? How do insurance companies decide how much to give you when 
starting you up again from scratch? How often can you start from scratch? And what about 
stopping from scratch?” (54) (One might wonder whether this is really supposed to be the 
narrator’s voice rather than Laura’s, except that the narrator spells out that “She [Laura] 
asks herself these questions” [54]). These rhetorical questions are expedient for Powers’s 
novel of ideas, but they hardly seem to comprise a realistic internal monologue for this real-
estate agent and mom. Similarly awkward moments pepper the narrative.  
The choice to periodically lend to Laura a surprising trenchancy does have one 
great advantage: it means that Laura recognizes that keeping herself safe will not be as 
simple as buying better products or investing in an air purifier for her house. This position 
might be considered to in itself offer a kind of ethics. Catriona Sandilands, for instance, 
criticizes how environmental discourses around health compel individuals to police 
themselves, pursuing both “personal” and “planetary salvation” by monitoring their 
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behavior and “cultivating a ‘natural’ body striving to be ‘free’ of corrupting toxins.”193 The 
ecological subject “submits to an increasingly abstract and rarefied understanding of 
environmental degradation, an increasingly codified discourse of environmental health, and 
an increasingly intricate and intrusive code of ecological behaviors” (21). In so doing, our 
actions add up not to true change but are instead part of a “slightly greener shade of 
capitalist accumulation” (19). Sandilands’s worries parallel Alaimo’s concern about how a 
“recognition of the risks of trans-corporeal exchanges” can engender “psychological, 
political, and material boundary practices aimed at protecting individuals from the world” 
(BN 11). Alaimo concludes that “Despite their green wrappings, environmental health 
practices at their most solipsistic are reminiscent of a bomb shelter mentality in which we, 
the fortunate few, attempt to save ourselves” (111). Laura refuses to conduct this kind of 
border patrol, and Powers’s novel avoids feeding the reader the illusion that what 
Sandilands calls “skin vigilance” is a solution for personal or ecological health. 
In my estimation, though, Laura’s characterization creates larger conceptual 
problems than it solves. Whereas Laura is a problematically uneven character, Clare Inc. 
emerges as the most compelling, dynamic, and vivacious persona in the book. Gain aims to 
critique how we ascribe to corporations human rights and human personalities, but its 
somewhat limp characters can also make individual humans seem old-fashioned and 
inadequate. As Bruce Bawer has commented, “Powers, alas, seems to have trouble 
resisting the urge to reduce people to his ideas about them—a surprising flaw in a novelist 
whose chief theme is the dehumanization of Americans by corporations” (“Bad 
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Company”). Perhaps, then, the problem with Gain is not, as Heise has it, that Powers’s 
toxic discourse is not experimental enough—but that the realist aspects of his narration fall 
short. The instances when Laura serves as an authorial mouthpiece undermine the novel’s 
success as fiction; in ethical terms, too, Laura’s position is ultimately unsatisfying. Laura’s 
rejection of purification practices might be driven either by sophistication—or by despair. 
That both positions should have the same ultimate effect should trouble us. Sandilands and 
Alaimo set up a contrast between boundary practices and meaningful, substantive 
environmentalist positions—but Gain underscores that rejecting one does not necessarily 
mean embracing the other. Skin vigilance is problematic in that it channels our energies 
away from structural and institutional changes that would do the most planetary good, but 
Laura’s story demonstrates that accepting one’s dangerous interconnectedness does not in 
itself constitute a sufficient ethics. 
In dramatizing that concern is not automatically converted to care, Gain does 
perform an incisive ecological critique. Simultaneously, however, Powers’s determination 
to avoid all manner of naïve positions also means that the books closes off evident 
possibilities for intervention; it drives fear with no apparent outlet. We might well wonder 
whether ecocriticism, as it increasingly embraces negativity, irony, and darkness, risks doing 
the same thing. As Garrard muses,  
Unsparing critique of concepts and rhetorics, without which one 
cannot, at the same time, speak or think, is perhaps a decent shorthand 
summary of deconstruction. If so, all serious ecocriticism would be 
deconstructive. On the other hand, I’m haunted by the question Scott 
Slovic kept asking of an essay I wrote criticizing place-based ecocritical 
pedagogy: What would you do?...I can testify [that] the destruction-testing 
phase is always more exciting and impressive than the constructive one. As a 
result, we risk leaving no tools in the box (509). 
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Like Powers, we have become awfully good at identifying and deconstructing naïve 
solutions. But as Gain demonstrates, awareness without the capacity to apply that awareness 
is no more than suffering—like Laura’s new toxic sight at the Harvest Fair. We are 
wrenched from the illusion of safety to a perception of risk, but with no promise that our 
burdensome insight means anything at all. Unexpectedly, then, Gain’s greatest relevance 
for ecocriticism might actually emerge from the very ways in which it falls short as an 
ecological novel. 
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